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ABSTRACT
This study provides an historical analysis of the Chicago Public School
Desegregation Consent Decree, while illustrating its relationship with the Brown v. Board
of 1954. It provides an analysis of the mission and objectives of all three versions of the
Consent Decree which include: The Original Consent Decree 1980, The Modified
Consent Decree 2004, and The Second Amended Decree 2006. The study also provides
an account of the Brown v. Board case of 1954, defining the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the conduits between the
landmark case and the Chicago Public School Desegregation Consent Decree.
The dissertation answers five questions; the discriminatory practices responsible
for the Consent Decrees origin, the goals established within the Consent Decree, the
strategies used to implement the Consent Decree’s goals, the supports and obstacles that
affected the implementation of the Consent Decree, and the effect of the Consent
Decree’s implementation on current and future leaders.
The Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual, official reports of the proceedings of
the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, and transcripts from the signing of the
Original, Modified, and Second Amended versions of the Consent Decree served as
valuable primary resources to support this study. Court transcripts from the Brown v.
Board court case assisted in establishing the relationship between the landmark case and
the Chicago Public School Desegregation Consent Decree.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Dating back to the signing of The United States Constitution in 1776, the United
States endorsed practices that alienated individuals based on their differences. Even
before the actions of our forefathers, America’s mistreatment of individuals perceived to
be different from the majority is well documented. The practice of slavery best illustrates
America’s commitment to its segregative mentality.
Although slavery played an important role in the building of the United States, it
did so with a price.1 From the early 1600’s when America imported its first slaves from
Africa, to the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, the practice of slavery oppressed
generations of Black people while creating wealth for American slave owners.2 The Civil
War ended in 1865, and although slavery was abolished through the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, there were those who still resisted the notion of not owning
slaves.3

1

James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Slavery and the Making of America (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7.
2

Ibid.

3

Harvey Fireside, Separate and Unequal (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005), 10.

1

2
The ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments worked to eliminate
the last remnants of slavery by giving Blacks citizenship and the right to vote.4 Despite
these efforts there were still barriers that hindered the ability for Blacks to be treated
equally. In the late 1800’s, Blacks found themselves still being alienated although slavery
was no longer in existence. In 1890, the state of Louisiana passed the Separate Car Law,
making it illegal for Blacks and Whites to ride in the same rail car.5 This would soon
serve as the catalyst of a larger movement, wherein Blacks began to question if their
rights were being violated.6 These feelings would later manifest themselves in the Plessy
v. Ferguson case of 1896.
The Plessy v. Ferguson case attempted to challenge the premise set forth in the
Separate Car Act, which established the separation of individuals because of their race.7
The outcome of the Plessy v. Ferguson case was not in the plaintiffs’ favor, with the
courts rendering a decision that established the doctrine “separate but equal” and
legalizing discriminatory practices in America until 1954.8
America’s ideology as it stood with racial integration was no different when it
came to how students were educated. Public schooling in the United States mirrored what
was going on in society by continuously alienating the minority population. A group of
individuals spoke out against the racial injustices being imposed on minorities, creating
4

Ibid, 21.

5

Ibid, 3.

6

Ibid, 20.

7

Ibid, 3.

8

Ibid.

3
in 1909 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).9 In
1930, Nathan Margold developed a plan for the NAACP to eliminate school
segregation.10 The original plan was to sue for equal schools at the elementary and highschool levels.11 Margold’s plan was later modified by NAACP lawyer Charles Houston,
who became the NAACP’s special counsel in 1935.12 Houston believed that focusing
efforts on higher education would be more feasible because the idea of integration would
be met with far less resistance.13 After achieving success in their early discrimination
cases, the NAACP and its group of lawyers decided to take on the idea of segregation
completely.14 The emphasis in all education cases was to create integrated school
settings, rather than attempt to create separate but equal accommodations for students of
different races.15
Ultimately, the most monumental case that came out of this new strategy was the
Brown v. Board of Education case of 1954. The Brown v. Board case actually represented
a total of five cases, all in separate states (D.C., Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia, and

9

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, About the NAACP,
http://www.naacp.org/about/index.htm, accessed February 2009.
10

Richard C. Hunter, “The Administration of Court-Ordered School Desegregation in Urban
School District: The Law Experience,” The Journal of Negro Education 73, no. 3 (2004, Special Issue:
Brown v. Board of Education at 50): 218-229.
11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled
Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21.
15

Ibid.
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Kansas).16 These cases were: Belton (Bulah) v. Gebhart (Delaware), Briggs v. Elliot
(South Carolina), Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia), Bolling v.
Melvin Sharpe (D.C.) and Brown v. Board of Education (Kansas). All of the lawsuits
worked to destroy the practices of racism that had taken over the country’s public school
system.17
The legal arguments in Brown were presented as follows:
1. The initial presentation of the case, which did not allow the justices
sufficient time to consider all of the presented evidence.
The justices were under constant pressure due to the magnitude of the case. It became
difficult to make an informed decision due to pressure from those whom still prescribed
to segregative practices.
2. A second phase, which argued the intentions of the 14th Amendment’s
framers.18
The NAACP lawyers continued to argue the fact that segregative practices violated the
equal protection included in the 14th Amendment. The intended meaning of 14th
Amendment was the subject of great debate throughout the Brown v. Board case.
3. After the court struck down Plessy v. Ferguson (Brown I), a call for a
remedy to segregation was initiated. (Brown II). 19
The original Brown verdict that came down in 1954 finally refuted the “separate but
equal” doctrine established in the Plessy v. Ferguson case. In 1955, the Brown II decision
16

Ibid., 30.

17

Mark Whitman, Removing a Badge of Slavery: The Record of Brown v. Board of Education
(Princeton and New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, Inc. 1993), 15.
18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.
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established that school districts should seek to integrate schools with “all deliberate
speed.”
In 1954, the Brown v. Board I decision finally struck down the decades old
premise that the segregation of races was a constitutional practice. What it did not do was
aggressively hold states and their school districts to a timeline by which the
desegregation process would happen. In 1955, in what was termed Brown II, the court
issued its enforcement decree.20 The courts took this opportunity to ensure the practices
set forth in Brown I would be enforced across the country.
The Brown decision established the idea that the concept of separate but equal
denied individuals of their rights. The Brown decision required school districts to
integrate Black and White students within the same schools in efforts to provide a quality
education for all. This would guarantee that the same effort given to educate Whites
would be given to their non-White counterparts.
Following the Brown v. Board of Education decision, many school systems
entered into judicially supervised Consent Decrees. These Consent Decrees sought to
compel school boards and their officials to desegregate their districts as federal trial
courts retained jurisdiction over the disputes until they fully complied with the terms of
their agreements.21
A Consent Decree is an order of a judge based upon an agreement, almost always
put in writing, between the parties to a lawsuit instead of continuing the case through trial
20

Barbara Loomis Jackson, “Race, Education, and Political Fear,” Educational Policy 22, no. 130

(2008).
21

Charles J. Russo, Encyclopedia of Education Law (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc,

2008), 2.
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or hearing. A Consent Decree is a common practice when the government has sued to
make a person or corporation comply with the law or the defendant agrees to the Consent
Decree in return for the government not pursuing criminal penalties. 22
Consent Decrees in educational disputes are negotiated equitable agreements
between plaintiffs and defendants in elementary and secondary school settings and in
higher education. They involve a wide array of issues, such as desegregation and special
education, wherein courts accept the agreed-upon settlements. In Consent Decrees in
education defendants, usually school boards or other educational entities, agree to
discontinue specified illegal activities such as segregation based on race, disability, or
gender.23
Organizations often utilize a Consent Decree to prevent their case from entering a
courtroom. It can be seen as an admission of guilt, as organizations often find themselves
on the cusp of lawsuits they believe they can’t win. Consent Decrees as they relate to
racial discrimination in education are no different.
Many school districts across the country have shown difficulty in developing
schools that can live up to the requirements set forth in Brown v. Board. San Francisco
and Seattle are examples of two large cities that have battled with issues of discrimination
within their schools districts, which resulted in them being forced to work under the
parameters of a Consent Decree.

22

http://dictionary.law.com/, Incisive Media US Properties 2009 (Merriam Webster, 2009).

23

Russo, Encyclopedia of Education Law, 27.
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In 1982, the San Francisco NAACP brought a legal action in the United States
District Court [1] in San Francisco stating that San Francisco schools were illegally
segregated.24 While this litigation initially focused on segregation of African Americans,
it evolved to include all racial and ethnic minorities.25 In this case both parties agreed to
enter into a Consent Decree.
In 2007, the Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School
District case challenged whether it was constitutional for the Seattle School District to
use race as one of the tiebreakers for admission to schools.26 This strategy was put into
place as a result of a Consent Decree. The Seattle case went all the way to the Supreme
Court, and on June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion. Justice Kennedy
stated:
In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it
is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt
general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which
is its racial composition. School boards may pursue the goal of bringing
together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means,
including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to
different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or

24

San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District, United States District Court,
N.D. California, Civ. No. C-78-1445, 576 F. Supp., 34.
25

Ibid.

26

Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/,
accessed December 5, 2008.
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she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand
strict scrutiny to be found permissible.27
Justice Kennedy’s reading of the court’s opinion further demonstrated a
commitment to creating more equitable schools. By being afforded the ability to use race
as a determining factor in enrollment, school districts were better able to diversify their
student bodies.
Public school systems continue to struggle with issues related to ethnicity, race,
diversity, and multiculturalism.28 Although the Brown decision was in place to make
education more equitable, inequality as it relates to educational opportunities still exists
along with the persisting issues associated with race.29
In 1980, the United States Justice Department set out to sue the Chicago Public
Schools Board of Education for running a segregated school system.
The United States has filed a complaint alleging that the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago (the “Board”) has engaged in acts of
discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of
federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a
continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and
ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system.30
The school district was accused of operating in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of
27

Seattle Public Schools. “New Release: Supreme Court Rules in PICS v. Seattle School District."
By Patti Spencer. June 28, 2007. http://www.seattleschools.org/area/news/0607/
SupremeCourtDecision.pdf, accessed June 1, 2009.
28

Gail L. Thompson, Through Ebony Eyes (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004), 1.

29

Ibid.

30

United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 1980, 1.
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1964.31 The complaint alleged that the Chicago Public Schools engaged in actions
regarding student/faculty assignment and other educational practices that promoted
inequalities regarding how students were educated. Specifically, these practices included
drawing attendance zone boundaries, adjusting grade structures of schools in racially and
ethnically segregative ways, allowing racially segregative intra-district transfers by White
students, maintaining severely overcrowded and thereby educationally inferior schools
for African American students and less crowded schools for White students, and
assigning teachers and staff to schools in racially segregative ways.32
The Board’s stance was ambiguous, neither acknowledging nor denying
allegations set before them. While they agreed that the school system suffered from
racially isolated schools, they also acknowledged that it would be financially difficult to
address the issues.
The Board neither admits nor denies the allegations of the complaint in
this action. It recognizes, however, that the Chicago public school system
is characterized by substantial racial isolation of students…
The Board believes that litigation of this action would require a substantial
expenditure of public funds and a substantial commitment of Board and
staff time and resources, at a time when financial and personnel resources
that are already greatly limited…33

31

United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 2003, 1.
32

Ibid.

33

United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 1980, 2.
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The two sides, based on the presented information, determined that they would
settle the action and resolve the United States request for relief by the entry of a Consent
Decree.34 The original Consent Decree consisted of several basic objectives:
2.1 Desegregated Schools - The plan will provide for the establishment of
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools,
considering all circumstances in Chicago.
2.2 Compensatory Programs in Schools-remaining Segregated - In order to
assure participation by all students in a system-wide remedy and to
alleviate the effects of both past and ongoing segregation, the plan shall
provide educational and related programs for any Black or Hispanic
schools remaining segregated.
2.3 Participation - To the greatest extent practicable, the plan will provide
for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups, and in all age and grade
levels above kindergarten.
2.4 Fair Allocations of Burdens - The plan shall ensure that the burdens of
desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial or ethnic group.35
The Board set out to utilize several techniques to establish the objectives set forth
in the Consent Decree:
4.1 Voluntary Techniques.
4.1.1 Permissive transfers that enhance desegregation, with transportation
at Board Expense.
4.1.2 Magnet schools that enhance desegregation
4.1.3 Voluntary pairing and clustering of schools.
4.1.4 If magnet schools or other voluntary techniques are used,
each shall contain racial/ethnic goals and management
controls (e.g., an alternative that would require mandatory reassignments) to ensure that the goals are met.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid., 4.
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4.2 Mandatory Techniques Not Involving Transportation
4.2.1 Redrawing attendance areas.
4.2.2 Adjusting feeder patterns.
4.2.3 Reorganization of grade structures, including creation of
middle schools.
4.2.4 Pairing and clustering of schools.
4.2.5 Selecting sites for new schools and selecting schools for
closing to enhance integration.
4.3 Mandatory Reassignments and Transportation- Mandatory
reassignment and transportation, a Board expense, will be included to
ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques are
insufficient to meet the objective stated in 2.1. The plan may limit the
time or distance of mandatory transportation to ensure that no student
shall be transported for a time or distance that would create a health
risk or impinge on the educational process. These limitations may vary
among different age and grade levels.
4.4 Priority and Combination of Techniques- The plan may rely upon the
techniques listed above and any other remedial methods in any
combination that accomplishes the objective stated in 2.1.36
In 2001, the United States and the Chicago Public Schools reviewed the school
district’s implementation of and compliance with the original Consent Decree and the
Desegregation Plan.37 It was determined by the court that there were areas of the plan that
had not reached full compliance.38 These areas related to magnet schools, transfers,
school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, controlled enrollment,
assignment of faculty and school based administrators, compensatory programs and

36

Ibid, 6-7.

37

United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 2004, 3.
38

Ibid.
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services for English Language Learner students.39 Twenty-four years after the Original
Consent Decree came into existence, the United States and Board of Education of the
City of Chicago entered into a Modified Consent Decree.40 The Modified Consent Decree
encompassed the original plans set forth in the original Consent Decree of 1980, along
with new requirements such as new reporting obligations, specific limits on
desegregation budget, and significant obligations with respect to the Chicago Public
Schools programs serving English Language Learners.41 The new Modified Consent
Decree was designed with the intention that its full implementation would address the
goals set forth in the original Consent Decree and Desegregation Plan.42 The new
Consent Decree also established a timetable that would bring the case to a final
resolution.43
In 2005, the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois asked the
United States and the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education to consider what
provisions of the Modified Consent Decree would continue.44 The court revisited the
Modified Consent Decree because of the significant changes in racial demographics in
Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.45 The student population of the Chicago Public

39

Ibid.

40

Ibid.

41

Ibid., 4.

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid.

44

United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (August 10, 2006), 1.

45

Ibid.
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Schools did not resemble that of the school population that existed during the creation of
both the original and modified versions of the Consent Decree.46 As a result of the court’s
inquiry, and further discovery by both parties, the United States of America and the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago jointly requested that they vacate the Modified
Consent Decree and be allowed to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree.47 In the
proposed Consent Decree, the two parties requested that the Consent Decree
automatically expire in June.48 The court approved the request to enter a Second
Amended Consent Decree; however, established that the Consent Decree could not
automatically expire without the determination being through the court.49
The Chicago Public Schools continued to plead its case to try to remove itself
from the court monitored Consent Decree. The trial was ongoing, as the school district
continued to struggle with proving its academic programs, school faculty, and facilities
are equally sufficient for both White and minority students. Fifty-five years after the
Brown v. Board case refuted the idea that segregation eliminated the possibility of
equality; the Chicago Public Schools found itself supporting a social pattern that
encouraged it. Further perpetuating the cause, a new group of educational leaders trained
to head the Chicago Public Schools have limited knowledge of Chicago’s history with
segregation as it relates to education. This lack of understanding lends itself to allow the

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid., 2.

49

Ibid.
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current and future educational leadership to dismiss the importance of the Consent
Decree, with the leader remaining oblivious to the idea of its support of the tenets set
forth in the landmark Brown v. Board case.
Twenty-nine years after the proposal of the Consent Decree, U.S. Judge Charles
Kocoras has ended the federal mandate requiring the district to integrate its schools.50
This requires even more responsibility for the current and future educational leader. No
longer with the Chicago Public Schools be required to answer to the courts, making it
even more essential for educational leaders to embrace the concept of desegregation.
Dismissing the Consent Decree as just another cumbersome external mandate is
truly missing the reason why its implementation is so important. Without accurate
knowledge of the Consent Decree in terms of the history behind its origin, the purpose
behind its stipulations, and the implications it has on leadership, both current and future
educational leaders will not be able to carry out the tasks necessary to foster an equitable
learning environment.
Throughout the graduate program at Loyola University Chicago, it has been
established that as agents of change, school leaders should be committed to supporting
the ideas of social justice. Many educators across multiple fields of study offer several
definitions of social justice, as well as defining social justice leadership.51 What is

50

Azam Ahmed, “Chicago Schools Desegregation Decree Lifted: Federal Judge Says Vestiges of
Discrimination are no Longer,” Chicago Tribune (September 26, 2009), 4.
51

Kathryn McKenzie, Dana Christman, Frank Hernandez, Elsy Fierro, Colleen Capper, Michael
Dantley, Maria Gonzalez, Nelda McCabe, and James Scheurich, “From the Field: A Proposal for Educating
Leaders for Social Justice,” Educational Administration Quarterly 44 (2008), 111.
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consistent with the many interpretations of the social justice concept is that educational
leaders need to become activist leaders with a focus on equity.52
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to provide the current and future educational leader a
historical analysis of the Consent Decree, illustrating its relationship with the Brown v.
Board of 1954. The historical analysis will document the discriminatory practices
responsible for the Consent Decrees origin, the goals established within the decree itself,
the strategies used to implement the decree’s goals, the supports and obstacles that
effected the decree’s implementation, and the effect of the decree’s implementation on
current and future leaders.
Research Questions
The study will answer the following research questions:
1.

What discriminatory practices, in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown
v. Board decision, led to the creation of the Consent Decree?

2. What were the goals set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at remedying the
discriminatory practices that were in violation of the tenets set forth in the
Brown v. Board decision?
3. According to available documentation, what did educational leaders have to
do to implement the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at
supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision?

52

Ibid.
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4. According to available documentation, what supports/obstacles did the
Chicago Public Schools and educational leaders face while implementing the
Consent Decree aimed at supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board
decision?
5. What implications does the implementation of the Consent Decree aimed at
meeting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision, have on current
and future educational leadership?
Methodology
The research methodology used for this study is historical documentary research.
“Historical research involves much more than the accumulation of facts, dates, figures, or
a description of past events, people or developments.”53 Historical researchers utilize
these resources, but also attempts to reconstruct and present facts and figures in a way
that represents an understanding of the events from more than one view point.54 It is
constructed in a manner that is beyond the retelling of past facts, rather it is a flowing,
fluid, dynamic account of past events that attempts to recapture the complex nuances,
individual personalities, and ideas that influenced the events being investigated.55
Primary and secondary sources will be used as research tools for this study. A
primary source can be an artifact or document in which the creator was a direct witness or

53

Burke Johnson and Larry Christensen, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and
Mixed Approaches (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2004), 391.
54

Ibid.

55

B.L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon),

114.
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in some other way directly involved or related to the event.56 Examples of primary
sources utilized for this study are documents from the Chicago Public Schools Policy
Manual, official reports of the proceedings of the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, transcripts from the signing of the original, modified, and amended versions of
the Consent Decree, and court documents from the Brown v. Board court case.
A secondary source is created from primary sources, secondary sources, or some
combination of the two.57 These sources give an account of an event from a second hand
perspective. Examples of books representing secondary sources utilized for this study
include: Eyes on the Prize by Juan Williams, All Deliberate Speed by Charles Ogletree,
and Separate and Unequal by Harvey Fireside.
To document the history of Brown v. Board, court transcripts will be used as
primary documentation to give an accurate account of what took place during the Brown
v. Board case as well as establishing the guideline set forth in its decision. Various
newspaper articles will also serve as primary documentation to provide a sense of what
was going on socially during the time of the Brown v. Board case. Secondary documents
will be used to provide commentary about events that took place during the time of the
litigations, and how the decision affected school leaders of the time. Most of these
documents will be presented through books that illustrate their own depiction of what
was took place during the landmark case, as well as providing analysis of the effects of

56

Johnson and Christensen, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed
Approaches, 391.
57

Ibid.
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the Brown v. Board decision. The research for both the Plessy v. Ferguson case as well as
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 will also utilize both primary and secondary sources.
Actual court documents, board reports, and the Chicago Public Schools press
releases will be utilized as sources of primary documentation to further inform readers
about the Consent Decree. Archived periodicals from Chicago’s two major newspaper
publications, The Chicago Tribune and The Chicago Sun-Times, will provide first-hand
accounts of the reactions to the court order that established the agreed upon the Consent
Decree. Archive periodicals from the Chicago Catalyst, an independent educational
reform publication, will provide some of the educators’ perspectives of the Consent
Decree.
The aforementioned primary and secondary documents will be used to provide
support for commentary as it relates to the Consent Decree and its creation due to a direct
violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. These documents will also be
used in providing an illustration of the implications on current and future educational
leaders due to the creation of the Consent Decree.
The researcher will acquire resources for this study from the Law Libraries
located in the Chicagoland area such as the Northwestern Pritzker Research Center,
Loyola University School of Law Library, and the University of Illinois Chicago Louis L.
Biro Law Library. The researcher will also use resources acquired at the Library of
Congress in Washington, DC and the Chicago History Museum. Primary documentation
regarding the Consent Decree will be attained through the Chicago Public School’s Law
Department as well as from the Chicago Public Schools archivist.
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Significance of the Study
Mandates, whether federally or locally imposed, often have a hand in shaping the
way we educate children. Leaders find themselves in a position that requires them to
implement these mandates that they may not agree with, or see as viable options for their
individual schools. The Consent Decree is in place because the Chicago Public Schools
did not do its part living up to the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision. The
irony is that many of today’s leaders were not even born when the Brown v. Board case
took place.
To properly implement the strategies associated with the Consent Decree, current
and future educational leaders must understand the Consent Decree’s importance.
Without understanding the premise behind the creation of the Consent Decree, current
and future educational leaders will never truly internalize the meaning behind the
strategies within its contents, making it impossible to foster their true benefits.
The significance of this study to the field of leadership is that it provides an
historical perspective as it relates to the Consent Decree. The study provides current and
future educational leaders with an understanding of the tenets set forth in the Brown v.
Board decision and how the Consent Decree was developed directly due to a violation of
these tenets.
The success of an initiative’s implementation often depends on leaders at the
building level to implement them. Without some level of “buy in” from the school leader,
the efforts of ensuring an initiative’s success will be minimal at best. The findings in this
study will provide current and future educational leaders a comprehensive background
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illustrating why the Consent Decree came into existence. It is with this new knowledge
that current and future educational leaders will be armed with the necessary tools to
ensure the tenets of Brown v. Board case are embraced within their school culture. It will
also prepare current and future educational leaders to empower their staffs, establishing a
vision that represents social justice.
The implications for current and future educational leaders after reviewing this
study are:
1. Current and future educational leaders will have a clear picture of the
correlation between the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision and the
Consent Decree. This knowledge will give the current and future educational
leaders a clear understanding of the importance of the Consent Decree.
2. Current and future educational leaders will have a comprehensive
understanding of the Consent Decree as it relates to its origin, contents, and
strategies for implementation. This knowledge will give current and future
educational leaders a working knowledge of the Consent Decree, making it
feasible to develop strategies for its full implementation.
3. Current and future educational leaders will have the necessary knowledge to
create a framework embracing the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case
and the effective implementation of strategies set forth in the Consent Decree.
Previous dissertations have discussed the Chicago Public Schools and its issues
with racial integration, but not necessarily the Consent Decree itself. These dissertations
generally looked at issues that took place before the Consent Decree of 1980. The studies
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emphasized some of the practices of past administrators and the Chicago school district
that perpetuated racial inequality. In this study an emphasis will be placed on how the
Chicago Public Schools has been forced to deal with problems of racial inequality under
the Consent Decree, and what the decree’s implementation means to both current and
future educational leaders.
Implications for the Urban School Leader
Urban school leadership has changed dramatically since the Civil Rights efforts
during the 50’s and 60’s to achieve educational equity for all.58 The task of leading an
urban school continually becomes more complex, taxing, and social-service oriented.59
Urban school principals find themselves facing challenges that would be inconceivable to
school leaders prior to the Brown v. Board decision.60
As an urban school principal, the researcher has dealt with the challenges that
hinder children’s education head on. Children are not only up against the ills of their own
environments, but also must deal with social and economic issues that are beyond the
control of the school that they attend. Urban schools across the country are often most
populated by minorities. These schools often represent some of the city’s lowest
performing educational institutions.
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Spencer Academy, where the researcher currently serves as school principal, has
reaped some benefit from the implementation of the Consent Decree by allowing Spencer
to work closely with the Chicago Public School’s Office of Academic Enhancement. The
Office of Academic Enhancement (OAE) was created in 1981 as the Office of Equal
Educational Opportunity Programs, in conjunction with the development of the Student
Desegregation Plan for the Chicago Public Schools.61 The primary responsibility of the
office was to maintain excellence and equity of educational opportunity for all students
and achieve a prescribed racial/ethnic balance through the creation of the greatest
possible number of stably desegregated schools.62 The office continues to provide
coordination and management for educational options for students.63 One of OAE’s main
responsibilities is to create academic programs that can be utilized by students in
neighborhood schools. This usually translates in academic distinctions being given to
schools that remain racially segregated. Spencer school began with a Math and Science
distinction, which provided the school both a Math and Science specialist along with
additional support in both subject areas. The reality though is that although this
distinction allowed students to apply to Spencer from all across the city, their population
is still 99.5% African American. The reality is that even with the additional support
Spencer school is still on probation and has failed to make AYP yet another year. Can
schools that are segregated by race, mirroring the demographics represented in many of
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Chicago’s neighborhoods, truly provide equal opportunities for students to be educated?
That is the question with which the urban school principal struggles with on a daily basis.
Limitations of the Study
This study is subject to limitations beyond the control of the researcher and the
limited scope of the research. The researcher is aware that it is essential to the research
process that these limitations are acknowledged. The researcher acknowledges these
limitations and the effect they will have on the study.
The researcher acknowledges that the research is limited to only analyzing the
Consent Decree associated with the Chicago Public Schools. This limits the scope of
study to only Chicago’s desegregation policy, although the implementation of the
Consent Decrees has affected school districts across the country. The study will only be
able to provide the reader a perspective of how the Consent Decree was created and
implemented in the Chicago Public Schools, without consideration of how similar
decrees effected school leadership in other school districts throughout the United States.
The researcher acknowledges that his perspective is limited to that of an
educational leader, with limited knowledge of the legal system and its policies. This
limits the amount of legal perspective included within the study. The study emphasizes
the effect of the implementation of the Consent Decree on current and future leaders, and
provides limited information on its ramifications and historical significance to the legal
system.
The researcher acknowledges that the research does not take into consideration
the effect of the Consent Decree on student achievement. This limits the ability of the
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researcher to prove the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Consent Decree as it relates
to students and their performance in the classroom. As a result, the reader’s interpretation
of the decree’s importance must be made without the benefit of knowing its effect on the
achievement of the students the Consent Decree was created to protect.
The researcher acknowledges that the research is limited to available documents,
and does not include the perspective of educational leaders through oral representation.
This limits the study by potentially excluding the perspectives of many of the school
leaders who had a hands-on experience during the Consent Decrees implementation. The
reader will only be provided this perspective from available documents, rather than
interviews providing personal accounts.
Biases of Researcher
The researcher acknowledges the potential biases that could skew the way
information is presented within this study. The researcher has maintained a journal
throughout this study as a strategy to deal with any existing predispositions as they relate
to information accumulated by the researcher. The journal was shared with the
dissertation director on an ongoing basis to ensure the integrity of the research, keeping it
free of individual biases and the manipulation of how data is presented.
The researcher acknowledges that his racial make-up is the same as that of the
individuals who experienced the discriminatory practices that led to the Brown v. Board
decision and the creation of the Consent Decree. The fact that the researcher is of
African-American descent may create the potential for research to be presented in a
manner that is in support of the researcher’s race, and make it impossible to look at the
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Consent Decree objectively. In order to protect the integrity of the study, the researcher
will keep a journal to express personal feelings or emotions he may have towards
information accumulated during his research.
The researcher acknowledges that he works as an educational leader in a Chicago
Public School that is composed of a student body that is made up of a single race. The
fact that the researcher works in a single race school may skew his perspective of how he
perceives the Consent Decree. This perspective may potentially shape how information is
presented in the study. In order to protect the integrity of the study, the researcher will
keep a journal to express personal feelings or emotions he may have towards information
accumulated during his research.
The researcher acknowledges that he has personally witnessed administrators
express frustration with the implementation of the Consent Decree. This experience may
have negatively influenced the researcher’s perception of the Consent Decree, and could
possibly have an adverse effect on how the researcher presents it in the study. In order to
protect the integrity of the study, the researcher will keep a journal to express personal
feelings or emotions he may have towards information accumulated during his research.
The researcher acknowledges that he currently works as an administrator in a
Chicago Public School that has benefited from the implementation of the Consent
Decree. The fact that the researcher works in a school that has benefited from the
implementation of the Consent Decree may affect how the researcher presents
information about its implementation. In order to protect the integrity of the study, the
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researcher will keep a journal to express personal feelings or emotions he may have
towards information accumulated during his research.
Chapter Overview
Chapter II, Historical Perspective: Prelude to the Consent Decree, provides a
historical narrative discussing some of the significant events that led up to initiatives such
as the Chicago Public School Consent Decree. It begins with a synopsis of the Plessy v.
Ferguson case of 1896. This case was significant because it established that racial
separation was constitutional.64 The case’s decision served to support more than half a
century of Jim Crow legislation.65 The Jim Crow laws were the source of many of the
restrictions placed on Blacks from the late 1800’s to the Brown v. Board litigations.
Moving from the Plessy v. Ferguson case which was a catalyst in establishing
racial segregation, the next part of this chapter focuses on the court case that challenged
it. The Brown v. Board of Education case worked against the concept of separate but
equal, embracing the idea that there were great disparities between Blacks and Whites of
the time.
Although the verdict was handed down in 1954, the plan for school integration
practices was never fully implemented. The justices tempered the impact of their ruling
by holding a formal Consent Decree to put the decision into effect.66 Legal experts of the
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time believed it may be years before the Supreme Court ordered states to comply with its
decision outlawing racial segregation in the nation’s public schools.67 Although school
districts were hesitant in implementing the laws of desegregation, eventually they were
forced to act in accordance with the court’s decision.
The next part of the chapter discusses the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The bill was
first introduced by John F. Kennedy in 1963 and was signed into law by Lyndon B.
Johnson. It was originally designed to uphold the 14th amendment enacted in 1868.68 The
bill served as a deterrent towards practices of segregation in public places, employment,
and education.69 Its implementation brought forth a true effort to integrate the nation’s
school systems. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the years leading up to
the Consent Decree after the passing of the Civil Rights Act, providing a brief
introduction of what will be further discussed in Chapter III. These years span between
the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1980 when the Consent Decree was
agreed upon.
Chapter III, An Analysis of the Chicago Public School Consent Decree, provides a
historical background of the Consent Decree of 1980. The beginning of the chapter
discusses some of the issues that were going on with the Chicago Public Schools that
were in direct violation of the tenets set forth in Brown v. Board, which consequently led
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to the agreement from the Chicago Public Schools to enter into a Consent Decree. In
1953, Benjamin Coppaage Willis became the new superintendent of the Chicago Public
Schools.70 During his tenure, the Chicago Public Schools had no system in place to
collect data on the racial composition of its student body or teaching force until they were
legislatively mandated in 1963.71 Disparities in how Blacks and Whites of the time were
educated are well documented. In 1962, the Urban League conducted a study wherein all
of one of the city’s largest populated elementary schools was in Black neighborhoods.72
Practices such as these brought attention to a reoccurring problem, and eventually led to
the lawsuit and eventual court intervention.
The next part of the chapter discusses the mission and objectives of the Consent
Decree. This part of the chapter will discuss the original Consent Decree of 1980, the
Modified Consent Decree of 2004, and the Amended Consent Decree of 2006. The
Chicago Public Schools claimed to have been working towards desegregated schools for
some period of time. In a Chicago Tribune article written in 1972, a representative from
the Chicago Public Schools was quoted:
The racial desegregation of the Chicago Public Schools is an objective
pursued for a number of years by government agencies both local
(Chicago Public Schools Board of Education) and national (the
Department of Health education, and Welfare).73
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Despite their commitment, the Chicago school district’s discriminatory practices
forced them to enter into the Consent Decree. As stated earlier in the chapter, the
Chicago Public Schools laid out several goals that were consistent with the tenets set
forth in the Brown v. Board decision, to be achieved with the original decree’s
implementation.
The chapter then discusses what school leaders had to do to implement the
guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree. Included within this chapter will be a
discussion about the creation of magnet schools and other similar alternatives designed to
make schools more diverse. It will also encompass the city’s attempt to create more
diverse teaching faculties as well as the debate about student travel and schools of choice.
The chapter ends with a discussion about public perception in regard to the
implementation of the Consent Decree. One of the requirements of the Consent Decree
was for Chicago to establish a comprehensive desegregation plan. There were mixed
reviews as to how communities felt about the Consent Decree and the plan’s
implementation. Two strategies that caused quite a bit of controversy were the busing of
students and the integration of school faculties. Although integration seemed like a
worthy cause, not everyone shared the same sentiment. In the 1970’s, many teachers and
administrators were transferred to particular schools as part of a system wide faculty
desegregation strategy. Some of Chicago’s North side schools found themselves newly
populated with African American students and staff. In an article featured in the Chicago
Catalyst, a Chicago Public School principal recounts her experiences when she became
principal of a predominately White school that had just taken on African American
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students being bused from the Westside of Chicago. “There were phone calls, threats
[from] some Nazi group, the John Birch Society, the KKK.”74 “So that was my
welcome.”75 Others, who believed that the current state of education was unjust,
welcomed the opportunity of better educational circumstances.
Geography also seemed to play a large role in how people perceived the Consent
Decree. Chicago, as most urban cities, was not only divided by race, but also
geographically. Neighborhoods could be easily identified as either White or Black. “The
very high degree of inequality in the system reflected the new pattern of spatial
differentiation emerging in Chicago and other large cities.”76 Social scientists have
consistently regarded Chicago as one of the most residentially segregated cities in the
country.77
The attitudes toward the Consent Decree often were predicated on where an
individual lived. This was no better illustrated than in the Chicago Public Schools Board
of Education’s first public hearing on desegregation. In a Chicago Tribune article
covering the event, three women from different parts of the city gave their opinion about
desegregating schools.
A woman from the West Side said:
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We have no quarrel with desegregation, but as parents we should be heard.
We wish you all would just listen to us for awhile. Please think children,
not money, because our children are suffering very badly.78
A woman from the Northwest Side said:
Our [educational] council supports equal education. We are opposed to the
mass movement of students to enhance desegregation.79
A woman from the Southwest Side said:
I speak for both Black and White parents. We want better schools. We
want to use the money that might be spent on busing on schools.80
This excerpt illustrates people’s varying attitudes towards the desegregating of the
Chicago Public Schools as well as the viewpoints that influenced the public’s feelings
toward the Consent Decree. As the end of Chapter III concludes with a discussion about
public perception, it is important to understand that geography played a huge part in how
people perceived Chicago’s quest toward the desegregation of its school system.
Chapter IV, Challenges to the Implementation of the Chicago Public School
Consent Decree, discusses some of the supports and barriers that occurred during the
attempt to implement the goals of the Consent Decree.
The chapter begins discussing some of the issues that went on related to travel.
The prospect of integrating schools was challenging due in part to the fact that
neighborhoods were not often integrated. This called for students as well as staff to be
relocated to other schools to racially balance out a school’s population. Busing was
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always a controversial topic because of its cost. This chapter looks at the Chicago Public
Schools and their experiences with transportation as it relates to integrating schools.
The next part of the chapter discusses the abundance of White citizens that moved
out of Black urban areas. This phenomenon is often referred to as White Flight. As White
citizens moved into suburban areas, the demographics of the Chicago Public School’s
student body began to drastically change. This made the concept of desegregation even
more elusive.
The next part of the chapter discusses teacher displacement. One of the
stipulations set forth in the Consent Decree was to create a more diverse faculty within
the schools. In order to accommodate this strategy, the Chicago Public Schools adopted
an involuntary teacher transfer system. The plan developed in September of 1977
required schools to have a faculty comprised of 35 to 60% minority members.81 This in
itself brought about issues that stifled the desegregation cause.
The chapter then discusses the concept of schools of choice, and how the Consent
Decree placed an emphasis on providing minority students particularly, different options
for their education. Within this part of the chapter, magnet schools and magnet cluster
schools will be introduced. The creation of these schools represents some of the many
strategies the Chicago Public Schools utilized to satisfy the goals of the Consent Decree.
The chapter moves into a discussion about the lack of government funding
provided to carry out the Consent Decree. Transportation and building modifications
accounted for just some of the cost associated with complying with the decree’s
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implementation. Lack of federal funding not only was a problem in Chicago, but also
became an issue with desegregation efforts across the country. Requests for funds
through state legislation were not available here in Chicago, and efforts had to rely on a
possible $13 million in federal funds under the Emergency School Aid Act.82 This
chapter looks at how funding the Consent Decree became problematic in its
implementation.
The final part of the chapter will discuss the concept of re-segregation, referring
to the idea that schools, despite all efforts, are becoming segregated once again. This part
of the chapter will discuss the concepts of desegregation and integration, defining each
term and laying out their fundamental differences. Making this distinction is imperative
in understanding the idea of schools being re-segregated. The chapter will then discuss
some of the viewpoints individuals had about desegregation during the Civil Rights
Movement, and look at where we are now in comparison to their earlier expectations.
Chapter V, The Final Analysis, looks directly at the Consent Decree and its
implications on current and future educational leaders. This chapter will provide the
findings from this study based on the analysis of historical documents.
The first part of the chapter reflects on the discriminatory practices that were in
violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision and led to the creation of
the Consent Decree. This part of the chapter gives current and future educational leaders
an accurate understanding of why the Consent Decree came into existence.
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The next part of the chapter revisits the goals set forth in the Consent Decree
aimed at remedying the discriminatory practices that were in violation of the tenets set
forth in the Brown v. Board decision. This part of the chapter gives current and future
educational leaders a clear illustration of the how the goals of Consent Decree were
consistent with the expectations laid out in the Brown v. Board case.
The chapter continues by reflecting on what school leaders had to do to
implement the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree that supported the tenets set
forth in the Brown v. Board decision. This part of the chapter gives current and future
educational leaders an example of how desegregation effected school leaders and
influenced their leadership practices.
The next part of the chapter discusses the supports/obstacles the Chicago Public
Schools and its school leaders faced while implementing the Consent Decree aimed at
supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision. This part of the chapter
gives current and future educational leaders a perspective on how presence of external
influences effected the implementation of the Consent Decree.
The chapter concludes with a look at the implications the implementation of the
Consent Decree, aimed at meeting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision, has
on current and future educational leaders. This part of the chapter will move the
discussion forward, looking at how the implementation of the Consent Decree affects
current and future educational leaders. It will also discuss the responsibilities of leaders
now that the decree has ended.
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Key Terms
Consent Decree –
An order of a judge based upon an agreement, almost always put in
writing, between the parties to a lawsuit instead of continuing the case
through trial or hearing. It cannot be appealed unless it was based upon
fraud by one of the parties (he lied about the situation), mutual mistake
(both parties misunderstood the situation) or if the court does not have
jurisdiction over the case or the parties. Obviously, such a decree is almost
always final and non-appealable since the parties worked it out. A Consent
Decree is a common practice when the government has sued to make a
person or corporation comply with the law (improper securities practices,
pollution, restraints of trade, conspiracy) or the defendant agrees to the
Consent Decree (often not to repeat the offense) in return for the
government not pursuing criminal penalties. In general a Consent Decree
and a consent judgment are the same.83
Desegregation - “To break down separation of the races and to promote greater
equality of opportunity.”84
Defacto Desegregation - Segregation that takes place because of segregated
circumstances. “Segregated schools created in segregated neighborhoods.”85
Dejure Desegregation - Segregation that is initiated intentionally. “Segregated
schools that are created in a dual school system, one for White children and one for
minorities.”86
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Elementary Magnet School –
Generally, magnet schools do not have a neighborhood attendance
boundary. Magnet schools offer a curriculum focused on a specific
programmatic theme. Every student in the school is involved in the
magnet theme or focus offered at the school. The Chicago Public Schools
uses non-testing admissions procedures for its magnet schools.87
Elementary Magnet Cluster School –
A magnet cluster school is a neighborhood school with a defined
attendance area and accepts students who live within that boundary.
Students who live outside of the neighborhood attendance boundary must
submit an application in order to be considered for acceptance. Magnet
cluster schools are located in groups of no less than four schools clustered
nearby in a manner that provides the benefits of magnet programs to as
many students as possible. Magnet cluster schools offer a curriculum
focused on a specific programmatic theme. Each school in a cluster offers
a programmatic theme in collaboration with its companion schools in the
neighborhood cluster. The Chicago Public Schools uses non-testing
admissions procedures for its magnet cluster schools.88
Historical Research – “The process of systematically examining past events or
combinations of events to arrive at an account of what happened in the past.”89
Integration - “To bring together people of different colors and ethnic
backgrounds so that they associate not only on an equal basis but also make a real effort
to respect the autonomy of other people and to appreciate the virtues of cultural
diversity.”90
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Primary Source - “A source in which the creator was a direct witness or in some
other way directly involved or related to the event.” 91
Secondary Source - “A source that was created from primary sources, secondary
sources, or some combination of the two.”92
White Flight - “The departure of Whites from places (as urban neighborhoods or
schools) increasingly or predominantly populated by minorities.”93
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PRELUDE TO THE CONSENT DECREE
Introduction
Significant effort by the United States of America has been and continues to be
expended towards the desegregation of schools; however, 147 years post the signing of
the Emancipation Proclamation, complete desegregation of schools remains a challenge
in the United States. This chapter discusses various actions and significant events as they
relate to desegregation in America, including the Emancipation Proclamation and
associated Amendments, Plessy versus Ferguson, Brown versus the Board of Education
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
On September 22, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into existence the
Emancipation Proclamation. The proclamation declared "all persons held as slaves within
any States, or designated part of the State, the people whereof shall be in rebellion against
the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free."1 The Emancipation
Proclamation did not free all slaves; rather it provided freedom to slaves in the
Confederate states. In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution,
and along with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, attempted to give Blacks and
Whites equal rights.
1
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President Lincoln was fully aware that the Emancipation Proclamation was just a
start in ensuring the freedom of all slaves. The Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished
slavery across all the states. Section one of the Thirteenth Amendment states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.2
With the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the United States found a final
constitutional solution to the issue of slavery.
The Fourteenth Amendment provided citizenship to former slaves. During
slavery, Black people were deprived of citizenship and rights afforded to citizens of the
United States. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.3
The Fifteenth Amendment made it possible for citizens to vote. Section one of the
Fifteenth Amendment states:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.4
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Despite efforts by the United States of America to create equality amongst
different races, there were still many barriers that made this seem to be an impossible
feat. Despite the newly adopted amendments to the constitution, some states attempted to
create their own rules, which facilitated further separation between Blacks and Whites. In
1890, Louisiana passed a statute called the Separate Car Act.5 This Act mandated “that all
railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches shall provide equal but separate
accommodations for the White and colored races, by providing two or more passenger
coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as
to secure separate accommodations.”6 Employees of the railways were held accountable
for ensuring there was no mixing of the two races. They were required to assign
passengers to their proper car or compartment, and if they failed, were subject to a
maximum of 20 days in jail and a $25 fine.7 Passengers who did not comply could be
subject to the same penalty, as well as be refused service.8
This statute was the cause of great distress for Blacks throughout the country.
Seventeen Blacks, all members of the American Citizen’s Equal Rights Association,
spoke out against the statute in a memorial filed on May 24, 1890.9 Their arguments were
to no avail, and the legislation passed.
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Plessy v. Ferguson
On September 1, 1891, a group of individuals who resided in New Orleans
organized a group, which became known as the Citizens’ Committee. The Citizens’
Committee challenged the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Act.”10 The group
solicited the legal expertise of Albion W. Tourgee, one of the country’s most prominent
White publicists in regards to Negro rights.11 Tourgee took the case without fee, and was
joined by a local New Orleans lawyer James C. Walker.12
The team began their attack by challenging the Separate Car Act as an
unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.13 Their strategy was to create a
scenario wherein a Black passenger would begin his trip in an area that did not practice
segregation, and would continue his trip in an area that did. The passenger would then be
forced to move to a segregated car. Daniel F. Desdunes, a 21-year old fair skinned man,
served as a volunteer for the team’s strategic maneuver.14 Desdunes was instructed to buy
a first-class ticket from the Louisville Nashville Railroad to an out-of-state destination.15
He was then asked by a train conductor, who was aware of Desdunes’ intentions, to move
to the colored car.16 When Desdunes refused he was arrested.

10

Ibid, 23.

11

Ibid.

12

Whitman, Removing a Badge of Slavery, 7.

13

Ibid.

14

Harvey Fireside, Separate and Unequal (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005), 24.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

42
Before the Desdunes’ case could come to trial, the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared in a different case, Abbott v. Hicks, that the segregation statute was invalid as it
applied to interstate travel.17 The language used in the Interstate Commerce Act
prohibited discriminatory practices; however did not specifically prohibit segregation
practices adopted by each individual state.18 These practices were only considered invalid
if they were thought to be discriminatory in nature.19 The team was forced to take its
argument in another direction.
Their new strategy was to challenge the Louisiana Law on the grounds that it
violated the equal protection clause.20 The attorneys began developing strategic plans,
which detailed how they would challenge the law, and bring a case before the courts.
They developed a strategy that was not grossly dissimilar to their first attempt. The new
focus would be on intrastate travel, and would determine whether a state had the right to
force Blacks into separate railway cars.21
On June 7, 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy, a young man in his late 20s, prepared to
take a first class trip across the state of Louisiana.22 He was a fair skinned man who was
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one eighth Black, appearing White to the casual observer.23 He handed his ticket to the
conductor J.J. Dowling, and stated to him that according to Louisiana Law he was a
colored man.24 After refusing to move to the colored only car, Plessy was arrested for
violating the Louisiana Separate Car statute.
The Plessy case did not take place until nearly five months later in the state
district court on October 28, 1892, with Judge H. Ferguson presiding.25 Assistant district
attorney Lionel Adams reiterated to the courts the conditions of the Louisiana law. He
also claimed, through the use of police testimony, that Plessy intentionally broke the
law.26 Adams pointed out that the segregation railway law made it illegal for White
passengers to take seats in the colored car.27 He continued to communicate that the
state’s intentions were to avoid hostile situations that might occur between individuals
due to their racial differences.28
James Walker, one of Plessy’s attorneys, argued that the Separate Car Act was
unconstitutional because it established:
….distinction and discrimination between Citizens of the United States
based on race which is obnoxious to the fundamental principle of National
Citizenship, perpetuates involuntary servitude as regards Citizens of the
Colored Race under the merest pretense of promoting the comfort of
passengers on railway trains, and in further respect abridges the privileges
23

Lofgren, The Plessy Case, 28.

24

Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 3.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

44
and immunities of Citizens of the United States and the rights secured by
the XIIIth and XIVth amendments to the Federal Constitution.29
Adams referred to the law’s requirement that accommodations be equal, and
referenced previous federal court decisions that upheld racial separation in common
carriers.30 He also asserted that Whites were inconvenienced by the foul odors of Blacks
in close quarters as well as having to cope with other interracial repugnancies.31 Adams
used these tactics in an attempt to establish that the Louisiana law and its requirements
were reasonable.32
Judge John H. Ferguson made the determination that the Louisiana state statute
did not promote discriminatory practices because it provided consequences for both
Black and White passengers when they attempted to occupy a car in which they didn’t
belong.33 It was determined that a state could regulate its railways as they desired as long
as accommodations were considered equal.
Plessy appealed the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Plessy and his lawyers
sued Judge Ferguson to prohibit Ferguson from proceeding with the original case.34 The
case then took on the title, Plessy v. Ferguson; although, the party in interest was the state
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of Louisiana.35 The Louisiana Supreme Court supported Ferguson’s decision, and
deemed the law as constitutional.
Plessy filed a petition for writs of error and certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, arguing that the Separate Car Act was in direct violation of both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.36
Justice Henry Brown was responsible for providing the majority opinion of the
Supreme Court. The Thirteenth Amendment argument was immediately struck down by
the court. Justice Brown states:
That it does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which abolished
and involuntary servitude, except a punishment for crime, is too clear for
argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude, a state of bondage; the
ownership of mankind as chattel, or, at least, the control of the labor and
services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of legal
right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services….
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between White and
colored races a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races,
and which must always exist so long as White men are distinguished from
the other race by color has not tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do
not understand that the thirteenth amendment is strenuously relied upon by
the plaintiff in error in this connection.37
The Fourteenth Amendment was considered to be the primary argument of the
case and became the major focus of the majority opinion.38 The constitutionality of
segregated transportation under the Fourteenth Amendment had never been questioned by
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the Supreme Court, so the Justices chose to examine the record for legal precedents.39
State law had segregated public schools much longer than railroads, so many of the lower
courts had already confronted the Fourteenth Amendment argument.40 In making its
determination, the Supreme Court pointed to Roberts v. City of Boston, a case decided in
1849 that determined races could remain separate in public schools.41
During the late 1700s, public schools in the city of Boston were integrated.
African American parents and students felt that they were mistreated by their White
counterparts, and sought to have separate accommodations created for them. When
denied public funding to establish an African American school, a private school was
developed in 1798. Parents were still responsible for paying taxes to support public
schools; although, their children were not welcome there. While the case was a joint
community action, Benjamin Roberts served as the lead Plaintiff. Parents explained to the
courts that their children had been denied entrance into all Boston schools except for the
one that was privately established. The courts determined that there was no wrong doing
because special provisions had been made for Black students to attend school.
As it related to railway travel, courts found carriers to have a common law
obligation to provide passengers with substantially equal seating.42 Carriers also held the
discretion to decide which seat a passenger would get, even if their decision was based on
39
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race.43 Courts relied on this definition of equality as a barometer for determining if state
statutes that segregated passengers did so without the presence of discrimination.44 The
opinion of the court reflected the idea that the 14th Amendment was designed to assure
equality between the races, but did not discourage separation when it was in the best
interest of either party.
Justice Brown stated:
The object if the amendment (14th) was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law but in the nature of
things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from the political equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, the separation in places where they liable
to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either
race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the State legislation in the exercise of their
police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for White and colored children, which
have been held to be valid exercise of legislative power even by the courts
of States where the political rights of the colored race have longest and
most earnestly enforced.45
While the judgment of the court was clear, it did not represent the opinion of all
of the Supreme Court Justices. Justice John Marshall Harlan represented the dissenting
opinion, one that is almost as well known as the verdict itself.46 During his dissent,
Justice Marshall states:
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The White race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens…
It is scarcely just to say that a colored citizen should not object to
occupying a public coach assigned to his own race. He does not object,
nor, perhaps, would he object to separate coaches for his race, if his rights
under the law were recognized. But he objects, and ought never to cease
objecting to the proposition that citizens of the White and Black races can
be adjudged criminals because they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the
same public coach on a public highway…
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments,
which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied
by White citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such
legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.47
The Plessy v. Ferguson verdict was a major setback for individuals fighting to end
segregation. Although the decision was directed towards a state law requiring separate
railway accommodations, the “separate but equal” doctrine it endorsed was soon applied
to many other situations including public schools.48 Many educational systems across the
country already instituted practices in segregation. The Plessy verdict further justified
this social ideology that existed as early as the 1700s.
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NAACP: Taking a Stand
On February 12, 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) was established.49 It was created in part to respond to the practice of
lynching and race riots that had taken place in Springfield Illinois.50 Their stated goal was
to secure for all people the rights guaranteed in the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution.51 This included dismantling the practices of Jim Crow, which gained
further momentum with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Plessy v. Ferguson
case.52
Nathan Margold developed a plan for the NAACP to eliminate school segregation
in 1930.53 The original plan was to sue for equal schools at the elementary and highschool levels.54 The NAACP, in its quest to achieve equality in education had to deal
with many of the realities of society due to Southern influences such as:
1. Local school districts admitted to disparities in educational funding,
but lied or exaggerated about efforts underway to ameliorate them.
2. States and local school districts were primarily responsible for public
school educational policy and funding inhibited litigation at the federal
level.
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3. There was the awesome weight of tradition and social custom; Plessy
was the precedent upon which Jim Crow rulings rested.
4. Because of the above, state courts did not consider state-sanctioned
Jim Crow to be in violation of the 14th Amendment right of Blacks to
equal protection under the law and, therefore, left Jim Crow intact.
5. The defendants and courts alike variously ignored, trivialized, masked,
neutralized, explained away, and accepted the pervasive reality of
separate and unequal.55
Margold’s plan was later modified by NAACP lawyer Charles Houston.56
In 1929, Mr. Charles Hamilton Houston served as Dean at the Howard University
Law School, one of a few Black Law schools that were in existence.57 A group of
talented young men and women began matriculating onto Howard’s campus, and became
key strategists in the plan to challenge segregated education.58 Howard University
produced some of America’s most talented litigators, most famously Thurgood
Marshall.59
In 1935, Charles Houston became special counsel to the NAACP.60 Houston
believed that focusing efforts on higher education would be more feasible because the
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idea of integration would be met with far less resistance.61 In the book Simple Justice,
Houston’s reasoning is depicted as follows:
The Black attack [on school segregation] ought to begin in an area where
the Whites were most vulnerable and least likely to respond with anger.
That segregation had produced blatantly discriminatory and unequal
schools systems, Houston calculated, was most obvious at the level of
graduate and professional schools…. There were [only two] graduate or
professional schools at any Black college in the South….Here was an area
where the educational facilities for Blacks were neither separate nor equal
but non-existent….[Through legal action] the South would either have to
build and operate separate graduate schools for Blacks or admit them to
White ones.62
A young Thurgood Marshall later joined Mr. Houston and began taking on cases
in both law and graduate schools in which their practices were discriminatory. Marshall
eventually took over as chief counsel of the NAACP, and soon after developed a separate
organization called the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.63
The Court Cases
Murray v. Maryland (1936)
The Murray v. Maryland case represented one of the first successful test cases for
the NAACP, and their strategy to take on America’s institutions of higher learning. It was
also Thurgood Marshall’s first civil rights case.64 In a Baltimore City court in 1935,
Thurgood Marshall put forth the argument that Donald Gaines Murray, an African
American male, was just as qualified as his White counterparts to attend the University of
61
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Maryland’s School of Law.65 Marshall argued that Murray was denied admission because
of his race. Marshall also argued that the “Black” law schools Murray would be forced to
attend were not of the same academic caliber.66 This would violate the principal of
“separate but equal.” With the disparities between the schools being so vast, Marshall
argued that the only remedy would be to allow Murray to attend Maryland University’s
law school.67 The courts sided with Murray, but the University appealed the decision. In
1936, The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the original decision and sided with Murray,
ordering the Maryland law school to acknowledge Murray’s application for admission.
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada (1938)
Lloyd Gaines, a graduate student of the all-Black college Lincoln University, was
denied admission into the University of Missouri’s Law School because of his race.68 The
State of Missouri offered Gaines an opportunity to attend a newly built all-Black law
school, or receive compensation to attend another law school within a neighboring state.69
Gaines rejected both offers, and sought the support of Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP. In 1933, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, where a six-member
majority sided with Gaines. It was determined by the court that since a Black law school
did not exist in the state of Missouri, the equal protection clause required a legal
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education for Gaines within the state’s boundaries.70 This was the same education that the
state provided for Whites.
Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library 1945
Louise Kerr attempted to join a training program in a Baltimore library and was
denied because of his color. The opposition for Kerr’s participation was not the library
itself, but rather its patrons. Kerr launched a civil suit alleging that the library’s actions
were in violation of the equal protection act. The courts acknowledge that the library did
not have a racist purpose, but still sided with Kerr and his claim. Out of this case came
what is known as the Kerr principle, which determined when and why the state is
responsible for enabling exclusive preferences, whether by an overextended applicable
rule that assist them or by state inaction that fails to block them.
Sweat v. Painter (1950)
In 1946, an African American mail carrier named Herman Sweat applied to the
University of Texas’ White law school.71 The University, in fear of having to integrate its
law program, created an inferiorly funded Black law school within its campus.72 The case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950. Thurgood Marshall’s argument was that the
Black law school did not offer the same quality of education as the White law school.
The justices agreed, and decided in favor of Herman Sweat.
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McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education (1950)
George McLaurin was reluctantly admitted to the University of Oklahoma’s
doctoral program in 1949.73 Although McLaurin was accepted at the University, he was
not allowed to sit with his White classmates during lunch or class sessions.74 McLaurin
believed these practices adversely effected how he was being educated, and solicited the
services of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP to argue his case.75 When the case finally
went to the Supreme Court, the justices ruled on the side of Mr. McLaurin and the
University was required to cease all discriminatory practices immediately.76
Shortly after the Sweat and McLaurin decisions, Thurgood Marshall felt it was
time to fight against segregation head on.77 The emphasis in all education cases would be
to create integrated school settings, rather than attempt to create separate but equal
accommodations for students of different races.78 The NAACP supported Marshall’s
stance, and the group began looking for cases. Each case was represented jointly by a
local lawyer and a lawyer from the NAACP’s national headquarters.79 Each school
differed with regards to their levels of inequality. There were instances when segregated
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schools were equal in some aspects.80One consistency was that all of the schools in
question were segregated by law, and the NAACP’s stand was that equality could not be
reached without the end of segregation.81
Brown v. Board
The Brown v. Board of Education case actually included appeals from decisions
in a total of five cases, all in separate states (Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Kansas).82
Belton (Bulah) v. Gebhart (Delaware)
This case was originally petitioned in 1951, and actually represented two separate
cases dealing with the same issue. The argument was that two schools established for
African American students were inferior compared to those designed for Whites. The
cases were brought forth by Ethel Belton and Shirley Bulah, two parents who believed
their children were being discriminated against. Chancellor Collin Seitz of the Delaware
Court of Chancery ruled that the all White schools would have to admit Black students
who had proved that the education they were receiving was substandard. The Delaware
Supreme Court conquered, but would not put on record that the segregation of students
was an unconstitutional act. The Board of Education appealed the decision, making the
Belton v. Gebhart case the only one of the five that was brought to court by the
defendants and not the plaintiffs.
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Briggs v. Elliot (South Carolina)
Harry Briggs, along with nineteen other parents brought a suit against R.W Elliot,
the president of the school board for Clarendon County, South Carolina. Parents’
frustration originally came from the idea that they were denied busing, a service that was
provided for their White counterparts.83 This prompted them to seek legal representation,
and file a suit challenging the concept of segregation as a whole.84 A school principal,
Reverend J.A. DeLaine, aggressively recruited parents for the complaint and sought out
the NAACP. Harold Boulware, a local lawyer, along with Thurgood Marshall filed the
Briggs v. Eliot case in the fall of 1950.85 The U.S. District Court decided against the
plaintiffs’ idea of abolishing school segregation. 86The court ordered the school board to
begin a plan to make the Black schools equal with the White ones.87 The lone dissenting
opinion came from Judge Julius Waring, who adamantly spoke out against school
segregation practices.88
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Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia)
A group of high-school students, led by student Barbara Rose Johns, participated
in a strike to protest inferior school conditions in Farmville, Virginia.89 The protest lasted
two weeks, and included over four hundred fifty African American students from Moton
High School.90 Moton High School lacked some of the resources available at other high
schools such as a gymnasium, cafeteria, and an infirmary.91 The students sought
assistance from the NAACP branch office in Richmond, Virginia.92 In 1951 Spottswood
Robinson and Oliver Hill, members of the local NAACP, filed a suit on behalf of one
hundred and seventeen students.93 The goal was to end the practice of segregated schools.
The U.S. District Court rejected the request of the students, and ordered the school board
to continue trying to equalize the African American schools.94 The plaintiffs were still
denied access to White schools.95 The case was sent to the Supreme Court along with the
four other cases.
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Bolling v. Melvin Sharpe (D.C.)
In 1947, Garden Bishop and the Consolidated Parents Group, Inc. began their
fight against school segregation in Washington, DC. In 1950, the group attempted to
enroll eleven African American students into the newly built John Phillip Sousa Junior
High School. Charles Houston provided legal services for the group.96 When Houston
became ill, he was replaced by James Nabrit Jr. Nabrit wanted to change the original
strategy by placing emphasis on ending school segregation, rather than focusing on
developing separate but equal accommodations.97 The U.S District court dismissed the
case on the basis of the ruling by the Court of Appeals in Carr v. Corning, which
determined that the segregation of schools was constitutional in the District of
Columbia.98 Nabrit filed an appeal, and later the case was heard with the other four cases
before the Supreme Court.
Brown v. Board of Education (Kansas)
The Brown v. Board of Education case was spearheaded by the local NAACP
chapter in Topeka, Kansas.99 The group attempted to solicit individuals whom were being
discriminated against by their neighborhood schools.100 Thirteen parents volunteered to
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participate in the NAACP’s strategy.101 At the beginning of the 1950 school year, these
parents attempted to enroll their children in the neighborhood school.102 Instead, they
were forced to attend one of four schools in the city designated for African Americans.
The suit was filed against the Topeka Board of Education on behalf of the parents and
their twenty children.103 The case was named after Oliver Brown, a minister, because he
was the first parent listed on the suit.104 The case was first filed in 1951.
All of the lawsuits were trying to attain the same constitutional goal: the
dismantling of Jim Crow education as a violation of the equal protection of the laws.105
The suits did not only represent the specific plaintiffs of each case, but also those in
communities who were victims of the same plight.106
The Case
The arguments in Brown took place in three stages:
1. The initial presentation of the case, which did not allow the justices
sufficient time to consider all of the presented evidence.
2. A second phase, which argued the intentions of the 14th Amendment’s
framers.
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3. After the court struck down Plessy v. Ferguson (Brown I), a call for a
remedy to segregation was initiated. (Brown II).107
Chief Justice Fredrick M. Vinson served as the primary judge when the five cases
initially were brought before the Supreme Court.108 Vinson had previously ruled on both
the McLaurin and Sweatt cases.109 Six days after the hearings began, the Court convened
to consider the evidence that had been brought before them.110Southern attitudes and
values favoring segregation permeated the Judge’s Chambers, and many of the Justices
were concerned about the impact of integration.111 While the Court understood that it was
imperative to render a decision, and decide whether to combine the five cases into one,
the court suffered from deep internal divisions causing Vinson to delay the decision.112
The Court announced it would need more information before it could make its final
determination.113 Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter drafted five questions that
were approved by the court, and would need to be addressed by the NAACP lawyers in
the next session.114 Three of the questions were concerned with the interpretation of the
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Fourteenth Amendment and judicial power under the amendment while the other two
dealt with decrees which the court might issue.115 The questions were:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the state
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not
understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. (If not) was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the
Amendment:
(a) the future Congress might, in the exercise of their power under
Section 5 of the Amendment abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such
segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the (earlier) answers do not dispose of the
issues, is it within the judicial power, in constructing the Amendment,
to abolish segregation in public schools?
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the
Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits
set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an
effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing
segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and
assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the
end described in question 4 (b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
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(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a
view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with
directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general
directions should the decrees of this Court include and what
procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at
the specific terms of more detailed decrees?" 116
On December 7, 1953 when the Court assembled for the rehearing, quite a bit had
changed.117 In September of that same year, Chief Justice Vinson, at the age of sixtythree, died of a heart attack in his hotel apartment in Washington.118 President
Eisenhower chose Governor Earl Warren of California as Vinson’s successor.119
When Judge Warren provided the majority opinion, he carefully approached how
he addressed the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. It was apparent that the “separate but equal
doctrine” would need to be eradicated in order to fully create equal education for all. This
could not be done without alienating those whom were against the mixing of races,
particularly those who lived in the South. Part of Justice Warren’s opinion, foreshadowed
the idea that the Supreme Court decision was going to look at segregation much
differently than the courts did in 1896. Part of Warren’s opinion read:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson
was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
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Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.120
Justice Warren addressed the importance of education, and how its benefits
should be available to all. Warren spoke of education as a necessity, and that those
without would have a minimal opportunity to be successful. He also painted a picture that
illustrated educated individuals as being an asset to the country as a whole. After
articulating the benefits of education, Warren then addressed the importance of education
being equal for all. The majority opinion reads:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.121
Once Justice Warren provided the importance of education, specifically equal
education, he then began to clearly express the court’s opinion on school segregation.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of
the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it
does.122
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As Justice Warren continued the majority opinion, he described the harms of
segregation. Warren made clear references of how segregation negatively affects students
of color. He also explicitly discussed how segregation practices enforced by law
consequently create a feeling of inferiority for Blacks.
Segregation of White and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of
inferiority effects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.123
Warren’s opinion regarding the detrimental effect segregation had on Black
children was likely the result of Thurgood Marshall and his team’s incorporation of
psychological and sociological testimony during the hearings.124 Marshall and his team
felt it was important to demonstrate the psychological and intellectual consequences of
segregation; therefore, they collaborated with Kenneth Clark, a Black psychologist who
studied how segregation affected children.
In 1939 and 1940, psychologist Kenneth Clark along with his wife Mamie Phipps
tested Black children in Washington, D.C. and New York City to determine how the
children perceived themselves.125 They used four plastic dolls with identical features
except their color. One doll resembled a White individual while the other represented a
Black. These dolls were shown to Black children between the ages of three and seven
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who attended both integrated and segregated schools.126 They were then asked questions
to determine racial perception and preference. The results showed that each child easily
identified the specific race of each doll. The children also correlated positive
characteristics and attributes with the White doll opposed to the Black one, and showed
preference to the White doll over the Black one. Dr. Clark also provided the children with
outline drawings of a boy and girl and told them to color the figures in a like image of
themselves. Children who were darker in color tended to color the figures with a White or
Yellow crayon. It was concluded that prejudice, discrimination, and segregation caused
Black children to develop a sense of inferiority and self-hatred. The study was published
in 1940 in the Spring issue of the Journal of Experimental Education.127 The study also
became the subject of a paper Dr. Clark presented at a White House Conference on
Children and Youth in 1950.128 Clark provided a critical social science testimony in the
Briggs, Davis, and Delaware cases. Clark’s work was later cited in the Brown decision.
The long debated topic about the Fourteenth Amendment was also addressed in
Justice Warren’s reading of the decision.
We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason
of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes
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unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.129
In the Brown decision of 1954, the Court delayed any directives for
compliance.130 The new arguments the Court asked for delayed the implementation of the
practices Brown set forth for a year.131
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the
formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable
complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was
necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We have now announced that such
segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we
may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the
cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to
present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by
the Court for the reargument….132
In 1955, in what was termed Brown II, the court issued its enforcement decree.133
This was the court’s opportunity to assure the practices set forth in Brown I would be
accepted by all Northerners and Southerners alike. In Judge Warren’s reading of the
court’s opinion, he put the burden of desegregating the schools on school authorities and
the local court system.
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution
of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems;
129
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courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible
need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can
best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate
to remand the cases to those courts.134
Judge Warren continued to discuss the roles of the local court system, relying on
them not to allow biases to get in the way of desegregating schools.
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise
of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal
interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may
call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to
school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles
set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly
take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in
a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them.135
The 1955 ruling attempted to place a time frame on when the desegregation
requirements would be implemented. It was a far cry from the original decision in 1954,
although many debate that its vagueness served as a detriment to the cause.
While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts
will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been
made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the
ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to
establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent
with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the
courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the
134
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physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact
units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools
on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may
be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider
the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these
problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory
school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain
jurisdiction of these cases.136
Judge Warren’s last comments again placed the responsibility on the local court
system to assure the proper desegregation of schools. The phrase “with all deliberate
speed” was mentioned by Justice Warren as it related to the time frame in which schools
would need to be integrated.
The judgments below, except that, in the Delaware case, are accordingly
reversed, and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion
as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases.137
As Marshall and his team reflected about the court’s decision, they tried to find
meaning in the phrase “all deliberate speed.”138 This phrase later took a meaning of its
own, allowing others to interpret its true definition.139 For those districts and communities
for which the directive applied, the phrase was taken literally, allowing them for almost
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ten years to have minimal compliance.140 Those who chose not to comply utilized many
tactics to discourage the court’s wishes.
When South Carolina threatened to dispose of the public school system entirely
rather than integrate its schools, officials in the state made it known that they would not
support the idea of Black teachers working in White schools.141 The sentiment of
Southerners at the time was illustrated publicly in a form letter created specifically for the
Black elementary school teachers in the Topeka school district. The letter was written by
Wendell Godwin, superintendent of schools in Topeka. It read:
Dear Miss Buchanan,
Due to the present uncertainty about enrollment next year in schools for
Negro children, it is not possible at this time to offer you employment for
next year. If the Supreme Court should rule that segregation in the
elementary grades is unconstitutional our Board will proceed on the
assumption that the majority of people in Topeka will not want to employ
Negro teachers next year for White children. It is necessary for me to
notify you now that your services will not be needed for next year. This is
in compliance with the continuing contract law. If it turns out that
segregation is not terminated, there will be nothing to prevent us from
negotiating a contract with you at some later date this spring. You will
understand that I am sending letters of this kind to only those teachers of
Negro schools who have been employed during the last year or two. It is
presumed that, even though segregation should be declared
unconstitutional we would have need for some schools for Negro children
and we would retain our Negro teachers to them. I think I understand all of
you must be under considerable strain, and I sympathize with the
uncertainties and inconveniences which you must experience during this
period of adjustment. I believe that whatever happens will ultimately turn
out to be best for everybody concerned.
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Sincerely, Wendell Godwin
Superintendent of Schools
WG:la
Cc: Mr. Whitson142
The feelings of those who expressed disdain towards integration practices were
evident in what has been termed as the Southern Manifesto. This effort was spearheaded
by U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Senior.143 The Southern Manifesto was a document that
spoke in opposition to the new laws of desegregation, and was signed by over one
hundred southern office holders.144 The document attempted to convey a message that the
decision of how children were educated should be made by each individual state. It also
tried to communicate the notion that such integration laws would cause dissention
amongst the races. An excerpt of the document reads:
The unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public school cases
is now bearing the fruit always produced when men substitute naked
power for established law…
We regard the decisions of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a
clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal Judiciary
undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to
encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people…
The unwarranted exercise of power by the Court, contrary to the
Constitution, is creating chaos and confusion in the State principally
affected. It is destroying the amicable relations between the White and
Negro races that have been created through 90 years of patient effort by
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the good people of both races. It has planted hatred and suspicion where
there has been heretofore friendship and understanding.145
On February 25, 1956, Byrd Senior called for what is known as the Massive
Resistance.146 Massive Resistance consisted of a group of laws put in place to stop the
integration of the public school system.147 The laws passed in 1958, and put into place a
pupil placement board, tuition grants for students who contested integration and a system
for relinquishing state funds from schools that chose to integrate.148
States that complied with the desegregation laws did so in a cautious manner.
School officials were aware of the concerns held by members of the White community,
and did their best to assure that their children would still get a quality education despite
integration. An excerpt from a Charleston newspaper illustrates these types of attempts
most clearly. In an article in the Charleston Gazette, Superintendent L.K. Lovenstein
states:
There is no indication that educational standards have suffered from the
desegregation move. For the most part the Negro teachers are well trained,
and the Negro children have been able to keep up with their White
counterparts. In extra-curricular activities, the same situation is evident.
Negroes are elected to class offices, they work on the school newspapers,
they play on the football, basketball and baseball teams, and they
participate in class plays.149
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These types of pleads became less necessary as years passed, but it was evident
that it would take more than the recent Brown decision to make the desegregation of
schools an acceptable practice across the country.
Civil Rights Act of 1964
While it seemed that the Brown decision encompassed all of the negativity
associated with racial discrimination, the demise of separate-but-equal practices did not
take place for another ten years.150 Although it was determined that state imposed
segregation practices in public schools was unconstitutional, implementing the ruling in
the nation’s school districts required local plaintiffs, money, and data.151 Finding
plaintiffs that were willing to take their case to the courts was a difficult task. They were
often afraid of retaliation southern communities.152 Filing suit also required the
employment of a local attorney, which also served as a difficult task.153 Both perspective
plaintiffs and attorneys had to consider the possibility of job loss and physical harm if
associated with a lawsuit against a Southern school district.154
On June 11, 1963, President John F. Kennedy announced publicly that he would
submit to Congress a comprehensive civil rights bill that would end racial segregation in
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public schools as well as public accommodations along with ensuring African Americans
the right to vote.155
President Kennedy would be murdered before he could see the Civil Rights Bill
through its fruition.156 Five days after Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon John and
members of Congress worked aggressively to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964.157 Their
efforts were met with great opposition, as a group of southern senators spoke out against
the bill’s passing, claiming that the federal government was superseding its authority by
denying American citizens their basic economic, personal, and property rights for the sole
benefit of the Black population.158
Despite resistance, the bill was passed by a majority vote in Congress.159 The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consists of several key provisions, with Title IV and VI having a
significant effect on the desegregation of schools.160 Title IV is broken into ten sections
that further describe how the government planned to protect individuals from
discriminatory practices. 161
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Section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the Commissioner of
Education the opportunity to assess the desegregation efforts of states and school
districts. This was a far cry from the vagueness associated with Judge Warren’s
request for desegregation efforts to be done with “all deliberate speed” as set forth
in the Brown v. Board decision. Section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
states:
The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the
President and the Congress, within two years of the enactment of this title,
concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for
individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public
educational institutions at all levels in the United States, its territories and
possessions, and the District of Columbia.162
Section 407 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the Attorney General the ability
to sue school districts who continued to endorse desegregation practices. Section 407 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing-(1) signed by a parent or group of parents to the effect that his or their
minor children, as members of a class of persons similarly situated, are
being deprived by a school board of the equal protection of the laws, or
(2) signed by an individual, or his parent, to the effect that he has been
denied admission to or not permitted to continue in attendance at a public
college by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin, and the
Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that
the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to
initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the
institution of an action will materially further the orderly achievement of
desegregation in public education, the Attorney General is authorized…
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to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any
appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for
such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall
exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section,
provided that nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the
United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any
school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one
school to another or one school district to another in order to achieve such
racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to
insure compliance with constitutional standards.163
Title VI addressed federally funded programs, and how they were to be
implemented. This was important because it directly affected the finances of those
districts who continued to prescribe to practicing desegregation. Section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.164
Moving Towards the Consent Decree
With the federal government taking a more aggressive role in enforcing the tenets
set forth in the Brown v. Board case, the Chicago Public School district, as well as other
school districts around the country, was forced to develop ways to promote desegregation
to maintain their federal funding. The years between the introduction of the Civil Rights
Act of 1965 and the agreed upon the Consent Decree in 1980 would prove to be filled
with failed attempts to create schools that could truly live up to Brown. In the two
decades that span this time period, the Chicago Public Schools would operate under the
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leadership of five superintendents, each with his or her own strategies in how they would
tackle the issue of desegregation. Ultimately, their failed tactics to eliminate segregative
practices within the Chicago Public Schools led to the signing of the decree.

CHAPTER III
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREE
Introduction
The shaping of public education in Chicago can be directly attributed to the rapid
changes of society. Shortly after World War II, many of Chicago’s White constituents
migrated to the suburbs in part due to housing shortages, stimulated road building, and
new modes of transportation. Ninety percent of Chicago’s population of nearly 3.4
million people was White. By 1960, Whites only made up seventy percent of the
population. These demographic changes greatly affected the make-up of Chicago’s
neighborhoods. Predominately Black poor urban areas of the city found themselves
surrounded by suburbs occupied by a majority White population.1
Education in the Chicago Public Schools mirrored the same racial isolation that
was going on in traditional society.2 The Chicago Public Schools had a history of
segregated public schools that continued the cycle of promoting racial isolation.3 Black
students attended the Chicago Public Schools as early as 1837. They were not formally
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segregated from their white peers; however, they were not encouraged to attend school.4
Compulsory attendance laws were not put in place until 1919, requiring all children to
attend school.5 As other minorities began to migrate to the city, Chicago’s population
became more diverse.6 Eventually, the neighborhoods within the city became segregated
based on race, ethnicity, and religious identity.7 The concept of the neighborhood school
was embraced by the Chicago Public Schools, and as neighborhoods became more
segregated so did their school’s populations.8 Ninety-one percent of elementary schools
along with 71% of high-schools were made up of a single race b y 1956.9
The racial isolation that plagued the Chicago Public Schools was not only
perpetuated by neighborhood demographics, but also by some of the practices of the
Chicago Public Schools itself.10 “Official restrictive housing covenants, and
neighborhood school policies established to be consistent with them, worked to contain
blacks and other minorities in specified areas of the city.”11 Actions such as these put the
Chicago Public Schools in direct violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board
case.
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Before the Chicago Public Schools entered into the Consent Decree, the school
district would be led by several different educational leaders, each with his/her own
perspective on the importance of desegregation. These leaders would be responsible for
spearheading Chicago’s attempts to desegregate its schools, spanning from the fifties up
until the early eighties when the Consent Decree was agreed upon. In their attempts,
educational leaders would find themselves dealing with many hindrances to their cause
such as, a lack of federal funding, community backlash, and in some cases what appeared
to be their own biases. Regardless of what circumstances there might have been, the
success of their attempts to desegregate the Chicago Public Schools was minimal as the
district found itself bound by court supervision when it entered into the Consent Decree.
Leadership and the Attempt at Desegregating the Chicago Public Schools
The Willis Era: 1953-1966
Benjamin C. Willis became the superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools in
1953 and played a major role in the Chicago Public School’s discriminatory practices.12
On the surface, Benjamin Willis appeared to have a profound positive effect on the
Chicago Public Schools, increasing enrollment at a pace of ten thousand students a year
while diminishing classroom sizes by 20%.13 Teacher salaries increased along with a
system enabling them to advance their education.14 Willis was also credited for the
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construction and expansion of 208 elementary schools and 113 high schools during a
time when the district was benefiting from public support.15
Benjamin Willis became one of the most celebrated school leaders of his day.16
His accomplishments were well documented, as stated in a Time magazine article entitled
“The Education of Big Ben.” An excerpt from the article reads:
Willis is the U.S.'s highest-paid public school official. His $48,500 salary,
indeed, ranks him fourth among all U.S. public officials, after President
Kennedy, Governor Rockefeller and New York's Mayor Wagner. Willis is
also an exceedingly able administrator who oversees 552,000 pupils,
22,000 teachers and a $300 million annual budget with brisk efficiency.
During his ten years in his post, he has recruited 6,000 additional teachers,
nearly doubled the salary scale, added enough classrooms to trim the
average class from 39 pupils to 32, and eliminated all double-shift
instruction despite a school-age population explosion. He has planned and
overseen a $250 million building program, completed without a single
major scandal.17
While Willis’s leadership brought a sense of stability to the Chicago
Public Schools, it did not come without a price. Willis was a strong advocate of
the values and virtues associated with the concept of neighborhood schools.18 This
philosophy was detrimental as illustrated in this excerpt of “The Education of Big
Ben”:
In Chicago, even more than in most U.S. cities, whites and
Negroes live apart, in separate neighborhoods. That has been the pattern
for generations. Since each child attends the school in his own
neighborhood, most Chicago public schools are either predominantly
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white or predominantly Negro. About 90% of the city's Negro elementary
school pupils attend schools that are virtually all Negro.19
Blacks during Willis’ tenure demanded that the Chicago Public Schools be
desegregated, but their wishes were met with little regard.20 Blacks not only felt their
education was segregated, but also unequal.21 According to a survey by the Chicago
Urban League, teacher salaries in Black schools were only 85% as high as their White
counterparts, while operating expenses per Black pupil were only 66% as high as that of
White pupils.22 Although Willis was known for building academic structures, schools in
Black neighborhoods weren’t the beneficiary of these new facilities.23 When schools in
black communities were overcrowded, Willis utilized various tactics to increase
classrooms within these schools. He allowed schools to operate with a proportionately
high number of mobile classrooms that became known as Willis Wagons. 24 He also
implemented plans that made it necessary to accelerate building schedules, teachers to
work double shifts, and commercial facilities to be converted into schools. These
strategies enabled Willis to circumvent any efforts designed to integrate schools.25
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Willis vehemently denied the prospect that the use of mobile classrooms was a
tactic to discriminate against minority students. In a report Willis made to the Chicago
Public Schools Board of Education on January 24, 1962, Willis depicted the use of
mobile classrooms being utilized at LeMoyne and Parker Elementary schools.26 In his
report it was indicated that the mobile classrooms contained the light, heat, space,
educational facilities and attractiveness of a regular classroom.27 The report also
conveyed that the mobile classrooms were used to eliminate double shift assignments.
The mobiles were used until a new school was built and could be used in areas with a
sudden population increase.28 According to Willis:
It would seem that the mobile classroom might better be called the model
classroom. In the comments of observers, the word delightful keeps
recurring. Certainly an atmosphere that calls forth this response can be an
invaluable asset, a motivation, and an inspiration in educating our
children. And let us not forget the economic impact of this, which means a
classroom for approximately $900 instead of $30,000.29
Blacks were enraged and grew impatient with Willis and his actions which were
perceived to perpetuate segregation.30 Civil rights activist, as well as many Black leaders,
saw the use of mobile classrooms as a way to make sure that Blacks were contained in a
certain area of the city preventing their migration to areas that were designated as all-

26

Benjamin Willis, Report to the Board of Education of the City of Chicago: Mobile Classrooms,
January 24, 1962 in Cyrus Hall Adams Papers Box 1-2, CHS.
27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid.

30

“The Education of Big Ben,” 82.

83
White.31 Blacks organized sit-ins at the Board of Education headquarters as well as
demonstrations wherein volunteers would lie in front of the mobile classrooms in protest
of overcrowded conditions.32
Willis strayed away from conversations of race claiming to be oblivious to the
amount of Black or White students enrolled at a particular school since the district did not
maintain records of students’ nor employees’ race, color, or creed.33 Willis stated he was
not working to maintain desegregated schools in the city of Chicago, but rather to
preserve the concept of the neighborhood school.34 Willis did put forth a transfer plan
that appeared to be just “for show” at best, as only a total of 32 children moved to other
schools.35
Eventually Willis’ discriminatory practices would be unveiled. Willis was
charged by the federal government with developing plans to utilize federal funding in
areas that did not accommodate high populations of low-income underprivileged
minorities.36 This resulted in the launching of an investigation.37 The federal government
made the determination that they would withhold their financial support provided to the
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city of Chicago pending the hearing on the complaints to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) on segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.38 Based on
the results of the hearing, a suit was brought by the Coordinating Council of Community
Organization (CCCO) in 1965.39 The CCCO was led by a former teacher named Al Raby,
and would be a focal point of Black mobilization around school issues for the next few
years.40 Part of the suit initiated by the CCCO read:
In 1964-65, with the addition of 10 new elementary schools and two new
secondary schools accommodating an increase of 642 white and 264 other
pupils, segregation in the Chicago schools was shown to have increased.
Absolutely segregated elementary schools now constituted 82.3% of the
total, and in both categories, segregated schools now constituted 74.4% of
the total.41
In 1963, the Chicago Public Schools created an advisory panel headed by Philip
Hauser to study the problem of segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.42 The panel
was designed to analyze and study the school system with particular regard to schools
attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes. After completing the assessment, the
panel was required to submit to the Board of Education a comprehensive report that
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included detailed plans to eliminate any prevailing educational, psychological, and
emotional problems or inequities in the school system.43
After twenty-four days of deliberation, the panel determined that the segregation
that plagued the Chicago Public Schools was not uncommon in other large urban cities.44
The segregation of its school system was not the intent or design of the Chicago Public
Schools Board of Education, but rather a by-product of segregated patterns of settlement
and housing.45 As a result of residential concentration, the black population like white
immigrants before them, found their children attending segregated schools.46 While the
Hauser Report acknowledged the fact that whites and blacks both found their children
attending de facto segregated schools, it also depicted an environment that discriminated
against black children solely based on their skin color.
The Negro, unlike the white immigrant, was and is an American citizen;
the Negro remains visible and therefore identifiable, even after long
residence in the City; in addition to the handicaps of being a newcomer,
the Negro carries the added burdens of his heritage of slavery, the
destruction of his African culture, underprivileged rearing, denigration,
and widespread racial prejudice. In consequence, although they have made
considerable progress in Chicago as measured by higher levels of
education, occupation, and income, Negroes have not been as free as their
white immigrant predecessors to break out of segregated settlement area
and to achieve rapid economic and social advance.47
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The report also directly criticized Willis for his stance on race in the Chicago
Public Schools, calling him “a giant of inertia, inequity, injustice, intransigence and
trained incapacity.”48 Despite the fact that the Hauser Report represented the opinion of
experts in the field, Willis dismissed the report’s contents and refused to allow others
opinions effect his management of the Chicago Public Schools.49He believed that schools
were to be led by educational experts, without external forces hindering the process.50
Willis’ commitment to this philosophy made him oblivious to other’s cries of racial
inequality, and consequently made him the symbol of resistance to school desegregation
in Chicago.51
In 1963 Charles Armstrong, a Chicago representative to the Illinois General
Assembly, introduced House Bill 113 which was successfully passed by the assembly
and would make significant changes to the School Code of Illinois.52 An excerpt from the
bill that would eventually be termed as The Armstrong Law read:
In erecting, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring buildings for school
purposes, the Board shall not do so in such a manner as to promote
segregation or separation of children in public schools because of color,
race, or nationality. As soon as practicable, and from time to time
thereafter, the Board shall change or revise existing (attendance) units or
create new units in a manner which will take into consideration the
prevention of segregation, and the elimination of separation of children in
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the public schools because of color, race, or nationality. All records
pertaining to the creation of attendance units shall be open to the public.53
In 1966, Benjamin C. Willis resigned from the Chicago Public Schools
charging that the Board had invaded his administrative domain amidst the
segregation controversy going on in the Chicago Public Schools.54
The Redmond Era: 1966-1975
On May 25, 1966, James F. Redmond was appointed as the superintendent of the
Chicago Public Schools.55 He was the unanimous choice of the Board of Education’s
committee responsible for choosing the successor of Benjamin C. Willis.56 Redmond’s
original contract extended over a four year period paying him $48,500 a year.57
Redmond’s demeanor contrasted that of his predecessor, placing emphasis on issues and
goals rather than himself.58
When James Redmond took over as Superintendent of the Chicago Public
Schools, the district was still segregated. Only 28% of white students were served by
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schools that had more than a 5% population of black students.59 In contrast, only 4.7% of
black students were served at schools that were considered to be predominately white.60
Redmond’s resolve was tested right away. In January 1967, the United States
Office of Education for Civil Rights provided a statement of findings and
recommendations as they related to the operation of the Chicago Public Schools.61 This
report was entitled Report on Office of Education Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago
Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.62 The report highlighted
four areas of concern which included: faculty assignment patterns, boundaries and
student assignment policies, the apprenticeship training program and the open enrollment
for vocational and trade schools.63
In response to these findings, Redmond developed a proposal requesting a
planning grant from the U.S. Office of Education under Section 405 (a) (2) of Title IV of
Public Law 88-352 to fund a specialist to assist in developing a plan to address
concerns.64 The grant was approved, and Redmond and his team began working to
resolve some of the problems associated with the operation of the Chicago Public
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Schools. Out of these collaborations Dr. Redmond developed the following
recommendations:
I.

Apprenticeship Training Programs
A. Cooperate with the U.S. Office of Education and the U.S.
Department of Labor in review of the Mayor’s program to increase
enrollment of students from Negro and other minority groups.
B. Develop plans for working on a continuing basis with
apprenticeship councils to assist in increasing minority
representation in apprenticeship programs and to develop public
confidence in the procedures of the councils.
C. Develop a program to more effectively inform students from
minority groups about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan
additional programs to prepare such students to achieve eligibility.

II.

Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools
A. Arrange conferences with the U.S. Office of education to explore
additional procedures to implement the open enrollment policy
now in effect in Vocational and Trade Schools in order to increase
integration in these schools.
B. Investigate opportunities for extension of career development
programs.

III.

Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies
A. Retain independent and objective specialists to work with the staff.
B. Review attendance boundaries and assignment policies of students.
C. Determine feasibility of various actions within the power of the
Board of Education to reduce segregation.

IV.

Faculty Assignment Patterns
A. Retain personnel administration experts as consultants.
B. Involve representatives of teacher organizations.
C. Review teacher personnel assignment procedures to plan for
increased integration of faculties.
D. Develop feasible plans to equalize the distribution of experienced
teachers to the greatest possible degree.
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E. Identify characteristics and conditions of schools which distinguish
desirable and less desirable schools as seen by teachers.65
At a special session of the Board of Education, Redmond presented the plan
entitled Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education
Programs.66 It was considered to be the first out-and out integration program in
Chicago’s history, and would later be known as the Redmond Report.67
One of the first major implementations of the Redmond Report was a proposal for
busing to encourage the integration of the Chicago Public Schools.68 The plan only called
for the busing of black students to white schools that had low black enrollment.
Arrangements to bus white students to predominately black schools were not included in
the plan due to anticipated resistance from the white community.69
At the beginning it seemed as if Redmond and his plan would have a strong
legion of support. The school board endorsed the new plan that aggressively worked to
integrate the Chicago Public Schools.70 However, as time passed implementation costs,
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lengthy traveling times, and the fear of bodily harm to students caused board members to
reassess the plan and eventually reject the busing project.71
The Hannon Era: 1975-1979
In 1975, James Redmond made the announcement to the Chicago Public Schools
Board of Education that he would not seek another term as the general superintendent.72
On July 24, 1975, Dr. Joseph P. Hannon was appointed as General Superintendent of
Schools for four years with an effective date of September 14, 1975. 73 Hannon took on
the Chicago Public Schools at a time when reading scores were low; there was an
increase in minority student population yet a decrease in minority teachers; the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare threatened to relinquish up to $100
million dollars in federal funding due to the school district’s failure to integrate their
faculties; integrating students appeared to be an elusive goal, and a teacher strike was
currently in progress.74
In the early part of 1976, Hannon submitted a plan to the Office for Civil Rights
in response to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s request to remediate
segregation policies in order to comply with Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act by September 1976.75 The plan was Hannon’s effort to put together in one
booklet the facts and figures related to the Plan to Integrate Local School Facilities,
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Equalize Staff Services, and Provide Special Services to National Origin Minority
Children.76 Before the plan was submitted, Hannon had to get approval from the Chicago
Public Schools Board of Education. In a General Committee meeting designed to review
his plan, Hannon explained to the Board of Education the procedures used in its
development. Hannon stated:
On January 21, 1976, the Board of Education authorized the General
Superintendent to develop a plan to integrate school faculties and
concomitant procedures necessary to achieve specific goals, and review
with the Board Committee, now a committee of the whole, the Chicago
Teachers Union, and the Chicago Principal’s Association, the plan to
further enhance the further racial/ethnic integration of school faculties as
delineated in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.77
Hannon’s opening statement to Board illustrated that the desegregation process would
need to involve all stake holders. Hannon sought representation from both the Teachers
Union as well the Chicago Principals Association understanding how important they
would be in the desegregating of the Chicago Public Schools. Ultimately, the decision to
approve Hannon’s plan would still rest in the hands of the Board.
Hannon’s closing statements would clearly illustrate that Hannon believed the
proposed plan would rid the Chicago Public Schools of segregation without
compromising its educational programs. He reiterated his commitment to providing a
quality education for all students. It also made clear that Hannon was truly behind this
plan, and believed that through its implementation, federal government requirements
would be satisfied.
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Hannon stated:When the request from the Office for Civil Rights was reviewed on
January 21, I said that quality education must go hand-in-hand with ethnic
and racial equality. This plan is concerned with quality education, with
ethnic and racial equality, and with the students, teachers, and citizens in
this city. We cannot and should not separate the school system from the
city or the city from the school system. A productive school system is
essential to a dynamic, progressive city.
This plan has been prepared with care and with concern for the ongoing
instructional programs provided to the children in our schools and for the
viability of the communities in Chicago. It is based on the firm belief that
it can be done without disruption of our schools and their educational
programs. It is a sound plan- - a plan which I believe will work. It is a plan
which I strongly urge the Board of Education to adopt and the Office for
Civil Rights to accept.78
Despite Hannon’s hard work and the plan’s approval from the Chicago Public
Schools Board of Education, the plan was rejected by the Office for Civil Rights and
Hannon was asked to provide additional information.79 The Office for Civil Rights
informed Hannon that it reviewed data to determine the process for assigning faculty and
staff to develop racially identifiable schools.80 They also wanted to know if teachers
assigned to work with minority students had less experience and professional training
than those assigned to work with their nonminority counterparts.81 Lastly, the office
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wanted to determine if minority children were being offered equally effective educational
opportunities as others.82
The Office for Civil Rights requested a plan be submitted within sixty days
explaining how the Chicago Public Schools would develop a process to assign faculty so
that it would comply with the goals for desegregation.83 They also expected that the ratio
of minority to nonminority personnel in individual schools be the same as the ratio across
the entire district by September 1976.84 At the same time it was expected that the
proportion of teachers with extensive professional education and experience, and those
teachers with lesser education and experience, be comparable in number in all of the
district’s schools.85
Dr. Hannon requested an extension of 60 days to respond to the expectations
provided by the Office for Civil Rights, and provided an outline of the steps necessary for
Chicago to comply with the provisions of Title VI. Hannon outlined the following nine
steps:
1.) Collecting and analyzing current data on the characteristics of
students and programs for the 1975-76 school year as they relate to the
regulations of Title VI;
2.) developing assessment techniques for the identification of the English
language proficiency of national origin minority students;
3.) reviewing the regulations of Title VI with the Chicago Teachers
Union;
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4.) reviewing and discussing the provisions of Title VI with the board of
education and developing recommendations related to a plan for
compliance for the board’s approval;
5.) coordinating the regulations of Title VI with the requirements of the
State of Illinois for mandated bilingual education programs and for
school district desegregation plans;
6.) developing instructional models that meet programmatic needs in
schools with students of national minority origins who have English
language problems;
7.) identifying sources of funding for the development of assessment
techniques, instructional models, and staff inservicing;
8.) studying alternative methods of reallocating support services in
schools attended by national minority students; and
9.) establishing procedures for identifying individual racial and ethnic
data on students and staff.86
The Board of Education passed a resolution prescribed by the Illinois Board of
Education to develop, adopt, and implement a comprehensive Equal Educational
Opportunity Plan created to meet the criteria for conformance with the Rules Establishing
Requirements and Procedures for the Elimination and Prevention of Racial Segregation
in Schools.87 A draft of the plan was created and submitted to the Office for Civil Rights
to ensure that it would meet the Illinois resolution and also comply with the guidelines set
forth by the Office of Civil Rights.88 The plan explained how the Chicago Public Schools
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would integrate faculties by September 1977, eliminate any identifiable pattern of
principal assignment, and provide appropriate bilingual services.89
In February of 1977, a federal judge made the determination that the Chicago
Public Schools was in violation on the federal faculty/staff racial factor and bilingual
issue but was not in violation of the faculty experience factor.90 A special consultant was
designated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to assist in the
negotiations with the Board in the settlement of the Title VI proceedings.91 On May 25th,
the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education adopted the Plan for the Implementation
of Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related To: Integration of
Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education Programs.92 The
plan, under Dr. Hannon’s leadership became known as Access to Excellence.93
Access to Excellence was designed to increase the quality of educational
opportunities for all students in a desegregated setting.94 The plan was designed to be
implemented within a five year period and to be completed by the 1982-1983 school
year.95 The plan consisted of three major parts:

89

Ibid.

90

Stringfellow, “Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago,” 56.

91

Plan for the Implementation of the Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights of 1964 related to:
“Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education Programs.” Chicago
Public Schools, Board of Education, Chicago, 12 October 1977.
92

Stringfellow, “Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago,” 57.

93

Joseph P. Hannon, Access to Excellence: Recommendations for Equalizing Educational
Opportunities. Integration Plan, April 12, 1978.
94

Ibid.

97
1.) District Programs- Educational initiatives that will be undertaken by
each of the 27 districts to serve primarily, but not exclusively, the
students of the district.
2.) System Programs- educational initiatives that will enroll students from
all parts of the city.
3.) Administrative Actions- Initiatives that give students the opportunity
to extend their school day year through the summer, to enroll in the
school of their choice, and to have improved educational facilities.96
District programs were established to provide necessary support for students that
were struggling academically. It was explicitly stated in the Access to Excellence plan
that students who needed extra assistance in specific subject areas would have access to
services to assist them in their learning.
District programs calls for each district to establish a basic skills program
so that students needing intensive work in reading, mathematics, and
language arts may have access to services that will help them gain the
skills necessary for further learning. In addition, each district is to develop
and implement a program to serve a particular need or interest of students
in the district.97
System programs were designed to offer educational alternatives for both low and
high achieving students. These programs were created to encourage the integration of a
diverse body of students who shared a common interest.
These programs will serve students from preschool through high school;
they appeal to many diverse interests by offering a broad range of subjects
and instructional approaches; they provide alternatives to meet the needs
of students who are below mastery level as well as to challenge students
who are academically gifted. Every program in every category is designed
to attract racially and ethnically diverse group of students with common
interests and aspirations.98
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System programs activities were divided into six categories: 1) Academic
Interest Centers, 2) Enrichment Studies Programs, 3) High School
Bilingual Centers, 4) Career Education Programs, 5) Magnet Schools, 6)
Preschool Programs.99
Administrative actions brought about the opportunity for students to extend their
own learning. Moreover, it provided the opportunity for students to attend other schools
that offer programming suited to their interests. It was also made clear that students
would no longer be subjected to environments that hindered their ability to learn.
Administrative Actions provides further opportunities for students:
summer school extends their learning opportunities; permissive enrollment
allows students to seek out the schools in the city that offer the programs
they desire; the removal of mobiles and construction of new facilities
gives students environments conducive to learning.100
In the spring of 1979, the federal government accused the Chicago Public Schools
of continually supporting segregation in its schools, and stated that they would file a suit
against the district if they did not develop a comprehensive desegregation plan by
September.101It was stated to Dr. Hannon in a letter from Joseph Califano that the
Board’s Access to Excellence program did not correct the identified violations.102 David
Tatel, Director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Office of Civil
Rights, delivered a document to Hannon expressing concern for Chicago’s segregated
schools.103 The document expressed the need for negotiations for a citywide
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desegregation plan to begin right away.104 Tatel stated that if Chicago refused to
participate in negotiations, the case would be referred to the Justice Department for court
action.105 Tatel also believed that the school board could do more to increase
desegregation beyond the Access to Excellence Plan. To make matters worse, the federal
government rejected the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education’s application for
desegregation funds under the Emergency School Aid Act with the hope that Chicago
would develop a plan that would give them eligibility.106 Federal officials gave Hannon
and the Chicago Public Schools the options of participating in a “show cause” hearing to
prove the charges incorrect or the opportunity to request a waiver to receive funding.107
Hannon chose to participate in the hearing, as he believed accepting the waiver would be
an admission of guilt.108
Hannon set out to challenge the government’s findings and prove to federal
officials that Chicago and its commitment to the Access to Excellence plan had made
substantial strides toward desegregating the Chicago Public Schools.109 On May 4, 1979,
Hannon met with the officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
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prove why the Chicago Public Schools should still receive federal funding.110 During the
proceedings, Hannon asked federal officials to revoke their findings that the Chicago
Public School District was deliberately segregating its schools, and to reinstate the
district’s eligibility for $36 million dollars in funds under the Emergency School Aid
Act.111 Hannon’s efforts could not persuade the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to change their mind. They did not agree with the district’s definition of what
constituted a school being desegregated. Chicago’s standard for desegregation was when
a school operated with no more than 90 percent of its student population belonging to
only one race.112 The definition as it related to federal criteria, considered a school
desegregated when the school’s full time student enrollment was 25 to 50% white and 50
to 75% black.113
In a newspaper article featured in the Chicago Tribune in 1979, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare was quoted as saying that “although there were many
sound educational programs contained in the Access to Excellence plan, it did not correct
the unlawfully segregated conditions that had been identified.”114
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Hannon returned to Chicago, and under the directive of his administration, the
Chicago Public Schools Board of Education approved an expansion of the Access to
Excellence plan. This would call for the addition of thirteen sites administering preschool
programs, classical schools, and language academies beginning in September of 1979.115
Hannon took a firm stance on the concept of a voluntary integration plan, shunning any
strategies that would be mandatory such as busing. Hannon believed that the
implementation of voluntary access to quality education was Chicago’s best option
despite the fact that the city was residentially segregated.116 Furthermore, mandatory
integration would not be an effective strategy due to the low white student enrollment
throughout the district.117
On July 13, 1979, Mayor Jane Byrne announced that she participated in a meeting
with Dr. Hannon to discuss the status of the desegregation negotiations between the
district and the federal government. She stated that Hannon and his staff were preparing
an expanded desegregation plan. This plan would include clustering, a strategy that
would combine the school populations of three or more schools within the same
proximity. This strategy along with the use of magnet schools would require little
busing.118 Hannon and his team also had to consider an alternative to their voluntary
plans. The federal government demanded that mandatory backup measures be instituted if
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voluntary efforts failed to meet the goal of achieving desegregation that was acceptable to
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.119
While mandatory integration strategies were not looked at favorably by the
Chicago Public Schools, the federal government still believed they were a viable option.
David Tatel, Director of the Office for Civil Rights stated: “We have decided that further
progress would be enhanced by developing some specific desegregation option; one of
the options will be busing.”120 Tatel also stated that the plan would need to be developed
and approved by September 15th with an implementation date to be determined through
later investigations.121 On August 26th, Patricia Harris would be newly appointed as the
secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.122 Although she stated
she would assist Chicago in mapping out an acceptable school desegregation plan, the
September 15th deadline would not be extended.123
On August 31, HEW developed a proposal for the Chicago Public Schools that
required the mandatory busing of 114,000 elementary students.124 It would not be a
requirement for Chicago to accept the proposal, but if they chose to do so, it would
desegregate 60% of the district’s schools and involve 55% of the district’s student
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population.125 Hannon’s response to the proposal was that busing 114,000 school children
to achieve the government’s definition of integration would be costly and would not
improve education nor aid the city’s stability.126
In mid September, Hannon submitted to Washington D.C. the plan, Access to
Excellence: Further Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities,
designed to achieve greater racial balance throughout the district.127 On September 26,
1979, the HEW informed the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education that their
submission would not be accepted because it did not adequately remedy the alleged
segregated conditions in the Chicago Public Schools.128 On October 17, 1979, HEW
announced it would continue negotiations if the Chicago Public Schools Board of
Education agreed to their definition of a desegregated school and submit an effective
desegregation plan by November 17, 1979.129 The Board refused to proceed with
negotiations under the terms set forth by the HEW.130 The following day, Hannon
informed the board that he would be receiving a letter announcing that Chicago’s
desegregation case would be received by the Department of Justice.131
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On October 29, 1979, HEW presented the matter to the Department of Justice
with the intention that it would initiate litigation.132 Hannon was encouraged by board
members and his close advisors to take a public stand and fight the desegregation issue in
court.133 The Chicago Public Schools Board of Education rejected the idea of creating a
citywide desegregation plan that coincided with the stipulations set forth by HEW.134
Hannon echoed their sentiments referring to HEW’s proposal as “unworkable and
unreasonable.”135
On November 14, 1979, the General Superintendent of Schools set out to meet
with members of government to work out a solution on pupil assignment.136 Hannon was
in opposition of the charges against his school district, but agreed to cooperate with HEW
to resolve the desegregation issue in hopes to reclaim federal funding.137 Later that year
the Board submitted an application to HEW requesting ESAA funds for the 1980-81
school year only to be denied once again by the HEW due to alleged discrimination.138
Hannon found himself in a position of great scrutiny with various communities
requesting his removal. In particular, a coalition of black civic and church leaders urged
the Board to remove Hannon and replace him with the black deputy superintendent who
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was presently serving.139 Hannon would announce that he would resign effective January
25, 1980.140 It was revealed to sources close to him that Hannon believed the schools
would never be able to work through their financial issues, as well as those dealing with
desegregation until education was put before politics.141 At a time when things appeared
to be at their lowest point, Angeline P. Caruso, Associate Superintendent of Curriculum
and Instruction Services was appointed superintendent.142
The Love Era: 1980-1985
Caruso served in the superintendent’s capacity until Dr. Ruth Love, Chicago’s
first black school superintendent was hired in April of 1980.143 On April 21, 1980, the
Department of Justice found the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education guilty of the
unlawful segregation of students based on their race.144 They were prepared to file a suit
against the board unless it was assured that voluntary compliance could be put in place to
remedy the alleged violations.145 The Department of Justice provided the Chicago Public
Schools Board of Education an opportunity to enter into negotiations in order to reach an
agreement that would resolve the desegregation matter.146
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On June 11, 1980, the Board developed a Committee on Desegregation to meet
with the United States Department of Justice to try to resolve the district’s legal issues.147
The Committee recommended to the board that it continue to promote racial integration
in its schools and that the programs they developed to achieve integration must be guided
by legal requirements as well as educational objectives.148
The Committee reached an agreement with the Department of Justice and
Education that centered on a three-step process to eradicate segregation in the Chicago
Public Schools. First, the parties’ agreed to a preliminary commitment to develop and
implement a plan which included principles that would guide the plan’s development.
The next step was to develop a detailed plan, with the participation by appropriate experts
and by the community, and an adoption of the plan by the Board no later than March
1981. Finally, the parties agreed to implement the plan beginning September 1981.149
The initial commitment would be carried out by entering into a Consent Decree
agreed upon by the Board and the Department of Justice and submitted to the United
States District Court for Approval.150 Initially, the Consent Decree was made up a set of
basic elements. The Board committed itself to the development of a plan consistent with
the requirements of the Constitution of the United States. In choosing among the many
variations that were constitutionally acceptable, the Board retained complete discretion to
design the plan that best meet the needs of the Chicago Public Schools and the City of
147
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Chicago. The preliminary commitment would only state the general principles to guide
the development of the plan, with further details being developed and established by the
Board in collaboration with students, parents, community groups, appropriate experts,
Board staff, and other interested parties.151
The Committee recommended that the Board accept the terms of the proposed
Consent Decree and seek to have it judicially approval.152 The Consent Decree was
approved, providing the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education not only a viable
solution to student desegregation, but also to areas that hindered their eligibility for
federal funding such as classroom integration, bilingual program staffing, and faculty
assignment.153
Under the agreed upon Consent Decree, the Board of Education and the United
States submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and recognized that subject matter
jurisdiction existed over this action under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.154 The Court would have full jurisdiction of the Consent Decree and would
determine when it could be terminated.155
The plan would be developed in accordance with the following time table:
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October 15, 1980

Appointment of principal plan development
consultants.

November 17, 1980

Progress report to Justice Department

December 4, 1980

Identification of plan components appropriate for
funding in the basic and magnet categories under
the Emergency School Aid Act and submission of
appropriate funding proposals to the Department of
Education

December 15, 1980

Progress report to Justice Department

January 15, 1981

Progress report to Justice Department

February 16, 1981

Progress report to Justice Department

March 31, 1981

Completion of final plan and adoption of plan by
the Board. The plan would be conveyed to the
Justice Department and filed with the Court.156
Mission and Objectives

The Original Consent Decree: 1980
In 1980, the United States Justice Department set out to sue the Chicago Public
Schools Board of Education for running a segregated school system.
The United States has filed a complaint alleging that the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago (the “Board”) has engaged in acts of
discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of
federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a
continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and
ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system.157
The school district was accused of operating in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of
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1964.158 The complaint alleged that the Chicago Public Schools engaged in actions
regarding student/faculty assignment and other educational practices that promoted
inequalities regarding how students were educated. Specifically, these practices included
drawing attendance zone boundaries, adjusting grade structures of schools in racially and
ethnically segregative ways, allowing racially segregative intra-district transfers by white
students, maintaining severely overcrowded and thereby educationally inferior schools
for black students and less crowded schools for white students, and assigning teachers
and staff to schools in racially segregative ways.159
The Board’s stance was ambiguous, neither acknowledging nor denying
allegations set before them. The Board acknowledged that the segregation of students
hindered their education. While they agreed that the school system suffered from racially
isolated schools, they also acknowledged that it would be financially difficult to address
the issues.
The Board believes that racial isolation is educationally disadvantageous
to all students and that educational benefits will accrue to all students
through the greatest practicable reduction in the racial isolation of
students…
The Board neither admits nor denies the allegations of the complaint in
this action. It recognizes, however, that the Chicago public school system
is characterized by substantial racial isolation of students…
The Board believes that litigation of this action would require a substantial
expenditure of public funds and a substantial commitment of Board and
staff time and resources, at a time when financial and personnel resources
that are already greatly limited…160
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The two sides, based on the presented information, determined that they would
settle the action and resolve the United States request for relief by the entry of a Consent
Decree.161 The original Consent Decree consisted of several basic objectives:
2.1 Desegregated Schools- The plan will provide for the establishment of
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools,
considering all circumstances in Chicago.162
This objective states implicitly that the desegregation of all of the Chicago Public
Schools may not be possible. It also acknowledged that the idea of desegregating
the Chicago Public Schools was an important and worthwhile goal despite the
obstacles. As long as it was feasible, the Chicago Public School District would be
committed to desegregating its schools.
2.2 Compensatory Programs in Schools-remaining Segregated- In order to
assure participation by all students in a system-wide remedy and to
alleviate the effects of both past and ongoing segregation, the plan shall
provide educational and related programs for any Black or Hispanic
schools remaining segregated.163
This objective addresses the idea that all schools will not be totally integrated and that
there may be schools that still operate with a majority of minority students as their
population. This objective commits the Chicago Public Schools to providing quality
educational programming to those students who remain in racially isolated schools.
2.3 Participation- To the greatest extent practicable, the plan will provide
for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups, and in all age and grade
levels above kindergarten.164
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This objective specifies that the desegregation plan is designed to benefit all races. It also
establishes the fact that it is targeted for students in grades first through twelfth.
Remaining consistent with the aforementioned objective 2.1, the Board specifies that its
actions to desegregate schools will take place when at all possible.
2.4 Fair Allocations of Burdens- The plan shall ensure that the burdens of
desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial or ethnic group.165
This objective makes the desegregation of the Chicago Public Schools an obligation for
all races. It assures that whatever race represents the majority population will not be held
responsible for their school’s demographics.
The Modified Consent Decree: 2004
In 2001, the United States and the Chicago Public Schools reviewed the school
district’s implementation of and compliance with the original Consent Decree and the
Desegregation Plan.166 It was determined by the court that there were areas of the plan
that had not reached full compliance.167 These areas related to magnet schools, transfers,
school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, controlled enrollment,
assignment of faculty and school based administrators, compensatory programs and
services for English Language Learner students.168 Twenty-four years after the Original
Consent Decree came into existence, the United States and Board of Education of the
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City of Chicago entered into a Modified Consent Decree.169 The Modified Consent
Decree encompassed the original plans set forth in the original Consent Decree of 1980,
along with new requirements such as new reporting obligations, specific limits on
desegregation budget, and significant obligations with respect to Chicago Public Schools
programs serving English Language Learners.170 The new Modified Desegregation
Consent Decree was designed with the intention that its full implementation would
address the goals set forth in the original Consent Decree and Desegregation Plan.171 The
new Consent Decree also established a timetable that would bring the case to a final
resolution.172
In the Modified Consent Decree, the following goal as it relates to student
assignment was established:
The parties recognize that, given the geographical size of the Chicago
Public Schools and the demographics of the Chicago Public Schools and
the City of Chicago, it is not practicable for all the Chicago Public Schools
to have enrollments that are desegregated. Therefore, in assigning students
to schools, the Chicago Public Schools shall use a variety of strategies to
assign students to schools, and in implementing these strategies, the
Chicago Public Schools shall establish and maintain as many schools with
stably desegregated enrollments as practicable.173
This part of the Modified Consent Decree acknowledges the fact that the size of the
Chicago Public School District hindered its ability to desegregate all of its schools. It also
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alludes to the idea that Chicago’s distinctive separation of neighborhoods is also reflected
in the organization of students within their neighborhood schools. With these obstacles in
place, the Chicago Public Schools agreed to establish desegregated schools when at all
feasible.
In the Modified Consent Decree, the following goal related to faculty assignment
was established:
The goal is to have the racial ethnic composition of full-time teachers in
each school to be within plus or minus 15 percentage points of the racial
and ethnic composition of full-time teachers district wide serving the same
grade levels… 174
This part of the Modified Consent Decree establishes that the Chicago Public Schools is
committed to maintaining staffs that are racially diverse when at all feasible. Requiring
staffs to have a racial composition that reflects that of the district wide average prevents
schools from creating staffs made up of a single race. By adding the specific grade level
component, schools are not allowed to over saturate specific grade levels with a teaching
staff composed of one particular race.
The Second Amended Consent Decree: 2006
In 2005, the courts asked both parties if provisions of the Modified Consent
Decree should continue, and set up a formal hearing to take place on May 15, 2006 to
address the question.175 The court revisited the Modified Consent Decree because of the
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significant changes in racial demographics in Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.176
The student population of the Chicago Public Schools in no way resembled that of the
school population that existed during the creation of both the original and modified
versions of the Consent Decree.177 As a result of the court’s inquiry, and further
discovery by both parties, the United States of America and the Board of Education of the
City of Chicago jointly requested that they vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be
allowed to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree.178 The motion was granted in part
as well as denied in part.179 In Section VI of the proposed amended decree, the two
parties requested that the Consent Decree automatically expire in June.180 The court
approved the request to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree; however, established
that the Consent Decree could not automatically expire without the determination being
through the court.181
The goals and objectives set forth in all three versions of the Consent Decree were
consistent with the precedence set forth in Brown v. Board I and II. Within the Brown v.
Board decision, it was determined by the court that the desegregation of students based
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on race deprived children of the minority group equal educational opportunities.182 As
stated by Justice Warren in the landmark case, education can be considered the most
important function of both local and state government. An individual’s success would not
be likely if he or she was denied an opportunity of receiving an education.183 This
opportunity must be available to all on equal terms.184 These goals and objectives of the
Consent Decree illustrated the Chicago Public School District’s new commitment to
remedying the discriminatory practices that violated the tenets set forth in the Brown v.
Board decision.
Implementation Strategies
The Original Consent Decree: 1980
In order to ensure that the Consent Decree of 1980 was successful, the Chicago
Public Schools utilized a series of strategies and techniques.185 The Chicago Public
Schools utilized techniques that were classified as both voluntary as well as mandatory to
help desegregate the Chicago Public Schools.186 The Board established that they may
utilize the following techniques among others to establish desegregated schools:
Voluntary Techniques
4.1.1

Permissive transfers that enhance desegregation, with
transportation at Board expense.
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4.1.2

Magnet schools that enhance desegregation.

4.1.3

Voluntary pairing and clustering of schools.

4.1.4

If magnet schools or other voluntary techniques are used, each
shall contain/ethnic goals and management controls (e.g., an
alternative that would require mandatory re-assignments) to ensure
that the goals are met.187

This excerpt from the original Consent Decree establishes the voluntary techniques the
Chicago Public Schools set out to implement in order to establish desegregated schools.
In this excerpt, the concept of Magnet schools is introduced. It also conveys the idea that
Board funded transportation may be utilized to create more racial balance at the school
level. In the last part of this excerpt in section 4.1.4 of the Consent Decree, the Chicago
Public Schools makes it clear that these voluntary actions will be monitored and
supported with mandatory mandates if necessary to support the desegregation of the
Chicago Public Schools.
Mandatory Techniques Not Involving Transportation
4.2.1 Redrawing attendance areas.
4.2.2 Adjusting feeder patterns
4.2.3 Reorganization of grade structures, including creation of
middle schools.
4.2.4 Pairing and clustering of schools.
4.2.5 Selecting sites for new schools and selecting schools for schools
closing to enhance integration.188
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This section of the original Consent Decree establishes the mandatory techniques the
Chicago Public Schools set out to implement in order to establish desegregated schools.
In this excerpt the Chicago Public Schools introduces the idea of modifying the way in
which students are assigned to schools using methods such as changing attendance
boundaries, changing the schools students go to after elementary graduation, and
developing a middle school model. In this excerpt, the Chicago Public Schools also
stated that it will identify new areas to build schools in order to enhance integration.
Mandatory Reassignment and Transportation
Mandatory reassignment and transportation, at Board expense, will be
included to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques
are insufficient…189
This section of the original Consent Decree establishes that mandatory student
reassignment and transportation may be implemented in mandatory techniques, voluntary
techniques, or a combination of the two in order to establish desegregated schools. This
section also provides the Chicago Public Schools with an opportunity to utilize order to
establish desegregated schools if other methods are deemed as insufficient. It also states
that any costs associated with these mandatory techniques will be incurred by the Board.
Priority and Combination of Techniques
The plan may rely upon the techniques listed above and any other
remedial methods in any combination that accomplishes the objective
stated in 2.1.190
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This section of the original Consent Decree establishes that the Board will utilize other
tactics that may not be listed in the decree to reach the goal of desegregating the Chicago
Public Schools.
The Modified Consent Decree: 2004
The creation of the Modified Consent Decree was based on a review by the
United States in conjunction with the Chicago Public Schools to determine the Chicago
Public Schools compliance with the plan set forth in the original Consent Decree.191 It
was determined that the areas that had not achieved full compliance were related to
magnet schools, transfers, school openings and closings, attendance zone changes,
controlled enrollment, assignment of faculty and school based administrators,
compensatory programs and services for English Language Learner students.192
Within the Modified Consent Decree, the Chicago Public Schools established
several guidelines as they related to the function of their Magnet schools. It was first
established that the goal for faculty integration set forth in the original Consent Decree
would also be included in the Modified Decree.
Magnet schools and specialized schools shall be considered desegregated
if they have enrollments that are 15% to 35% White and 65% to 85%
Black.193
The Modified Consent Decree established that Magnet schools would be open to
students from across the city. It also gave a clear description of how a student lottery
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system would be used to select students when there are more applicants than the school
can accommodate. The strategy would help to assure that the selection process remained
equitable.
Magnet schools are open to students from throughout the Chicago Public
Schools…If there are more applicants than seats, the Chicago Public
Schools shall use a lottery process to select students…If there are fewer
applicants available than seats available, the Chicago Public Schools shall
admit all applicants.194
The following two excerpts from the Modified Consent Decree established the
idea that the Chicago Public Schools would put systems in place to guarantee racial
equity in its magnet schools. In the first excerpt it is mentioned that the Chicago Public
Schools will actively recruit students from all races to attend its magnet schools. In the
second excerpt it is established that the Chicago Public Schools will conduct a study
analyzing the acceptance rate of students accepted into magnet schools to determine if
new magnets need to be built. It is also established the idea that the Chicago Public
Schools will also continue to review its existing policies as they relate to Magnet schools
to ensure that they are committed to serving desegregated populations of students.
The Chicago Public Schools shall revise and update, if necessary, its
magnet school recruitment guidelines and procedures to ensure that
student from all races and ethnicities have equitable access to magnet
schools and that a variety of strategies…continue to be used to recruit
students from all races and ethnicities to achieve a desegregated
enrollment.195
The Chicago Public Schools shall conduct a study of its magnet schools,
which shall analyze whether, in light of the number of students who have
applied for and who were not accepted into magnet schools or other
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quality school options due to space constraints, the Chicago Public
Schools should establish additional magnet schools…In addition, the
Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, the
curriculum, recruitment procedures, transportation limitations and other
aspects of magnet schools to enhance their ability to attract a racially
ethnically diverse pool of applicants and to enroll desegregated student
bodies.196
The Chicago Public Schools also developed a strategy for those schools that may
remain racially isolated. Their strategy was to put quality academic programming within
neighborhood schools. These schools would be available to students who lived within the
school’s attendance boundary.
Magnet cluster schools are open to students who live in the attendance
boundary for a particular magnet cluster school…Where possible, the
Chicago Public Schools shall identify schools to be part of a magnet
cluster that are in close geographical proximity and that may contribute to
desegregation of the schools in the cluster.197
Each school within a magnet cluster implements one of six academic areas
of focus: Fine and Performing Arts; the International Baccalaureate
Middle Years; the International, the Chicago Public Schools Scholars
Program; Literature and Writing; Math and Science or World Language.198
Within the Modified Consent Decree, it is mentioned that the Chicago Public
Schools transfer policy will be reviewed and updated to make sure that it is aligned with
the goals of the Consent Decree. The following excerpt from the Modified Consent
Decree illustrate some of the monitoring strategies the Chicago Public Schools put in
place to work toward desegregating it schools.
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The Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, its
transfer policy to provide for open enrollment transfers, majority-tominority transfers and NCLB transfers to ensure that the transfer policy is
consistent with this Consent Decree.199
For those students who attended schools that were considered underperforming,
the Chicago Public Schools put into place a system that gave them an opportunity to
transfer to a better performing school. This process went along with the idea of providing
quality academic programming for all students.
Students attending a Title I school identified for School Improvement,
Corrective Action, or Restructuring pursuant to NCLB have the
opportunity to transfer to a school that is not identified for School
Improvement, Corrective Action, or Restructuring…Where feasible, the
Chicago Public Schools shall identify schools to which students may
transfer where transferring shall promote or maintain desegregated
enrollments.200
The Chicago Public Schools attendance policy would also be reviewed and
updated as stated in the excerpt below.
The Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, and
publish a policy for establishing and revising attendance boundaries. This
policy shall include the process and procedures for setting these
boundaries, including the public hearing requirement, which is now in
effect. In addition, the policy shall include the process and information
that shall be provided by the Board. The policy shall require that
alternatives or options be developed for each proposed attendance
boundary and that a range of factors be considered, including the
capacities of each of the school involved in the proposed boundaries.201
The allegation of overcrowded neighborhood schools was addressed directly
within the Modified Consent Decree. It was apparent that some schools experienced these
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conditions more than others and it often coincided with the race of the school’s
population. The Chicago Public Schools explicitly acknowledged this problem and put
procedures in place to ensure equal conditions for all students while promoting the idea
of desegregated schools.
The Chicago Public Schools shall alleviate any racially and ethnically
disproportionate overcrowding of school sites, to the extent practicable.202
The Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, and
publish its procedures regarding overcrowded schools and controlled
enrollment to include a) a provision that the Chicago Public Schools shall
determine whether there exists a racially or ethnically disproportionate
overcrowding of schools district wide and b) a provision that the Chicago
Public Schools shall consider a variety of factors when alleviating
overcrowding in schools. These factors shall include maintaining or
promoting stable desegregated enrollments at sending and receiving
schools.203
The Modified Consent Decree also placed a checks and balances system on those
schools who utilized a controlled enrollment strategy. It ensured that schools who
implemented controlled enrollment did not abuse it.
The Chicago Public Schools shall develop and implement a plan to
monitor enrollment at schools that are overcrowded and the
implementation of the controlled enrollment procedures at these schools to
ensure that schools do not remain part of the controlled enrollment process
after such time that enrollment drops to capacity where additional students
may be enrolled.204
The Modified Consent Decree also addressed the integration of school faculties, a
goal established within the original Consent Decree. It was important to assure that the
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racial make-up of a school’s staff was a direct reflection of the district’s commitment to
integrating its schools.
The Chicago Public Schools shall make every good faith effort to follow
assignment and transfer practices for teachers that, when taken together as
a whole on a frequently reviewed periodic basis, promote and maintain
individual school full-time teaching faculties that more nearly approach
the district wide proportion of full-time minority teachers at schools
serving the same grade levels…205
The Modified Consent Decree also addressed the procedure by which
administrators were assigned to schools. The Chicago Public Schools wanted to ascertain
that the race of a school’s administrator and teaching staff would not determine the race
of the student population to which it served.
The Chicago Public Schools shall make every good faith effort to follow
assignment and transfer practices for school-based administrators so that a
school is not racially identifiable by student enrollment and by the
teachers and school based administrators assigned to the school.206
The Modified Consent Decree also revisited the addition of compensatory
and supplementary programs as a means of increasing students’ achievement. The
Modified Consent Decree first established that the goal of compensatory and
supplementary programs remained consistent with the goals established within the
original decree.
...the overriding goal of the compensatory and supplementary programs
required by…the 1980 Decree is to address minority students’ educational
needs through improving achievement in all schools, with particular
emphasis on schools with the greatest needs and attended by children who
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have been the most disadvantaged. The parties agree that this goal shall
remain in effect…207
It is also established within the Modified Consent Decree how these programs
would be funded, as well as examples of the kinds of programs that would be put in
place. It is clearly established that these programs would be targeted for schools who
service minorities and who remain in racial isolation.
The Chicago Public Schools has initiated programs that address the
compensatory and supplementary program goal and funds such programs
independent of its desegregation budget through other local, state, and
federal funds…208
…examples of such programs include the Chicago Public Schools
Reading Initiative which provides supplemental reading sources to
approximately 300 schools. The Chicago Public Schools has fully
implemented a math/science initiative at 84 schools…The Chicago Public
Schools has expanded its early childhood, full day kindergarten, and afterschool program. During the life of this Consent Decree, the Chicago
Public Schools shall maintain, and increase, if practicable, these programs
at African American and Hispanic racially-isolated schools.209
The Modified Consent Decree also established how the schools that implemented
these programs would be identified, and that their participation would be included within
their school report card. This would give potential students and their guardians an
opportunity to know what these schools had to offer.
The Chicago Public Schools shall identify the schools that are
implementing the reading initiative, the math/science initiative, early
childhood education programs, and full-day kindergarten programs or
after school extended day programs. The Chicago Public Schools shall
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include in the school’s report card which of these programs are being
implemented.210
Within the Modified Consent, the Chicago Public Schools reaffirms its
commitment to ELL students. It is established that the programs for these students
will be readily accessible without hindrance.
The Chicago Public Schools continues to be committed to providing
language acquisition programs to all eligible students…The the Chicago
Public Schools shall not assign or reassign ELL students to schools in a
manner that interferes with their participation in language acquisitions
programs.211
The Second Amended Consent Decree: 2006
The United States of America and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago
jointly requested that they vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be allowed to enter a
Second Amended Consent Decree.212 The motion was granted in part and denied in
part.213 In Section VI of the proposed amended decree, the two parties requested that the
Consent Decree automatically expire in June.214 The court approved the request to enter a
Second Amended Consent Decree; however, established that the Consent Decree could
not automatically expire without the determination being through the court.215
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Within the Second Amended Decree is a list of reporting structures established to
guarantee that strides would be made between the two parties to reach the goals set forth
in the Consent Decree. These reporting structures would give the courts an opportunity to
see the progress the Chicago Public Schools had made before allowing the Consent
Decree to expire.
The Chicago Public Schools shall report to the United States and amici
curiae: a) the number and percentage of students, disaggregated by
race/ethnicity, per school and in the Chicago Public Schools as a whole; b)
the number and percentage of teachers, disaggregated by race/ethnicity,
per school and in the Chicago Public Schools as a whole; c) the race of the
principals of each school; d) for each magnet school, the number and
percentage of students, disaggregated by race/ethnicity, who applied, were
accepted, enrolled, and denied admission to the school; and e) the number
of students, disaggregated by race/ethnicity who applied, were accepted,
and enrolled as M-to-M transfers by sending and receiving school.216
The Chicago Public Schools shall submit to the United States and amici
curiae a listing of each compensatory program at each school.217
The implementation strategies set forth in all three versions of the Consent Decree
were consistent with the precedence set forth in Brown v. Board I and II. Chicago has
always been segregated by neighborhoods and consequently relied on racially isolated
neighborhood schools to educate its students. This lent itself as an obstacle for Chicago to
embrace the desegregation of its schools. As stated within the Brown v. Board cases,
many obstacles may have to be eliminated to create integrated schools.218 Within the
original Consent Decree, the strategy of utilizing a mandatory reassignment and
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transportation as a means of supporting desegregation is a direct reflection of what was
established in Brown v. Board. The Modified and later Amended versions of the Consent
Decree supported the same agenda, adding a monitoring structure as well as additional
accountability.
Public Perception
A requirement of the Consent Decree was that the Chicago Public Schools
develop and implement a system-wide student desegregation plan.219 This plan consisted
of three parts: 1) Recommendations on Educational Components; 2) Student Assignment
Principles, Financial Aspects and General Policies; 3) The Comprehensive Student
Assignment Plan.220 Each part of the plan came with its own share of public criticism.
On April 15, 1981, the Board approved Recommendations on Educational
Components, the first part of the Student Desegregation Plan.221 This part of the plan
outlined several strategies for ensuring educational equity and raising the achievement
levels of students.222 Specific components addressed in the plan included student
discipline, staff development, special education and testing, bilingual education, magnet
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schools, and faculty desegregation and affirmative action, as well as monitoring and
evaluation.223
On April 29, 1981, the Board approved Student Assignment Principles, Financial
Aspects and General Policies, part two of the Student Desegregation Plan which
established the framework and timetable for development of a comprehensive student
assignment plan.224 It also established the definitions for integrated and desegregated
schools under the plan.225
Part I and II of the plan were highly criticized by citizen groups. The Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund believed the plan failed to ensure equal educational opportunities for
Hispanic students.226 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
believed that ridding the schools of operating in racial isolation should be the point of
emphasis.227 This concern was also shared by the Citizens School Committee, a
multicultural association of parents, community and civic leaders, educators, and other
concerned citizenry.228 The Citizens School Committee also expressed a concern about
the quality of education in these schools, stating that only 45 of the 350 schools in
question benefited from enhanced compensatory educational programs.
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On January 22, 1982, the Board adopted The Comprehensive Student Assignment
Plan, the final part of the Student Desegregation Plan.229 The plan was designed to reduce
the amount of racially isolated schools in the system.230 In order to achieve this goal, four
basic strategies were to be implemented:
1. to attract children back to the Chicago Public Schools by directly
competing with private, parochial, and suburban schools;
2. to stabilize and increase the desegregation that already exists in some
schools;
3. to the greatest extent practicable, to desegregate those schools that are
not desegregated; and
4. to avoid the unnecessary use of compulsory measures.231
The Comprehensive Student Assignment Plan was highly criticized by the
Hispanic community because they believed that Hispanic students would remain in
racially isolated schools.232 They believed that Hispanic students would have to rely on
quality educational programs to guarantee an equal education. This was consistent with
their emphasis on having access to compensatory programs.233
The Chicago Urban Leagues believed that the plan’s intentions to minimize white
flight brought about additional burdens and restrictions on blacks. These included:
1. the failure to require black participation in the definition of the remedy
of past racial isolation;
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2. allowing a system with only 17 percent whites to retain 70 percent
white schools;
3. the creation of restrictions against minorities transferring into schools
that would thereby drop below 50 percent white;
4. the exemption from racial quota transfer-out restrictions granted
exclusively to whites (who wish to attend magnet school) when such
preferential treatment does not even assume that the goal of
desegregation will be enhanced in any individual instance;
5. the failure to explicitly require any whites to attend a school outside
their residential neighborhood while continuing to mandate that blacks
attend schools outside their residential neighborhood.234
Members of the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education also found fault in
the Comprehensive Student Assignment Plan, barely approving it with a six-to-five
vote.235 Board member Joyce A. Hughes, who voted against the plan, believed it suffered
from two fundamental flaws. She felt it protected white students at the expense of black
students, and it regarded racial minorities as being interchangeable.236
In spite of the numerous amounts of negative criticism, the Court found Chicago’s
Student Desegregation Plan to be constitutional.237 The Consent Decree had
accomplished something that had been a struggle thirty years after the Brown v. Board
decision. Chicago had developed a comprehensive desegregation plan. Along with the
plan’s implementation came quite a bit of change. In order to achieve the goals
established by the Consent Decree and later supported through the Desegregation Plan,
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the city and school district would deal with a variety of the supports and barriers. As we
move into Chapter IV, we will take a close look at some of the things the Chicago Public
Schools had to deal with in order to desegregate its schools.

CHAPTER IV
CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHICAGO PUBLIC
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREE
Introduction
The prospect of integrating the Chicago Public Schools was a daunting task and
would not be accomplished without pain and strife. In order to comply with the court’s
order, the Chicago Public School District would have to work through a history of
operating schools based on geographic location, regardless of conditions and available
resources. The government threatened to cut funding to states that intentionally
segregated schools and Chicago found itself as the first location where the issue would
arise.1 Chicago not only represented the most powerful accusation of discrimination the
Office of Education had received, but it also brought attention to the confrontation
between superintendent Benjamin Willis and the city’s Black community.2 The Chicago
Public School District would be led by several different educational leaders, and it
became clear that they would have to take an aggressive approach in attempting to
integrate the Chicago Public Schools. This would call for the use of several strategies that
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amidst public criticism challenged Chicago’s ability to reach full integration in its
schools.
Transportation
As stated in the original Consent Decree, mandatory reassignment and
transportation had to be included and funded by the Chicago Public Schools Board of
Education to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques were
insufficient to create desegregated schools.3 Chicago had dealt with transportation before
in their quest to develop desegregated schools. Superintendent Benjamin Willis was
highly criticized for his voluntary transfer plan which permitted the transfer of
elementary students, most of them Negro, from some of Chicago’s most overcrowded
schools.4 Part of the controversy developed because the burden of paying for the
students’ transportation rested on the parents whom oftentimes were financially incapable
of covering the cost.5 Superintendent James Redmond also took on the issue of busing
when part of his proposed desegregation plan included the busing of over a thousand
black children to schools outside of their neighborhood.6 Effective desegregation did not
happen for a number of reasons including disinterest amongst parents, lack of private
transportation, and extensive traveling time experienced by the students.7 Superintendent
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Joseph Hannon’s plan attempted to avoid mandatory busing.8 Instead, the plan relied on a
voluntary system allowing students who were chosen through a lottery system the
opportunity to attend a magnet school. Even with the prospect of voluntary busing, the
plan still had its detractors. In an article in Illinois Issues, Doris Galik, a parent from the
Gage Park neighborhood stated: “The only thing Access to Excellence will teach us is
how to ride a bus at the taxpayers’ expense.”9
The concept of school busing as a desegregation strategy changed dramatically
after the Supreme Court legitimated the use of busing in its April 1971 decision in the
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education case.10 In 1968, James Swann and
other residents of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg North Carolina School District filed a
lawsuit claiming that the current integration plan was ineffective. This case was unlike its
predecessors, as it involved urban city schools. Swann was the victor in the case out of
the federal district court, making the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District the nation’s
first major urban district to bus children to achieve racial balance.11 The new integration
plan implemented in 1970 would prove to be more expensive than previous plans as it
included strategies such as busing to more aggressively work towards integration. The
plan required that 29% of each of the district’s public schools consisted of black students,
reflecting the amount of black students in the entire school district. It would also require
8
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13,000 students to participate in a busing program, which consequently called for the
district to purchase over one hundred new buses. With a half- million dollar price tag as
well as an additional million dollars to get started, the school board met the new plan
with great resistance.
The verdict was brought to the Court of Appeals by the school board. The courts
sided with the Board, and reversed part of the plan under the premise that it put too much
burden on the school district.
On appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed the District Court’s order as to
faculty desegregation and the secondary school plans, but vacated the
order respecting elementary schools. While agreeing that the District
Court properly disapproved the board plan concerning these schools, the
Court of Appeals feared that the pairing and grouping of elementary
schools would place unreasonable burden on the board and the system’s
pupils.12
As a result, the Legal Defense Fund of the National Association for the
Advancement of Color People (NAACP) appealed the decision and took the case to the
Supreme Court. On April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of
Swann. The Supreme Court was led by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who established
within the court’s opinion, that some of the practices implemented by school district’s
since the Brown v. Board decision were not consistent with tenets set forth in the
landmark decision.
…choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating
or maintaining a state-segregated school system. In addition to the classic
pattern of building schools specifically intended for Negro or white
students, school authorities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools
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which appeared likely to become racially mixed through changes in
neighborhood residential patterns.13
Within the reading of the court’s opinion, Chief Justice Burger also acknowledged
the idea that many things hindered school districts’ ability to achieve desegregation. Part
of the issue was that school districts acted against the court’s wishes.
Over the 16 years since Brown II, many difficulties were encountered in
implementation of the basic constitutional requirement that the State not
discriminate between public school children on the basis of their race.
Nothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone for
dealing with changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity
encountered since then. Deliberate resistance of some to the Court’s
mandates has impeded the good faith efforts of others to bring school
systems into compliance. The detail and nature of these dilatory tactics
have been noted frequently by this Court and other courts.14
One of the most significant opinions to come out of this case was the court’s
stance on mandatory busing to establish desegregated schools. The concept of mandatory
busing was frowned upon by Charlotte-Mecklenburg as it was a major point of their
argument against the previously proposed desegregation plan. Chief Justice Burger
established clearly in his reading of the court’s opinion that busing would become a
significant part of the effort to desegregate public schools. As he began discussing the
prospect of busing, he first established that the issue had never been clearly defined by
the courts and that developing its definition would not be a clear cut process. He also
stressed the importance of busing to the history of education.
Chief Justice stated:
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The scope of permissible transportation of students as an implement of a
remedial decree has never been defined by this Court, and, by the very
nature of the problem, it cannot be defined with precision. No rigid
guidelines as to student transportation can be given for application to the
infinite variety of problems presented in thousands of situations. Bus
transportation has been an integral part of the public education system for
year, and was perhaps the single most important factor in the transition
from the one-room schoolhouse to the consolidated school.15
Chief Justice Burger also made it clear that the court would support the District
Court’s original decision that busing could be used to help desegregate the CharlotteMecklenburg school district. The Supreme Court’s opinion would contradict any idea that
the desegregation plan put too much burden on the school district.
The importance of bus transportation as a normal and accepted tool of
education policy is readily discernible in this ….case. The District Court’s
conclusion that assignment of children to the school nearest their home
serving their grade would not produce a dismantling of the dual system as
supported by the record.16
Thus, the remedial techniques used in the District Court’s order were
within that court’s power to provide equitable relief; implementation of
the decree is well within the capacity of the school authority.17
The strategy of using mandatory busing was the subject of great criticism, with
people’s opinions falling in line with their views on desegregation. Integrationists who
supported the decision of the Court viewed state imposed (de jure) school segregation as
an evil and desegregation as an important end itself.18 Individuals who believed in
mandatory desegregation strongly advocated for the idea of mandatory busing. They were
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often argued against under the premise that transportation was costly, and that students
would not be safe. Proponents of the busing strategy spoke out:
Parents whose children utilize busing for transportation can rest assure in
the fact that the National Safety Council regards the school bus as “the
safest transportation in the United States.”19
The argument about school bus safety usually only appears when
desegregation is involved…. Riding on a school bus is ten times safer than
walking to school and six times safer than riding in your own car.20
Desegregation/integration does cost money, but not nearly as much as
many opponents claim. A 1976 Rand Corporation study….indicates that
student transportation expenses appear to level off at roughly three times
the pre-desegregation magnitude.21
The mandatory busing strategy gained momentum when in 1966 the U.S. Office
of Education released a report entitled Equality of Educational Opportunity.22 This report
was written by James Coleman who served as a sociologist at John Hopkins.23 The report
would become known as the Coleman Report, and it appeared at a time when issues of
race relations and equality were at the forefront of peoples’ consciousness.24 Coleman
and a team of researchers utilized data from over 600,000 students and teachers across
the country, coming to the conclusion that academic achievement was less related to the
quality of a student’s school and more related to the social composition of the school, the
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student’s sense of control of his environment and future, the verbal skills of teachers, and
the student’s family background.25 Members of the media and policymakers placed their
focus on one prediction taken out of the report: black children who attended integrated
schools would have higher test scores if the majority of their classmates were white.26
This would give validity to the idea of mandatory strategies such as busing to ensure the
integration of the nation’s public schools.
Anti-busing citizens believed that segregation was an accidental result of private
decisions (defacto desegregation) and that desegregation should only take place if it could
be proved that the process yielded educational gains.27 Those who were against the
busing strategy often believed that integration should be a voluntary process and not one
that is mandated by a government entity. Opponents of the busing strategy were against it
for many reasons. Walter Williams, a black professor at Temple University made this
statement in an interview with Patrick Buchanon for a local newspaper.
Forced busing is paternalistic and racist in its premise that a black child
cannot learn unless the next desk is occupied by a white. And how can one
even discuss such nonsense as busing when children are being hauled to
schools where students arrive stoned on drugs and booze, and teachers and
pupils are regularly molested, mugged, and raped.28
There was also data that concluded that busing had been tried before with little
effect on desegregating schools. On October 11, 1978, the National Association for
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Neighborhood Schools put out a bulletin highlighting the negative effects of busing
strategies utilized across the country. Some of the statistics included within the bulletin
read:
After an unprecedented but short lived stay obtained by BUSSSTOP, the
buses rolled in Los Angeles on September 12, 1978—with one minor
problem—they rolled practically empty!
The courageous and innovative parents of the L.A. area are determined to
prove to the State of California that their children still belong to them and
not the state. These parents have turned to already established private
schools, started their own private schools, or are having their children
tutored in private homes.
(New Castle County, Delaware) On September 30, 1977, actual attendance
was 70,941. On September 19, 1978,… attendance in the forced busing
area was only 59,333. That represents an attendance decline, in one year
of 11,608 or 16.4%.
Louisville has lost over 29,000 students since forced busing began and the
figure increases to 32,000 when 3,000 kindergarten children were added to
the figures of the 1976-1977 school year. This is nearly 25% of the total
school population.
(Dallas) The same decline in enrollment is being experienced in 1978-79
as has been experienced since the 1971 forced racial balancing order.
Enrollment on August 28, 1978, was 112,500 students, down 4,234 from
the total of the 1977-78 year. This decline is being seen in grades 4-8, as
these are the bused years in the Dallas school district. The 9-12th grades
are experiencing an increase in enrollment, because the 1976 busing
ordered nullified busing in those grades.29
The issue of busing was a delicate topic of discussion, especially for some of
Chicago’s head politicians. Mayor Bilandic found that he had to consistently defend the
fact that he refused to take a stand on the busing issue.30 In an article featured in the
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Chicago Tribune in 1977, Bilandic stated that his duty as mayor was to provide safety for
those involved and assist the school board in implementing its policies.31When Richard
M. Daley became Mayor of Chicago, he also knew that he would have to say something
about the issue of school busing, but taking a clear position would alienate a portion of
his Democratic Coalition.32 Supporting mandatory busing would enrage many of the
party faithful in the predominantly white areas of the city.33 Opposing it would insult
blacks and white liberals who supported integration.34
In Gary Orfield’s book, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy,
Orfield provided a three pronged explanation of why busing was such a hot topic.
The busing issue has become explosive for three reasons: First the schools
are the largest and most visible of public institutions, directly effecting
millions of families. Second, school assignment patterns, unlike housing
or job patterns, are wholly determined by public officials and can thus be
rapidly changed by a court order to those public officials. Third, because
of the strong base of constitutional law and massive evidence of illegal
local actions, school desegregation is still proceeding at a time when
action against housing and job discrimination has been hampered by weak
enforcement and controversial Supreme Court decisions.35
With cost and safety already being topics of discussion, the idea of white
migration out of the city limits also became a detriment to the desegregation cause. The
silent withdrawal of white students from public schools was the most significant form of
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rejection to mandated busing efforts.36 There was quite a bit of opposition to school
desegregation in Chicago as evidenced by the actions of white grass-roots groups which
attempted to block the enrollment of black students at predominantly-white schools.37
The school board was cognizant that the desegregation of its schools may stimulate an
exodus of white constituents to the suburbs.38
The topic of white migration out of urban cities would become a worldlier topic
of discussion when in 1975 James Coleman, author of the Coleman Report, began
denouncing the use of mandatory busing.39 In a press conference held before Congress,
Coleman openly stated his opposition to mandatory busing.40 Coleman conducted a new
study sponsored by the Urban Institute of Washington, DC analyzing racial data and
trends in U.S. public schools from 1968 to 1973.41 In an article published in 1975 by
Time magazine entitled “New Coleman Report,” Coleman spoke of how when there were
only small numbers of “well-behaved, well-scrubbed” black children involved in busing,
white parents did not resist too much.42 When busing began to involve larger numbers of
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low-income blacks from big-city ghettos, whites began to move out of the city.43 This
type of scenario was consistent with the fears of those who spoke out against busing since
its onset.
These same views as they relate to mandatory strategies for desegregation were
shared by Coleman in his book, Prejudice and Pride. Coleman states:
White exodus to the suburbs has produced a situation in which most of the
largest central city school systems are majority black, while the
surrounding ring remains predominantly white. Such segregation did not
arise by official action-unless one wants to argue that actions of the courts
in instituting racial balance orders which resulted in whites leaving the
city are “official segregating acts.”44
The topic of white migration out of urban cities would now be realized as viable
issue once Coleman made public the results of his new study. His findings would serve
as a topic for great debate for many years to come, familiarizing all with the concept of
“White Flight.”
White Flight
In 2006, the court revisited the Modified Consent Decree because of the
significant changes in racial demographics in Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.45
The student population of the Chicago Public Schools no longer resembled that of the
school population that existed during the creation of both the original and modified
versions of the Consent Decree.46 As a result of the court’s inquiry and further discovery
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by both parties, the United States of America and the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago jointly requested that they vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be allowed
to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree.47
Chicago’s population changed just as those of many other urban cities that
developed some form of integration plan for its public schools. Those schools that once
attempted to integrate their populations were now being depleted of their white students.
The concept of white students leaving urban cities and their public schools became
known as “white flight.”48 By the end of the 1970’s, there was an overall consensus that
the “white flight” phenomenon truly existed, but there was no agreed upon cause.49 There
were many researchers who began developing their own theories to why large
populations of whites were leaving big cities after the implementation of desegregation
practices.
In a publication put out by the Association of American Geographers, J, Dennis
Lord classified “white flight” as a result of school desegregation into two forms.50 The
first form of white flight consists of students abandoning public schools and enrolling in
private schools.51 The second form is a locational response involving residential
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movement of households.52 This form of white flight has been typically depicted through
the movement of white households from large desegregating districts to nearby suburbs.53
Within the same publication, the question is discussed about a “tipping point” as it
relates to black students. In other words, is there an established number or ratio of black
students within a school district that when a school district reaches this number, there is a
rapid acceleration of the number of white students who leave the school eventually
leading to a predominantly black school system?54 The “tipping point” concept as it
relates to white flight was conceptualized by Charles Clotfelter, who characterized the
concept into two different forms: 1) when the black ratio reaches a critical value, all
whites leave and the school district will automatically become black; 2) when the black
ratio reaches a critical value it will effectuate a dramatic shift in the rate of white flight
and will result in an all black system. The conclusion is that in either scenario the school
system will become all black with the only difference being the time required for the
transition.55
In August of 1975, James Coleman along with Sara D. Kelly and John Moore
made public the results of their study entitled Trends in School Segregation 1968-73. Just
as the original Coleman Report in 1966 added fuel to the debate of desegregating public
schools, Coleman’s new study on integration was thought to bring about the same type of
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controversy.56 The premise of this study was to analyze the current progress of student
desegregation efforts amongst elementary and secondary schools in districts regardless of
the source of segregation between school districts for the period of 1968 to 1973.57 The
study provided a detailed statistical analysis of the status and trends in school segregation
by race throughout the U.S. and utilized data sources and statistical reports collected by
HEW.58 The study begins with an examination of the state of integration amongst schools
within a district in 1968, later moving to an examination of the changes that occurred
from 1968 to 1973.59
The researchers wasted no time in stirring up the busing issue. Within the
introduction of the study the researchers provide a new definition of the concept of
desegregation based on government control. There is then a scenario designed to give the
new definition credence, which compares the emotions felt by a black mother who dealt
with discriminatory practices in educating her child to those of a white mother forced to
deal with busing so her child in order to participate in integrated schooling.
Desegregation has meant many things during the period since 1954. The
term initially referred to elimination of dual school systems, in which one
set of attendance zones was used to assign white children to one set of
schools, and the second set of attendance zones was used to assign black
children to a different set of schools. The classic and plaintive query of the
black mother in the South was why should her child be bused to a school
far away, past a nearby school, merely because of the color of his skin.
The extent of the change is that the same plaintive query is now heard
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primarily from white mothers, primarily in large cities, where busing has
begun to be used, not to segregate children by race, but to integrate
them…
From the initial meaning of eliminating a system of dual assignment, the
term desegregation has come to mean reduction of any segregation within
a system, and in the strongest meaning of the term, elimination of any
racial imbalance of among schools in a system. Thus, desegregation,
which initially meant abolition of a legally-imposed segregation, has come
to mean in many cases, affirmative integration.60
As the researchers continue with the introduction of their study, they make clear
that government intervention as it relates to school integration practices may not always
be a good thing. While efforts may be well intended, results of government intervention
may provide adverse effects.
The researchers also allude to the concept of white flight in describing people’s
individual actions against mandated desegregation policies.
…there are numerous examples of government policy in which the result
of the interaction between policy and response is precisely the opposite of
the result intended by those who initiated the policy. It is especially
important in the case of school desegregation to examine this interaction,
because many of the actions taken by individuals, and some of those taken
by their local government bodies have precisely the opposite effect on
school desegregation to that intended by federal government policy. The
most obvious such individual action, of course, is a move of residence to
flee school integration.61
One of the most controversial findings in Coleman’s study was the idea that
desegregation efforts perpetuated segregation because white students would ultimately be
removed from the public school population.62 Although data did not give evidence that
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there was a continuing increased loss of white students once desegregation took place, it
did illustrate an increase in the proportion of blacks in the schools which itself, increases
the rate of white students leaving the system.63 It also increases the racial disparity
between cities and their outlying suburbs, increasing the rate of loss.64 In a paper entitled
“School Desegregation and Loss of Whites from Large Central-City School Districts,”
Coleman directly addresses the question of the effect of school desegregation on the loss
of white children from large central-city school systems. In the paper Coleman states:
It is clear…that there is a segregating process occurring through individual
movement, primarily of white families, from schools and districts in which
there is greater integration or a greater proportion of blacks, to schools and
districts in which there is less integration or a smaller proportion of blacks.
The consequences of this, or course, are to partially nullify the effects of
school desegregation as carried out by various governmental or legal
agencies.65
The researchers involved in the Trends in School Segregation study realized that
one way to gain a sense of the difference that desegregation makes in the racial
composition of a city after implementation would be to consider a hypothetical city with
specific characteristics and apply the coefficients of the equations to the changing
population of the city on a yearly basis considering two conditions: with sharp
desegregation in year one, and without any change in segregation.66
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The results of desegregation on this hypothetical city emphasized some of the
same findings as shown through previous data:
…the emerging patterns of segregation are those between large cities
which are becoming increasingly black, and everywhere else, which is
becoming increasingly white. Desegregation in central cities hastens this
process of residential segregation but not by a great deal under the
conditions specified in the example. It provides a temporary, bust fast
eroding, increase in interracial contact among children within the central
city. In districts with certain characteristics, however, (such as about 75%
black and about .4 between-district segregation, as in Detroit, Baltimore,
Philadelphia, or Chicago), the impact of full scale desegregation would
be,…very large, moving the city’s schools to nearly all black, in a single
year.67
Coleman’s study brought about many detractors, particularly those who were
advocates for the implementation of desegregation policies such as Roy Wilkins and
Kenneth Clark.68 Coleman served as the primary author of the Equal Educational
Opportunity Survey, which had served as the chief evidence of the beneficial effects of
school desegregation.69 Coleman’s new point of view was perceived as traitorous and
critics began questioning it as well as the validity of the study.70 There were three major
criticisms of Coleman’s new study: 1) the validity of his conclusions were in question
because he did not look at a large enough pool of school districts and those that he did
examine had not undergone court-ordered desegregation; 2) that white flight from central
cities is a long term phenomenon predating school desegregation; and 3) the same level
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of white flight is evident in big cities whether or not they have enacted desegregation
plans.71
The concept of white flight brought about conflicting claims due to researchers
utilizing different methods to complete their study.72 Edna Bonacich and Robert
Goodman in 1972 conducted their case studies within one city.73 James Bosco and
Stanley Robin in 1974 conducted their study utilizing a small quantity of central city
school districts.74 David Armor restricted his investigation to cities experiencing
segregation while Jackson in 1975 studied data from a large pool of school districts.75
Three types of research models can be used to test the hypothesis that school
desegregation leads to declines in white enrollment.76
1.) Pooled Model- Data for all districts and for all years are combined into
one large model in which annual changes in white enrollment are
related to annual changes in segregation and other independent
variables.
2.) Means Model- Seek to account for between-district variance in
changes in white enrollment (or average white loss) using betweendistrict variances in changes in segregation (or average changes in
segregation) as the primary independent variable.
3.) Deviations Model- Considers within-district changes in white
enrollment and relates them to within-district changes in school
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segregation. The white flight hypothesis will be confirmed if it is
found that there is an unusually large loss of whites during a year
when an unusually large amount of integration took place.77
In Coleman’s study, he and the other researchers relied primarily on the pool
model to conduct their research.78 The researchers utilized data from 1968 to 1973 in
which they obtained five one-year change observations for 67 school districts.79
Observations from all districts and all time intervals were pooled and then one year
changes in white enrollment were correlated to one-year changes in school segregation
along with several other independent variables. From this research, Coleman found a
significant correlation between reduction in segregation and declining white enrollments
in public schools.80 Coleman then made the conclusion that desegregation plans may be
counterproductive in increasing minority exposure to whites.81
Christine Rossell, a political scientist at Boston University, provided evidence that
contradicted Coleman’s findings as they related to the concept of white flight.82 Rossell
supplemented HEW school desegregation data used by Coleman with pre-1967 and casehistory data which she collected from each district.83 Rossell assembled data on eightysix northern and western districts (26 had undergone no desegregation, 60 had
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experienced varying degrees of desegregation with 11 being under court orders).84 This
yielded an analysis of trends in pre and post desegregation white enrollment by district.85
In the findings of the study there wasn’t a significant difference either between the full
pre-desegregation trend and the trend for the first year of desegregation, or between the
pre- and post desegregation trends.86 There wasn’t a significant difference in the rate of
decline in the proportion of white students between pre and post desegregation years for
any of the desegregating districts.87 When white migration was existent, there was not
significantly more white flight in districts with court ordered desegregation than in those
without it, districts with extensive desegregation than in those with minimal
desegregation, or in districts with desegregation than in districts without.88 Rossell’s
opposition was made clear in her paper “The Political and Social Impact of School
Desegregation Policy: A Preliminary Report.” In it she states:
Although Coleman has claimed in television appearances and to
journalists he is conducting research on school desegregation policy, he is
doing nothing of the sort. Indeed, there is no evidence he knows what
school desegregation policy has been implemented in the school districts
he is studying…By simply measuring the changes in school segregation
(which is much easier than tracking down the data on school segregation
policy), Coleman cannot distinguish between ecological succession in
neighborhood school attendance zones and an actual identifiable
governmental policy resulting in the same thing-integration. In the case of
ecological succession in school attendance zones, the integration will be
temporary and the eventual re-segregation will look like white flight
84
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resulting from school desegregation. This confusion of two different
phenomena means that his model is invalid for the case of governmental
or court-ordered school desegregation policy.89
Rossell also made it clear that she did not agree with Coleman’s methodology.
She believed that because Coleman compared data as utilizing absolute numbers rather
than percentages, that his findings as they relate to the frequency of white flight would be
exaggerated.90 This was a key difference between Rossell’s and Coleman’s research.
Rossell stated:
Coleman…measures loss in white enrollment in a way that may tend to
exaggerate white flight in some cities. He compares the raw figures on
white enrollment in the previous year and then claims white flight in the
latter is lower than the former. Yet one can easily predict cases where due
to job layoffs, factory closings, etc., both whites and blacks leave a city at
a faster rate than before, but blacks leave at a higher rate. Although this
would result in the percentage of black decreasing and the percentage of
white increasing, Coleman would still call this white flight, even though it
might more properly be called black flight. In the final analysis, the most
important variable for policy purposes is the percentage white, not the
number white.91
Most researchers, even those who disagreed on the role of desegregation in
producing white flight, agreed that white losses were greatest in districts containing large
proportions of blacks.92 This plight was also evident in Chicago and its public school
system. Even though the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education thwarted all
demands for segregation in the early 1900’s, white constituents of the city and its public
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schools continued to migrate outside of its boundaries.93 Before 1920, Chicago only had
one elementary school that had a student enrollment that was over 90% black, but in
1930, twenty-three elementary schools, two junior high schools, and one high school
were over the 90% mark.94 White enrollment in the Chicago Public Schools continued to
drop totaling 34.6% of the school district in 1970, 19% in 1980, and declined an
additional 8% by 1990.95
Although the cause for white migration out of the Chicago Public Schools can be
up for debate, the aftermath of it taking place made it challenging for Chicago to fully
desegregate its schools and consequently difficult to meet the goals of the Consent
Decree. Without an equitable ratio of blacks and whites in the District, it became
increasingly difficult to support integration. This would not be the only daunting task the
Chicago Public Schools would face implementing what was set forth in the Consent
Decree. The District had also made the commitment to integrate their teaching staff
which would bring about a whole new set of problems.
Faculty Integration
The original Consent Decree included the following provisions with regard to
teacher assignment:
The Board will promptly implement a plan to assure that the assignment of
full-time classroom teachers to schools will be made in such a manner that
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no school is identified as intended for students of a particular race, color,
or national origin.96
3.1 No later than November 1, 1981, with respect to the full-time
classroom teachers in each faculty, the racial/ethnic composition and the
proportion of experienced teachers will be between plus and minus 15
percent of the system wide proportion of such teachers with respect to
such characteristics, and the range of educational training will be
substantially the same as exists in the system as a whole.
3.2 The Board will make every good faith effort to follow professional
staff assignment and transfer practices which, when taken together as a
whole on a frequently reviewed periodic basis, will assure that the racial
composition, the experience and the educational background of individual
school faculties and administrative staff more nearly approach the citywide proportions of minority, experienced, and more extensively trained
professional staff; provided, however, that nothing that nothing in this plan
shall require the assignment or transfer of any person to a position for
which he or she is not professionally qualified. The Board will not adopt
or follow assignment and transfer practices which will foreseeably result
in the racial identifiability of school based on faculty or administrative
staff composition or in unequal distribution of experienced and more
extensively trained staff.
3.3 The failure of a particular school or schools to meet the guidelines will
not constitute noncompliance with the above guidelines if the district
provides a detailed satisfactory explanation justifying such failure to meet
guidelines.97
The original Consent Decree was not the first time Chicago was faced with the
dilemma of having to integrate their teaching workforce. In January of 1967, the Chicago
Public Schools received a statement of findings and recommendations from the United
States Office of Education relating to Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.98 The
Chicago Public Schools created a proposal initiating action in response to the report,
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resulting in a grant which provided specialists to assist in seeking solutions to the
problems indicated within the report.99 One of the issues addressed was Chicago’s
desegregated teaching staffs.
As stated in a document highlighting the United States Office of Education report,
the teaching staffs of the Chicago Public Schools was racially imbalanced.100 There were
several forces that acted as barriers to Chicago’s quest to integrate its staff, including fear
and uncertainty, misconceptions, representation of desertion of the teacher’s own people,
and segregation in housing.101
The report also provided a series of recommendations designed to help assist in
integrating Chicago’s teaching staff. Some of these recommendations focused directly on
the teachers themselves as it related to their recruitment, teaching experience, and ability
to be retained.
1. A program is recommended through which teachers may become fully
aware of staffing problems and may aid in their solution.
2. A city-wide policy should be adopted which would result in each
school having the same percentage of regularly certified teachers.
3. It is necessary to build stability and reduce turnover in the staffs of all
inner city schools. Inner city schools must be made more attractive to
teachers.
4. Significant numbers of more experienced and better qualified teachers
are needed now to balance staffs in inner city schools.
5. Intensive efforts should be made to recruit, prepare, and keep teachers
in inner city schools.102
6. Attention should be given to modifying the Illinois School Code to
permit assignment and transfer which would promote staff integration
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Some of these recommendations focused on supporting those teachers who taught
at inner city schools. This support could be illustrated in many different ways such as
providing additional safety measures for teachers’ safety, as well as providing an
infrastructure that supported teacher growth. Some of these recommendations included:
7. Teachers in inner city schools should be provided with guarded
parking lots and/or transportation to and from school.
8. Instructional groups consisting of the following members are
recommended as a staffing pattern for each 150 students: 1 master
teacher, 3 regular teachers, 1 beginning teacher, 2 practice teachers,
and 3 aides.
9. Teacher aides should be available immediately with or without new
organizational patterns.
10. Intensive efforts should be made to reduce absenteeism and to attract
and keep substitute teachers.103
Some of these recommendations focused on teachers and their interactions with
the community. The report made it clear that the Chicago Public Schools should be
focused on the school/community relationship. Some of these recommendations included:
11. Professional staff, special classes, and assistance of parents and
community agencies should be more widely utilized in providing for
children who have serious discipline problems.
12. Community support of teachers should be immediately and widely
cultivated.104
The report also acknowledged that some of the Chicago Public School’s practices
to promote desegregation were acceptable. It was recommended that these programs be
expanded.
Some of the activities already in progress should be continued and
expanded: summer school staff integration, transfer on loan, exchange
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programs within Chicago and with suburbs, and joint programs with
teacher preparation institutions concerning inner city problems.105
A plan for the implementation of the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was prepared by the Chicago Public Schools entitled The Chicago Public
School’s Plan to Integrate School Faculties and Equalize per Pupil Costs.106 The plan
was adopted by the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education on October 12, 1977.107
As the plan was being presented to the public, the Board was keenly aware and included
in their public statements that the educational quality would not suffer as a result of
teacher redistribution.108 The plan stated that all future assignments would be made with
the intention of ensuring that the racial composition, experience, and educational
training of each school’s faculty would more nearly approach the citywide average +/10 percent.109 This would be accomplished through the assignment of all new teachers
with regular or temporary certificates; all teachers whose classification changed from a
temporary certificated teacher to a regular certificated teacher; and all regularly
certificated and appointed teachers returned from leave whose positions had been
declared vacant.110 Consideration would be given to teachers 55 years old or older.111
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These teachers would only be asked to transfer if a school could not be brought into
compliance without their moving.112 This plan was not met without resistance. In July
of the same year, thirty-six Chicago school teachers filed a federal class suit to block the
transfers of more than 2,000 teachers.113 The teachers argued that the transfers were
illegal because they constituted reverse discrimination, violated their contracts, and were
done without determining if their current staffs were segregated.114
In April of 1981, the Chicago Public Schools adopted the Student Desegregation
Plan, which reiterated the Board’s commitment that each school should have a faculty
makeup reflecting within 15% of the system wide faculty composition.115 As a result of
the plan the Board was required to conduct the Annual Desegregation Review which
included an annual examination of the implementation of the plan, its objectives and
requirements, and an assessment of faculty integration.116 In July of 1989, the Board
adopted the School Reform Act limiting the power of Local School Councils to that of
making recommendations to the principal concerning their appointments of persons to
fill any vacant, additional, or newly created positions.117 Even with this new act
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providing an opportunity for community input, it still did not stray away from the
precedence set forth in the Consent Decree. A provision of the reform act reads:
The General Assembly does not intend to alter or amend the provisions of
the desegregation obligations of the Board of Education, including but not
limited to the Consent Decree or the Desegregation Plan in United States
v. Chicago Public Schools Board of Education, 80 C 5124, U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Accordingly, the
implementation of this amendatory Act of 1988, to the extent practicable,
shall be consistent with and, in all cases, shall be subject to the
desegregation obligations pursuant to such Consent Decree and
Desegregation Plan.118
In September 1990, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and the
Chicago Teachers Union joined in an agreement that would take them through the
1993 school year.119 The following articles contained within the Agreement
address the issue of faculty integration:
Article 38- Teacher Assignment Procedures
38-1 … appointments shall be made so that they will assure that the racial
compositions, experience and educational training of each school’s faculty
more nearly approaches the system wide proportions.
Article 42- Transfer Policy and Procedure
42-2… when assignments are made, said assignments shall first be made
from the transfer list if following said transfer, both the receiving school
and the sending school remain within the compliance goals for faculty
desegregation outlined in the Consent Decree entered and approved by the
United States District Court.
42-3… Upon being declared supernumerary, the Bureau of Teacher
Personnel shall immediately provide the supernumerary teacher with a list
of all vacant positions for which he or she further enhances or maintains
the achievement of the goals of the Plan to Implement the Provisions of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and which as a result of his or her
selection will assure that the racial composition, experience, and
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educational training of the schools selected will more nearly approach the
system wide proportions.
42-4…Such selection of staff members shall be consistent with the
compliance goals for faculty integration.
One of the tactics utilized by the Chicago Public Schools principals at the school
level was the use of the faculty integration waiver. This tactic was used when a potential
hire would place a school out of racial compliance because of the candidate’s race. The
Department of Human Resources made this form available to principals electronically.
If a candidate in which you selected takes your school out of racial
compliance, a note will appear that states that your school is out of racial
compliance. You will then be given the opportunity to download a Faculty
Integration Waiver. The Waiver will need to be completed and submitted
to the Department of Human Resources before the candidate begins
working in your unit.120
The Chicago Public Schools utilized a Faculty Integration Compliance Committee
to develop guidelines and procedures for the Department of Human Resources to meet
the requirements of the Consent Decree relative to faculty integration.121 The mission of
the Faculty Integration Compliance Committee reads:
To develop and submit recommendations for consideration in the general
superintendent’s final report to the desegregation committee, together with
any necessary recommendations for board action, before the end of the
school year. The recommendations shall include the identification of
issues to be examined regarding necessary improvements in faculty
integration requirements and processes, development and implementation
of guidelines and procedures, and development of monitoring compliance
measures.122
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Under the jurisdiction of the Faculty Integration Compliance Committee, it was
determined that the following personnel transactions would be subject to the terms of
faculty integration:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Administrative transfers
Transfer list transactions
Options for Knowledge positions
Regular appointments from another school to a true vacancy
Full-time-basis (FTB) substitute teacher appointments from another
school to true vacancy
6. Intraschool transactions, i.e., FTB to regular appointment
7. Intraschool transactions, i.e. promotional opportunities
8. Promotional opportunities from a another unit123
The Committee listed a group of scenarios that would constitute a transfer putting
a school out of compliance. These types of personnel transactions would be considered as
a hindrance to Chicago’s goal of integrating its teaching faculty. The list included the
following scenarios:
1. Sending school in compliance before transfer, but not after a transfer,
but receiving school maintains or enhances compliance.
2. Sending school in compliance before transfer, but not after transfer,
and receiving school out of compliance before and after transfer.
3. Sending school in compliance before transfer, but not after transfer,
and receiving school in compliance before but out of compliance after.
4. Sending school out of compliance and transfer compounds the
noncompliance status but receiving school maintains or enhances
compliance.
5. Sending school out of compliance, transfer enhances compliance but
receiving school out of compliance and noncompliance
compounded.124
The following transactions were exempted from faculty integration requirements:
Intraschool transfers, promotional opportunities i.e. assistant principal, acting assistant
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principal, counselor, head teacher appointments cadre to full-time basis (FTB) substitute
teacher, FTB substitute teacher to regular appointment.125
By explicitly listing these scenarios and exemptions, the Committee made it very
clear to the Department of Human Resources, the Chicago Public Schools and its
principals that they were committed to making sure that the implementation of the
Faculty Integration plan was consistent with the provisions set forth in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.126 This also held true in regards to how the Committee
monitored the use of waivers. Waivers would be considered based on programmatic
needs and personnel shortages in specialty areas.127 The Faculty Integration Compliance
Committee determined the following transactions would not require a waiver:
1. Sending school in compliance and maintains compliance and receiving
school in compliance and maintains compliance.
2. Sending school out of compliance maintains or enhances current level
of compliance and receiving schools maintains or enhance current
level of compliance.128
Despite Chicago’s efforts to integrate its teaching faculty, school leaders still
found it to be an unlikely task for various reasons. Beverly Tunney, president of the
Chicago Principals Association stated, “Principals have had difficulty integrating schools
and filling positions because of distance and safety concerns.” “…in Chicago, we have a
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teacher shortage. “We are finding it very difficult to get qualified teachers in the
classrooms due to the integration guidelines.”129
Teachers also seemed to have issues with the faculty integration plan, sighting
fear, resentment, and feelings of tokenism as some of the emotions that they were forced
to deal with. White teachers were often categorized as being fearful when they found
themselves working in all black schools. In an article published in the Chicago Tribune, a
teacher recounts a statement she heard from one of her teaching colleagues: “I have heard
white teachers say they were afraid of retaliation if they chastised a child in school –they
thought somebody might beat them up. But children need discipline, and if a teacher isn’t
providing it, he isn’t doing a job.”130 Resentment was felt by black teachers, who felt
white teachers came with a patronizing attitude, feeling that black children were in need
of love more than learning.131 An excerpt from an interview in the Chicago Tribune
quoted a white educator stating: “If I were working in a suburban school I don’t think I
would feel my students would need me as much, and I would feel a lot of effort I was
putting out was wasted. They could get the same thing at home.”132 Tokenism was often
the feeling of black teachers whom found themselves in all white schools. A teacher
stated: “I think they look at me and might judge all blacks by what I am like. Black
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people are different from another too, and I think white children should have an
opportunity to learn that.”133
Chicago Public Schools still operated in racial isolation with over half of its
schools being out of compliance with faculty guidelines on race.134 In September of 1980,
29% of schools were out of compliance compared to 59% twenty years later.135
There were proposed changes to these guidelines on Wednesday, November 15,
2000 when school board members voted unanimously to loosen guidelines for racial
composition of faculty at individual schools.136 Former guidelines required schools to
have faculties that required plus or minus 15% with the new plan expanding that number
to 25%.137
Chicago continued to struggle as attempts to loosen federal guidelines were not
fulfilled. One of the issues associated with the lack of integration in Chicago’s teaching
faculty was a severe shortage of minority teachers.138 An example was provided in
Chicago Tribune article written in 2002. It provided the following scenario:
The system’s fastest growing student group is Hispanics, who compose 36
percent of the public school population. Yet, only 12 percent of all
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teachers are Hispanic. A plurality of Chicago teachers are white, although
white students now make up 10 percent of the total.139
In the same article Deborah Lynch, president of the Chicago Teachers Union at
the time, reaffirmed the idea that a shortage in minority teachers made it difficult to
integrate teaching staffs. Lynch stated: “This is all confounded by the teacher shortage.
There is the concern about the number of minority teachers who apply to Chicago. There
are not enough.”140 Others faulted the principals, stating that hiring practices were done at
a local level making it difficult for central administrators to address the ethnic and racial
composition of faculties at individual schools.141
Regardless of where the blame fell, faculty integration of the Chicago Public
Schools teaching force appeared to be an elusive goal. Whether it was teachers’ negative
experiences with the process, the lack of available teachers, or principal’s hiring
practices, achieving the faculty integration portion of the Consent Decree remained a
difficult feat. Just as student integration proved to be a difficult task for the Chicago
Public Schools, developing teaching faculties that would be more racially balanced also
brought about some complications. The Chicago Public Schools needed to have other
strategies in place. One of them would be the development of magnet schools.
Magnet Schools
The federal courts have classified magnet schools as schools having a “distinctive
program of study” that attracts a voluntary cross section of students from a variety of
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racial groups.142 Federal regulations classify magnet schools as schools with a special
curriculum capable of attracting substantial numbers of students of different racial
backgrounds.143 Educators have defined magnet schools as schools offering a variety of
educational offerings that result in the voluntary integration of the students enrolled.144
Within all of these definitions four criteria stand out:
1. Magnet schools must offer an educational program that is different,
special, distinctive, or otherwise distinguishable from the regular
curriculum in non magnet schools.
2. The special curriculum must be attractive to students of all races, not
just whites or blacks or Hispanics, or other minority groups.
3. Magnet schools must be racially mixed and must have the effect of
eliminating segregation of the races among the students.
4. Magnet schools should be open to students of all races on a voluntary
basis, and any admission criteria that are imposed must not have the
effect of discriminating on the basis of race.145
The first magnet school, Boston Latin, was founded in the 17th Century in 1635
and was designated to meet the needs of intellectual elite.146 The magnet schools were
founded for the primary purpose of solving a pressing political problem. They were
designed to thwart active, dramatic, and possibly violent resistance by some whites to the
development of desegregated schools required by the court.147 Magnet schools now serve
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with a two pronged focus: the improvement of educational quality and the increase racial
integration.148 While the concept of the magnet school is not a new one, the application of
that concept has gone through expansions and modifications over the years as societal
needs have changed.149 Magnet schools appeal to many educational constituencies by
simultaneously creating desegregation without mandatory busing.150
After 1975, federal courts began accepting magnet schools as a method of
desegregation, consequently causing their numbers to dramatically increase.151 Magnets
were first developed in large urban school districts that were seeking a voluntary
desegregation strategy that allowed them to shun the idea of forced busing.152 The 1976
amendment to the Emergency School Aid Act, which authorized grants supporting the
development and implementation of magnet schools in desegregating districts,
accelerated urban interest in the magnet school concept and strengthened their reputation
as a viable desegregation strategy.153
As the number of urban school districts using magnet schools as a tool for
desegregation and expanded public choice increased, the debates around issues of equity
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and excellence became more significant.154 In Smreker and Goldring’s book, School
Choice in Urban America: Magnet Schools and the Pursuit of Equity, the authors give an
account of both sides of the argument.
Advocates of magnet schools argue that magnets:
1.) attract students of different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds
with similar educational interests;
2.) provide unique sets of learning opportunities; and
3.) encourage innovation. In other words, magnets are viewed as an
effective way to enhance diversity and equity among schools, increase
educational quality in school district, and stabilize enrollments.155
Critics of magnet school programs believe the concept enhances a class system
between the affluent and those who are economically disadvantaged, specifically when
magnet schools are selective in their enrollment and are few in number.156 They assert
that middle-class parents have more of a vested interest as it relates to the availability of
educational options, while lower-income parents are left with conventional attendance
area schools that lack specialized offerings and have limited resources.157 Consequently,
it is then claimed that magnets tend to absorb more academically motivated and capable
students, as well as more effective and innovative teachers, resulting in diminished
educational opportunities for those who are not afforded the opportunity to attend
them.158
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Chicago, just as many other urban school districts, saw the implementation of
magnet schools as a viable option to help desegregate its schools. It was thought that if
special schools were an option, children from all over the city would be attracted to
them.159 As a result, schools would have a multiracial student body in a system that had
too many racially isolated schools.160 In the original Consent Decree, section 1.1.2
established that the Board may utilize magnet schools to enhance desegregation. In
section 602.2 of the Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual, there are several goals listed
for magnet schools and programs including:
1. To provide and maintain desegregation in student assignments
consistent with the District’s desegregation obligation in U.S. v. Board
of Education of the City of Chicago
2. To promote diversity within schools included but not limited to the
prevention, reduction and elimination of minority group isolation
3. To provide a unique or specialized curriculum or approach
4. To improve achievement for all students participating in a magnet
school or program161
The following types of magnet schools and programs exist in the Chicago Public
Schools and are collectively referred to as magnet schools and programs:
1. Elementary Magnet Schools- Generally, magnet schools do not have a
neighborhood attendance boundary. Magnet schools offer a curriculum
focused on specific programmatic theme. Every student in the school
is involved in the magnet theme or focus offered at the school. The
Chicago Public Schools uses non-testing admissions procedures for its
magnet schools.
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2. Elementary Magnet Cluster Schools- A magnet cluster school is a
neighborhood school with a defined attendance area and accepts
students who live within that boundary. Students who live outside of
the attendance boundary must submit an application in order to be
considered for acceptance. Magnet cluster schools are located in
groups of no less than four schools clustered nearby in a manner that
provides the benefits of magnet programs to as many students
possible. Magnet cluster schools offer a curriculum focused on a
specific programmatic theme. Each school in a cluster offers a
programmatic theme in collaboration with its companion schools in
the neighborhood cluster. The Chicago Public Schools uses nontesting admissions procedures for its magnet cluster schools.162
The Chicago Public Schools developed this strategy for those schools that may
remain racially isolated. Their strategy was to put quality academic programming within
neighborhood schools. These schools would be available to students who lived within the
school’s attendance boundary.
Magnet cluster schools are open to students who live in the attendance
boundary for a particular magnet cluster school…Where possible, the
Chicago Public Schools shall identify schools to be part of a magnet
cluster that are in close geographical proximity and that may contribute to
desegregation of the schools in the cluster.163
Each school within a magnet cluster implements one of six academic areas
of focus: Fine and Performing Arts; the International Baccalaureate
Middle Years; the International the Chicago Public Schools Scholars
Program; Literature and Writing; Math and Science or World Language.164
3. Elementary Gifted and Enriched Academic Programs (GEAP) – Gifted
and Enriched Academic Programs constitute a continuum of programs
and services that modify, supplement and support the standard
education of students identified as gifted and talented who consistently
excel in general intellectual ability or possess aptitude or talent in a
specific area. The Gifted and Enriched Academic Programs consist of
Regional Gifted Centers, Classical Schools, Academic Centers, and
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International Baccalaureate Preparatory Programs as further described
below.
A. Regional Gifted Centers-A Regional Gifted Center is a school or a
program within a school that offers a curriculum which is designed
to meet the needs of gifted students and is faster in pace, broader in
scope, and presents subject matter in greater depth than is possible
in most programs. Some of these centers are designed to service
the needs of high ability English Language Learners.
B. Classical Schools-Classical Schools are designed to provide a
challenging liberal arts course of instruction for students with high
academic potential. The instructional program in these schools is
accelerated and highly structured for strong academic achievement
in literature, mathematics, language arts, world language and the
humanities.
C. Academic Centers-Academic Centers offer a program that allows
academically advanced students in grades 7-8 the opportunity to
move through the course material at their own pace.
D. International Baccalaureate Preparatory Program-An
International Baccalaureate Preparatory Program is designed for
intellectually able 6th, 7th, and 8th grade students. The program
includes intensive study in English, French, social studies,
laboratory science, mathematics, technology, arts, physical
education, library science and advanced research.165
4. Selective Enrollment High Schools-Selective Enrollment High Schools
are designed to meet the needs of the City’s most academically
advanced students. A selective enrollment school does not have an
attendance area.166
5. High School Magnet Programs-High school magnet programs are
located in neighborhood high schools in order to increase educational
opportunities for students. The schools accept students who live within
their attendance boundary. Students who live outside the neighborhood
attendance boundary must submit an application in order to be
considered accepted.167
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The goals of magnet schools and programs were explicitly described within the
Chicago Public Schools policy manual. It made clear that these goals were consistent
with the Second Amended Consent Decree. It was important that the motive behind the
implementation of magnet schools and programs correlated with what was being asked of
the district in regards to desegregation.
Desegregation Goals- Consistent with the Second Amended
(Desegregation) Consent Decree in the matter of U.S. v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, the District currently applies specified
racial goals to the extent practicable, in selecting applicants for admission
in magnet schools and programs. The goal of each magnet school and
program is to have an enrollment between 65-85 percent minority (Black,
Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, or American Indian/Alaskan Native) and
15-35 percent non-minority (White).168
It was also important to establish a system that enabled students of all races the
opportunity to attend a magnet school. The lottery system was developed to assure that
students were chosen randomly. It is again established that this process is also compliant
with the second Amended Consent Decree.
Computerized Lotteries- Where there are more applicants to a magnet
school, magnet cluster school or high school magnet program than there
are spaces available, a computerized lottery will be conducted to randomly
select students for the available spaces. All lotteries shall be conducted in
compliance with the Second Amended Consent Decree and the guidelines
set out in the District’s Option for Knowledge publication.169
The concept of magnet schools represents another strategy the Chicago Public
Schools put into place in order to help desegregate its schools. These schools provided an
alternative to the traditional neighborhood school, attracting students from all across the
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city with varying racial backgrounds. Historically, these magnets have often represented
some of Chicago’s highest performing and most diverse schools. Although these schools
had populations that reflected what was set forth in the Consent Decree and seemed to be
consistent with the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case, other schools in the city
were quickly dealing with the prospect of all their work to promote integration being
undone. Chicago Public Schools were facing the reality of resegregation.
Resegregation
Even with all of the efforts school districts made to desegregate their faculties and
student bodies, the goal of fully desegregating schools still seemed elusive. As time
passed, the commitment to the tenets of the Brown v. Board case became less of a
priority. This created an environment that provided an opportunity for school systems to
experience the concept of resegregation.
In 1991, The Supreme Court ruled in the Oklahoma v. Dowell case that the
desegregation orders set forth as a result of the Brown decision were temporary.170 The
Oklahoma v. Dowell ruling allowed local school districts to return to a system of
neighborhood schools even in areas where residential segregation would require school
children to attend either predominantly white or predominantly black schools.171 In the
Missouri v. Jenkins case in 1995, the Court determined that Kansas could end its
desegregation plan if it could not be proven that its neighborhood school system
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intentionally promoted racial discrimination.172 Supreme Court decisions such as these
have made a strong contribution to the resegregation of many of our Nation’s public
school systems.173
The Civil Rights Project of Harvard University was responsible for some of the
key research that discussed the concept of resegregation. According to a Harvard
University Graduate School of Education press release, “The Civil Rights Project at
Harvard University is an interdisciplinary initiative committed to mobilizing the
resources of Harvard and the broader research community in support of the struggle for
racial and ethnic justice. By building strong collaborations between researchers,
community organizations, and policy makers, The Civil Rights Project hopes to raise the
level of discourse on targeted issues and to reframe the tone and content of many of the
current legal and political debates.”174 Gary Orfield, a professor at Harvard University as
well as the co-director of the Civil Rights Act Project, was the catalyst of several studies
related to resegregation. One of Orfield’s study’s entitled “Brown At 50: King’s Dream
or Plessy’s Nightmare,” examines a decade of resegregation from the time of the
Supreme Court’s 1991 Dowell decision.175
Major findings of the study included:
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•

In many districts where court-ordered desegregation was ended in the
past decade, there has been a major increase in segregation. The courts
assumed that the forces that produced segregation and inequality had
been cured. This report shows they have not been.

•

Among the four districts included in the original Brown decision, the
trajectory of educational desegregation and resegregation varies
widely, and it is intriguing that three of the four cases show
considerable long-term success in realizing desegregated education.

•

Rural and small town school districts are, on average, the nation’s
most integrated for both African Americans and Latinos. Central cities
of large metropolitan areas are the epicenter of segregation;
segregation is also severe in smaller central cities and in the suburban
rings of large metros.

•

There has been a substantial slippage toward segregation in most of
the states that were highly desegregated in 1991. The most integrated
state for African Americans in 2001 is Kentucky. The most
desegregated states for Latinos are in the Northwest. However, in
some states with very low black populations, school segregation is
soaring as desegregation efforts are abandoned.

•

American public schools are now only 60 percent white nationwide
and nearly one fourth of U.S. students are in states with a majority of
nonwhite students. However, except in the South and Southwest, most
white students have little contact with minority students.

•

Asians, in contrast, are the most integrated and by far the most likely
to attend multiracial schools with a significant presence of three or
more racial groups. Asian students are in schools with the smallest
concentration of their own racial group.

•

The vast majority of intensely segregated minority schools face
conditions of concentrated poverty, which are powerfully related to
unequal educational opportunity. Students in segregated minority
schools face conditions that students in segregated white schools
seldom experience.

•

Latinos confront very serious levels of segregation by race and
poverty, and non-English speaking Latinos tend to be segregated in
schools with each other. The data show no substantial gains in
segregated education for Latinos even during the civil rights era. The
increase in Latino segregation is particularly notable in the West.
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•

There has been a massive demographic transformation of the West,
which has become the nation’s first predominantly minority region in
terms of total public school enrollment. This has produced a sharp
increase in Latino segregation.176

The study entitled “Resegregation in American Schools” was also completed by
Gary Orfield along with John T. Yung, a doctoral candidate in education at Harvard.177
Orfield and Yung’s study focused primarily on the following four important trends.178
1. American South is resegregating, after two and a half decades in which
civil rights law broke the tradition of apartheid in the region's schools
and made it the section of the country with the highest levels of
integration in its schools.
2. Data shows continuously increasing segregation for Latino students,
who are rapidly becoming our largest minority group and have been
more segregated than African Americans for several years.
3. The report shows large and increasing numbers of African American
and Latino students enrolled in suburban schools, but serious
segregation within these communities, particularly in the nation’s large
metropolitan areas. Since trends suggest that there will be a vast
increase in suburban diversity, this raises challenges for thousands of
communities.
4. There is a rapid ongoing change in the racial composition of American
schools and the emergence of many schools with three or more racial
groups. The report shows that all racial groups except whites
experience considerable diversity in their schools but whites are
remaining in overwhelmingly white schools even in regions with very
large non-white enrollments.179
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As a result of the study, it was determined that the causes for resegregation
stemmed from a number of social and political factors: court rulings beginning in the late
1980s that reversed many of the desegregation orders, the isolation of whites students in
suburban schools, the increasing segregation of blacks and Hispanics in suburban
schools, and the refusal of the Clinton administration to initiate any programs to
challenge this reactionary trend.180
Orfield and Yung believed that in order to stop the resegregation of schools, it
would be necessary to develop an alternative to existing policies.181 The authors listed the
following priorities as a means of avoiding mass resegregation and improving interracial
schools.
1) Active discussion and leadership on this issue by the President and
Education and Justice Department leaders, who would explain trends
and consequences and discuss constitutional issues. Initiatives of this
sort by the Reagan Administration, together with a systematic restaffing of the courts, have produced the current legal changes that
exacerbate segregation.
2) Leadership by the Justice Department and the Office for Civil Rights
in defining standards for "unitary status" which specify how the
various legal requirements of desegregation should be factually
examined. Also important is the use of educational expertise to help
the courts, which are often making quick and superficial judgments of
complex issues, related to schools.
3) Aggressive defense of remaining court orders.
4) Requirements that charter schools receiving federal funds are
desegregated in conformity with local and state desegregation plans
and policies.
5) Incentives in Title I plans that facilitate and encourage the transfer of
low income students from concentrated-poverty low-achieving schools
to schools that are more diverse. This is logical, since Title I research
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shows little success of Title I programs in concentrated poverty
schools, which are usually segregated minority schools.
6) A policy of strong support for diverse suburban communities by the
Education, HUD, and Justice Departments. This would include
research on successful local practices that create integrated
communities and vigorous enforcement against housing markets and
lending practices that spread segregation.
7) Proposing a program of aid for human relations, staff training, and
educational reform in the nation's thousands of multiracial schools.
Such a program existed until the Reagan Administration eliminated it.
8) Fill the vacant federal judgeships.182
The Chicago Public Schools have also had issues with the concept of
resegregation. Despite their efforts, the Chicago Public Schools still manage to be
segregated. A perfect example of this would be Chicago’s magnet schools that were
intended to embrace student diversity. In the late eighties during the peak of Chicago’s
magnet programs, twenty-five out of twenty-eight elementary magnet schools were
racially mixed without a predominant racial group.183 Twenty-two of these schools
ranked among the top one hundred elementary schools in the country.184 In 2008, only ten
of the existing twenty-seven magnet schools were racially mixed, with the remaining
seventeen being either predominantly Black or Latino.185
This trend was also evident in Chicago’s selective enrollment high-schools. While
blacks make up half of the Chicago Public Schools student population, they only
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represent 29% of the student body in selective enrollment high-schools.186 This
represented an 8% drop from the African American student population that was enrolled
in these schools twelve year ago, with the biggest drops being in Chicago’s highest
performing schools: Young, Jones, Lane, Payton, and Northside Prep.187
As the make-up of Chicago’s population shifted, so did the students to which the
city served. The less diverse the student population became, the more difficult it became
to desegregate schools. This dilemma made it difficult for Chicago and its school system
to meet the criteria set forth in the Consent Decree and to remain committed to the tenets
set forth in the Brown v. Board case. While the effects of resegregation would be up for
debate similarly to transportation and white flight, there would be one underlying issue
that would make or break all desegregation efforts. This would be the assistance or lack
thereof provided in terms of funding from the federal government.
Government Funding
The prospect of federal funding has been utilized in two ways to help support the
idea of school desegregation; as leverage to secure compliance with civil rights mandates,
and as direct support of desegregation related activities.188 Local school systems have
historically either illegally separated their students based on their race, or
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misappropriated financial resources that could be utilized to correct racial imbalance.189
In the 1960’s the concept of nondiscrimination was paramount to public policy, so as a
consequence, federal aid to school districts was based on their commitment to
nondiscriminatory practices.190 This became part of the Chicago Public Schools history
with desegregation.
Superintendent Benjamin Willis dealt with the issue of government funding and
the government’s philosophy with discrimination head on. Willis was charged with
developing plans to utilize federal funding in areas that did not accommodate high
populations of low-income underprivileged minorities, resulting in the launching of an
investigation.191 The federal government made the determination that they would
withhold their financial support provided to the city of Chicago pending the hearing on
the complaints to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) on
segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.192 Superintendent James Redmond dealt with
a similar plight. The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
threatened to relinquish up to $100 million dollars in federal funding due to the school
district’s failure to integrate their faculties.193
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Over the span of three decades, Chicago as well as other school districts across
the nation would deal with several government policies established to help fully
desegregate the nation’s public schools. The implementation of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 along with the issuance and enforcement of guidelines
for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contributed to a significant change in the
relationship between the federal government and local school systems.194 The focus of
federal financial assistance for education no longer was to assist schools in doing better
than they were currently doing; rather, it was to remedy their failure to provide equal
educational opportunities to minorities, specifically black children.195 In 1970, President
Nixon proposed the Emergency School Assistance Program, designed to help school
districts with court ordered desegregation.196 Under this program, $171 million dollars
was provided for school districts over a two year period.197 Unfortunately after the
program’s implementation, it was determined that these funds often were awarded to
segregated districts who did not use them to further desegregation.198 The Emergency
School Aid Act of 1972 was enacted as part of the Education Amendments of 1972 and
imposed strict non-discrimination standards for school districts’ to be eligible for
government assistance.199 In order to be considered eligible, school districts had to be
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implementing a plan requiring desegregation of children or faculty pursuant to either a
final court order or an order of a state agency. Eligibility for government assistance was
also provided to school districts that had either a desegregation plan approved under Title
VI, or a voluntary plan for the elimination of minority group isolation.200From fiscal year
1973 to fiscal year 1981, $2.2 billion dollars was provided in order to aid in the
desegregation of the nation’s schools.201 These funds were utilized for staff training,
additional staff, new curriculum development, community relations activities, and the
financing of magnet schools.202 In the early eighties, the philosophy of federally aided
desegregation changed direction once again. On February 18, 1981, the White House
issued America’s New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery, designed to
reduce federal expenditures and federal presence in domestic venues.203 As a result, fortyfive federal education programs would be consolidated in order to move control of
educational policy away from the federal government and back to State and local
authorities.204
When the Chicago Public Schools entered into the Consent Decree in 1980, it not
only provided a viable solution to student desegregation, but also to areas that hindered
their eligibility for federal funding. These areas included classroom integration, bilingual
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program staffing, and faculty assignment.205 Section 15 of the Original Consent Decree
directly addresses the issue of funding as it relates to fulfilling the decree’s obligations.
Section 15 states:
15.1 Each party is obligated to make every good faith effort to find and
provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the
implementation of the desegregation plan.
15.2 Each party reserves the right to seek to add additional parties who
may be legally obligated to contribute to the cost of the desegregation
plan.
15.3 The parties recognize that financial cost of implementation does not
excuse the failure to develop a desegregation plan consistent with the
principals set forth in 55 2-14, and is not a basis for postponement,
cancellation or curtailment of implementation of the plan after it has been
finally adopted, but is one legitimate consideration of practicability in
meeting the objective in 2.1.206
The Chicago Public Schools questioned whether the provisions set forth in the
Consent Decree required financial assistance from the federal government.207 This debate
was decided in the United States v. Board of Education case when federal district Judge
Milton I. Shadur ruled that the United States was obligated to provide assistance.208 The
Chicago Public School District sought payment from the federal government because
they believed that the language in the Consent Decree entitled them to government
funds.209 Judge Shadur’s ruling required that the federal government provide $103.8
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million dollars to assist in Chicago’s desegregation efforts.210 The Board requested $114
million for its schools, but Judge Shadur believed that some of the programs the board
requested did not meet the legal requirements of materially aiding desegregation.211
The U.S. Justice Department was unhappy with Judge Shadur’s decision.
President Reagan and his administration appealed the judge’s decision that would require
the federal government to pay $14.6 million dollars for the 1983-84 school year and as
much as $250 million dollars over the next five years.212 The government’s position was
developed from the Reagan Administration’s policy decision to reduce the government
funding made available to school districts.213 Reagan’s Administration was responsible
for phasing out the Emergency School Aid Act, the primary resource of federal aid
designed to help school districts undergoing desegregation.214 On July 13, 1983, the
Justice Department filed papers with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stating that the previous judgment constituted an unwarranted interference and intrusion
upon the discretion vested in officials in the executive branch.215 The Justice
Department’s disgust was articulated in its motion seeking an Order to Stay the
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proceedings. In an article published in the Education Week journal, the Justice
Department is quoted as saying:
The court’s decision is a sweeping unprecedented judicial intrusion into
the formulation of national policy…The order is an affront to the doctrine
of separation of powers and a profound intrusion into the constitutionally
protected domain of the executive branch.216
Part of the Department of Justice’s argument was that funding Chicago’s
desegregation project would take funding from other school district’s trying to
desegregate their schools. This made it an issue of equity, questioning whether it was an
equitable decision to provide so much support to one single school district.
It marks the first time that a court has directed an official of the executive
branch to divert funds from hundreds of federal grantees across the nation
in order to finance a desegregation plan for one school district. It marks
the first time that a court has ordered the executive branch to seek
legislation in derogation of Administrative policy if a specified sum of
money cannot be produced by reallocating funds.217
The Department of Justice also challenged the amount that the Chicago Public
School district was requiring to implement its desegregation plan. They believed that the
amount was unwarranted, and would be used elsewhere rather than to desegregate their
school system.
The nature and scope of the school board’s desegregation plan are so
broad that they are virtually indistinguishable from all other educational
activities conducted by the board…It appears that the board is attempting
to balance its overall budget by seeking to make the United States
responsible for the shortfall.218
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sided with the Department of
Justice, finding that Judge Shakur misinterpreted the provisions set forth in the 1980
Consent Decree.219 A three judge appellate panel found that the Consent Decree does not
require the federal government to lobby the Congress for desegregation funds for
Chicago but only requires that the Chicago Public School District receive “top of the line
priority” for funds from Educational Department accounts that can be used for
desegregation purposes.220 Chicago would be forced to cut some of its programs and
staff, eliminating $20 million dollars from its desegregation budget during the 1983-84
school year.221
The funding debate that took place in Chicago provided another barrier in the
district’s quest to desegregate its schools. The strategies the Chicago Public Schools
utilized throughout its history with desegregation such as busing, teacher transfers, and
magnet schools were all very costly. School districts across the country felt the pressure
to desegregate their school systems, but the prospect of funding always created a
hindrance.
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CHAPTER V
FINAL ANALYSIS
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the analysis of historical documents to
respond to the research questions presented in this study. Each research question was
designed to support the purpose of this study, which is to provide the current and future
educational leader an historical analysis of the Chicago Public School Consent Decree
(Consent Decree), while illustrating its relationship with the Brown v. Board case of
1954. Analyzing the Consent Decree from an historical perspective will provide findings
addressing the following:
1. The discriminatory practices responsible for the Consent Decree’s origin.
2. The goals established within the Consent Decree.
3. The strategies used to implement the Consent Decree’s goals.
4.

The challenges that effected the implementation of the Consent Decree.

5. The implications of the Consent Decree’s implementation on current and
future leaders.
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Research Question 1
What discriminatory practices, in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v.
Board decision, led to the creation of the Consent Decree?
Findings
Education in the Chicago Public Schools mirrored the same racial isolation that
was going on in traditional society.1 The Chicago Public Schools have had a history of
segregated public schools, continuing the cycle of racial isolation.2 Black students
attended the Chicago Public Schools as early as 1837. They were not formally segregated
from their white peers; however, they were not encouraged to attend school.3 Compulsory
attendance laws were not put in place until 1919, requiring all children to attend school.4
As other minorities began to migrate to the city, Chicago’s population became more
diverse.5 Eventually, the neighborhoods within the city became segregated based on race,
ethnic, and religious identity.6 The concept of the neighborhood school was embraced by
the Chicago Public Schools, and as neighborhoods became more segregated so did their
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school’s populations.7 Ninety-one percent of elementary schools along with 71% of
high-schools were made up of a single race by 1956.8
The racial isolation that plagued the Chicago Public School system was not only
perpetuated by neighborhood demographics, but also by some of the practices of the
Chicago Public Schools itself.9 “Official restrictive housing covenants, and neighborhood
school policies established to be consistent with them, worked to contain blacks and other
minorities in specified areas of the city.”10 Actions such as these put the Chicago Public
School system in direct violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case.
The Willis Era: The Fifties
Benjamin C. Willis became the superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools in
1953, and played a major role in the Chicago Public School’s discriminatory practices.11
Willis was a strong advocate of the values and virtues associated with the concept of
neighborhood schools.12 Blacks during Willis’ tenure demanded that the Chicago Public
Schools be desegregated, but their wishes were met with little regard.13 Although Willis
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was known for building academic structures, schools in Black neighborhoods weren’t the
beneficiary of the new facilities.14
When schools in black communities were overcrowded, Willis utilized various
tactics to increase classrooms within these schools. He allowed schools to operate with a
proportionately high number of mobile classrooms that became known as “Willis
Wagons.” 15 He also implemented plans that made it necessary to accelerate building
schedules, to require teachers to work double shifts, and to convert commercial facilities
into schools. These strategies enabled Willis to circumvent integration.16 Blacks were
enraged and grew impatient with Willis and his actions, which were perceived to
perpetuate segregation.17 Civil rights activist, as well as many Black leaders saw the use
of mobile classrooms as a way to make sure that Blacks were contained in a certain area
of the city, preventing their migration to areas that were designated as all-White.
Eventually, Willis’ discriminatory practices would be unveiled. The federal
government charged Willis with developing plans to utilize federal funding in areas that
did not accommodate high populations of low-income underprivileged minorities,
resulting in the launching of an investigation.18 The federal government made the
determination that it would withhold its financial support provided to the City of
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Chicago, pending the hearing on the complaints to the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) on segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.19
Based on the results of the federal government’s hearing, a suit was brought by
the Coordinating Council of Community Organization (CCCO) in 1965 against the
Chicago Public Schools.20 On October 4, 1963, Benjamin C. Willis resigned from the
Chicago Public Schools Board of Education, (the Board), charging that the Board had
invaded his administrative domain amidst the segregation controversy going on in the
Chicago Public Schools.21
The Redmond Era: The Sixties
On May 25, 1966, James F. Redmond was appointed as the superintendent of the
Chicago Public Schools.22 When James Redmond took over as superintendent of the
Chicago Public Schools, the district was still segregated. Only 28% of white students
were served by schools that had more than a 5% population of black students.23 In
contrast, only 4.7% of black students were served at schools that were considered to be
predominately white.24
In January 1967, the United States Office of Education for Civil Rights provided a
statement of findings and recommendations as they related to the operation of the
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Chicago Public Schools.25 This report was entitled Report on Office of Education
Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.26 The report highlighted four areas of concern, which included: faculty
assignment patterns, boundaries and student assignment policies, the apprenticeship
training program and the open enrollment for vocational and trade schools.27
In response to these findings, Redmond developed a proposal requesting a
planning grant from the U.S. Office of Education under Section 405 (a) (2) of Title IV of
Public Law 88-352 to fund specialist to assist in developing a plan to address concerns.28
The grant was approved, and Redmond and his team began working to resolve some of
the problems associated with the operation of the Chicago Public Schools. At a special
session of the Board of Education, Redmond presented the plan entitled, Increasing
Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education Programs.29 It was
considered to be the first out-and out integration program in Chicago’s history, and would
later be known as the Redmond Report.30
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The Board endorsed the new plan that aggressively worked to integrate the
Chicago Public Schools.31 However, as time passed implementation costs, lengthy
traveling times, and the fear of bodily harm to students caused board members to reassess
the plan and eventually reject the busing project.32 In 1975, James Redmond made the
announcement to the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education that he would not seek
another term as the general superintendent.33
The Hannon Era: The Seventies
On July 24, 1975, Dr. Joseph P. Hannon was appointed as General Superintendent
of Schools for four years.34 With an effective date of September 14, 1975, Hannon took
on the Chicago Public Schools at a time when: reading scores were low; there was an
increase in minority student population yet a decrease in minority teachers; the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare threatened to relinquish up to $100
million dollars in federal funding due to the school district’s failure to integrate their
faculties; integrating students appeared to be an elusive goal; and a teacher strike was
currently in progress.35
In the early part of 1976, Hannon submitted a plan to the Office for Civil Rights
in response to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s request to remediate
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segregation policies in order to comply with Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act by September, 1976.36 The plan was Hannon’s effort to put together, in
one booklet, the facts and figures related to the Plan to Integrate Local School Facilities,
Equalize Staff Services, and Provide Special Services to National Origin Minority
Children.37
The plan was rejected by the Office for Civil Rights, and Hannon was asked to
provide additional information.38 The Office for Civil Rights informed Hannon that it
reviewed data to determine the process for assigning faculty and staff to develop racially
identifiable schools.39 They also wanted to know if teachers assigned to work with
minority students had less experience and professional training than those assigned to
work with their nonminority counterparts.40 Lastly, the office wanted to determine if
minority children were being offered equally effective educational opportunities as
others.41
The Office for Civil Rights requested a plan be submitted within sixty days
explaining how the Chicago Public Schools would develop a process to assign faculty so
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that it would comply with the goals for desegregation.42 It also expected that the ratio of
minority to nonminority personnel in individual schools be the same as the ratio across
the entire district by September 1976.43 At the same time, it was expected that the
proportion of teachers with extensive professional education and experience and those
teachers with lesser education and experience be comparable in number in all of the
district’s schools.44
The Board of Education passed a resolution, prescribed by the Illinois Board of
Education, to develop, adopt, and implement a comprehensive Equal Educational
Opportunity Plan created to meet the criteria for conformance with the Rules Establishing
Requirements and Procedures for the Elimination and Prevention of Racial Segregation
in Schools.45 A draft of the plan was created and submitted to the Office for Civil Rights
to ensure that it would meet the Illinois resolution and also comply with the guidelines set
forth by the Office of Civil Rights.46 The plan explained how the Chicago Public Schools
would integrate faculties by September 1977, eliminate any identifiable pattern of
principal assignment and provide appropriate bilingual services.47
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In February of 1977, a federal judge made the determination that the Chicago
Public Schools Board of Education was in violation on the federal faculty/staff racial
factor and bilingual issue but was not in violation of the faculty experience factor.48 A
special consultant was designated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to
assist in the negotiations with the board in the settlement of the Title VI proceedings.49
On May 25th, the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education adopted the Plan for the
Implementation of Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related To:
Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education
Programs.50 The plan, under Dr. Hannon’s leadership became known as Access to
Excellence.51
Access to Excellence was designed to increase the quality of educational
opportunities for all students in a desegregated setting.52 The plan was designed to be
implemented within a five year period and to be completed by the 1982-1983 school
year.53
In the spring of 1979, the federal government accused the board of continually
supporting segregation in its schools, and stated that it would file a suit against the board
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if the Chicago Public Schools did not develop a comprehensive desegregation plan by
September.54 It was stated to Dr. Hannon in a letter from Joseph Califano that the
Board’s Access to Excellence program did not correct the identified violations.55 David
Tatel, Director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Office of Civil
Rights, delivered a document to Hannon expressing concern for Chicago’s segregated
schools.56 The document expressed the need for negotiations for a citywide desegregation
plan to begin right away.57 Tatel stated that if Chicago refused to participate in
negotiations, the case would be referred to the Justice Department for court action.58
Tatel also believed that the school board could do more to increase desegregation beyond
the Access to Excellence Plan. To make matters worse, the federal government rejected
the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education’s application for desegregation funds
under the Emergency School Aid Act with the hope that Chicago would develop a plan
that would give them eligibility.59 Federal officials gave Hannon and the Chicago Public
Schools the options of participating in a “show cause” hearing to prove the charges
incorrect or asking for a waiver to receive funding.60

54

Stringfellow, “Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago,” 59.

55

O’Connor, “City Faces School Bias Suit by U.S.,” 1.

56

Stringfellow, “Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago,” 70.

57

Ibid.

58

Banas and O’Connor, “Busing Plan Needed, U.S. Official Says,” 12.

59

Ibid.

60

Ibid.

199
Hannon set out to challenge the government’s findings and prove to federal
officials that Chicago and its commitment to the Access to Excellence plan had made
substantial strides toward desegregating the district’s public schools.61 On May 4, 1979,
Hannon met with the officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
prove why the Chicago Public Schools should still receive federal funding.62 During the
proceedings, Hannon asked federal officials to revoke their findings that the Chicago
Public School District was deliberately segregating its schools, and to reinstate the
district’s eligibility for $36 million dollars in funds under the Emergency School Aid
Act.63 Hannon’s efforts could not persuade the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to change its mind. The department did not agree with the district’s definition of
what constituted a school being desegregated. Chicago’s standard for desegregation was
when a school operated with no more than 90% of its student population belonging to
only one race.64 The definition as it related to federal criteria considered a school
desegregated when the school’s full time student enrollment was 25 to 50% white and 50
to 75% black.65
Hannon returned to Chicago, and under the directive of his administration, the
Chicago Public Schools Board of Education approved an expansion of the Access to
Excellence plan. This would call for the addition of 13 sites administering preschool
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programs, classical schools, and language academies beginning in September of 1979.66
Hannon took a firm stance on the concept of a voluntary integration plan, shunning any
strategies that would be mandatory, such as busing. Hannon believed that the
implementation of voluntary access to quality education was Chicago’s best option
despite the fact that the city was residentially segregated.67 Furthermore, mandatory
integration would not be an effective strategy due to the low white student enrollment
throughout the district.68
On July 13, 1979, Mayor Jane Byrne announced that she participated in a meeting
with Dr. Hannon to discuss the status of the desegregation negotiations between the
district and the federal government. She stated that Hannon and his staff were preparing
an expanded desegregation plan. This plan would include clustering, the combining of
school populations of three or more schools within the same proximity. This concept
along with the use of magnet schools would require little busing.69 Hannon and his team
also had to consider an alternative to their voluntary plans. The federal government
demanded that mandatory backup measures be instituted if voluntary efforts failed to
meet the goal of achieving desegregation that was acceptable to the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.70
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While mandatory integration strategies were not looked at favorably by the
Chicago Public Schools, the federal government still believed they were a viable option.
David Tatel, Director of the Office for Civil Rights stated: “We have decided that further
progress would be enhanced by developing some specific desegregation option; one of
the options will be busing.”71 Tatel also stated that the plan would need to be developed
and approved by September 15, 1979 with an implementation date to be determined
through later investigations.72 On August 26, 1979, Patricia Harris would be newly
appointed as the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.73
Although she stated she would assist Chicago in mapping out an acceptable school
desegregation plan, the September 15, 1979 deadline would not be extended.74
On August 31, HEW developed a proposal for the Chicago Public Schools that
required the mandatory busing of 114,000 elementary students.75 It would not be a
requirement for Chicago to accept the proposal, but if they chose to do so, it would
desegregate 60% of the district’s schools and involve 55% of the district’s student
population.76 Hannon’s response to the proposal was that busing 114,000 school children
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to achieve the government’s definition of integration would be costly and would not
improve education nor aid the city’s stability.77
In mid-September, Hannon submitted to Washington, D.C. the plan, Access to
Excellence: Further Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities,
designed to achieve greater racial balance throughout the district.78 On September 26,
1979, the HEW informed the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education that their
submission would not be accepted because it did not adequately remedy the alleged
segregated conditions in the Chicago Public Schools.79 On October 17, 1979, HEW
announced it would continue negotiations if the Chicago Public Schools Board of
Education agreed to their definition of a desegregated school and submit an effective
desegregation plan by November 17, 1979.80 The Board refused to proceed with
negotiations under the terms set forth by HEW.81 The following day, Hannon informed
the Board that he would be receiving a letter announcing that Chicago’s desegregation
case would be received by the Department of Justice.82 On October 29, 1979, HEW
presented the matter to the Department of Justice with the intention that it would initiate
litigation.83 Hannon was encouraged by board members and his close advisors to take a
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public stand and fight the desegregation issue in court.84 The Chicago Public Schools
Board of Education rejected the idea of creating a citywide desegregation plan that
coincided with the stipulations set forth by HEW.85 Hannon echoed their sentiments
referring to HEW’s proposal as “unworkable and unreasonable.”86
On November 14, 1979, the General Superintendent of Schools set out to meet
with members of government to work out a solution on pupil assignment.87 Hannon was
in opposition of the charges against his school district, but he agreed to cooperate with
HEW to resolve the desegregation issue in hopes to reclaim federal funding.88 Later that
year, the Board submitted an application to HEW requesting ESAA funds for the 1980-81
school year only to be denied once again by the HEW due to alleged discrimination.89
The Caruso and Love Era: The Eighties
Hannon would announce that he would resign effective January 25, 1980.90 At a
time when things appeared to be at their lowest point, Angeline P. Caruso, Associate
Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction Services was appointed superintendent.91
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Caruso served in the superintendent’s capacity until Dr. Ruth Love, Chicago’s first black
school superintendent was hired in April of 1980.92
On April 21, 1980, the Department of Justice found the Chicago Public Schools
Board of Education guilty of the unlawful segregation of students based on their race.93
The Department of Justice was prepared to file a suit against the board unless it was
assured that voluntary compliance could be put in place to remedy the alleged
violations.94
The United States has filed a Complaint alleging that the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago (the “Board”) has engaged in acts of
discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of
federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a
continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and
ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system.95
The school district was accused of operating in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.96 The Complaint alleged that the Chicago Public Schools engaged in actions
regarding student/faculty assignment and other educational practices that promoted
inequalities regarding how students were educated. Specifically, these practices included:
drawing attendance zone boundaries, adjusting grade structures of schools in racially and
ethnically segregative ways, allowing racially segregative intra-district transfers by White
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students, maintaining severely overcrowded and thereby educationally inferior schools
for African American students and less crowded schools for White students, and
assigning teachers and staff to schools in racially segregative ways.97
The Department of Justice provided the Chicago Public Schools Board of
Education an opportunity to enter into negotiations in order to reach an agreement that
would resolve the desegregation matter.98 On June 11, 1980, the Board developed a
Committee on Desegregation to meet with the United States Department of Justice to try
to resolve the district’s legal issues.99 The Committee recommended to the Board that it
continue to promote racial integration in its schools, and that the programs they
developed to achieve integration must be guided by legal requirements as well as
educational objectives.100
The Committee reached an agreement with the Department of Justice and
Education that centered on a three-step process to eradicate segregation in the Chicago
Public Schools. First, the parties agreed to a preliminary commitment to develop and
implement a plan, which included principles that would guide development of the plan.
The next step was to develop a detailed plan, with participation by appropriate experts
and by the community, and adoption of the plan by the Board no later than March 1981.
Finally, the parties agreed to implement the plan beginning September 1981.101 The
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initial commitment would be carried out by entering into a Consent Decree, agreed upon
by the Board and the Department of Justice and submitted to the United States District
Court for approval.102
Conclusion
For numerous decades, Chicago Public Schools have been accused of
discriminatory practices. Even through the tenure of several different superintendents
each with their own desegregation plan, the Chicago Public Schools still could not satisfy
the federal government. The Brown v. Board case established that individuals needed to
have an equal opportunity for an education. This means that every student should be
afforded the same opportunity without fear of being discriminated against because of
their race. The Chicago Public Schools ultimately found itself signing the Consent
Decree because they were found to be in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v.
Board decision, a lesson that taught the nation that there is no such thing as “separate but
equal.”
Research Question 2
What were the goals set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at remedying the
discriminatory practices that were in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v.
Board decision?
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Findings
The Consent Decree 1980
The original Consent Decree and Desegregation Plan had two major goals.103 The
first goal was to establish “the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated
schools, considering all the circumstances in Chicago.”104 These circumstances referred
to the challenges associated with desegregating the Chicago Public Schools such as the
diverse racial make of the city and its segregated neighborhoods. The second goal of the
Consent Decree and Plan was to “provide educational and related programs for any Black
or Hispanic schools remaining segregated.”105
The original Consent Decree consisted of several basic objectives:
1.1 Systemwide Remedy- The Chicago Public Schools Board of Education
(the “Board”) will develop and implement a system-wide plan to remedy
the present effects of past segregation of Black and Hispanic students.
2.1 Desegregated Schools- The plan will provide for the establishment of
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools,
considering all circumstances in Chicago.
a. Compensatory Programs in Schools-remaining Segregated- In order to
assure participation by all students in a system-wide remedy and to
alleviate the effects of both past and ongoing segregation, the plan
shall provide educational and related programs for any Black or
Hispanic schools remaining segregated.
2.3 Participation- To the greatest extent practicable, the plan will
provide for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups, and in all age
and grade levels above kindergarten.
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1.1 Fair Allocations of Burdens- The plan shall ensure that the burdens
of desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial or ethnic
group.106
The Modified Consent Decree
In 2001, the federal government and the Chicago Public Schools reviewed the
school district’s implementation of and compliance with the original Consent Decree and
the Desegregation Plan.107 It was determined by the district court that there were areas of
the plan that had not reached full compliance.108 These areas related to magnet schools,
transfers, school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, controlled enrollment,
assignment of faculty and school based administrators, compensatory programs and
services for English Language Learner students.109 The federal government and Board of
Education of the City of Chicago entered into a Modified Consent Decree.110 The new
Modified Consent Decree was designed with the intention that its full implementation
would address the goals set forth in the original Consent Decree and Desegregation
Plan.111 The new Consent Decree also established a timetable that would bring the case to
a final resolution.112
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The Second Amended Consent Decree
In 2005, the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, asked the
federal government and the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education to consider what
provisions of the Modified Desegregation Consent Decree would continue.113 The court
revisited the Modified Desegregation Consent Decree because of the significant changes
in racial demographics in Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.114 The student
population of the Chicago Public Schools in no way resembled that of the school
population that existed during the creation of both the original and modified versions of
the Consent Decree.115
As a result of the court’s inquiry, and further discovery by both parties, the federal
government and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago jointly requested that they
vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be allowed to enter a Second Amended Consent
Decree.116 In the proposed Consent Decree, the two parties requested that the Consent
Decree automatically expire in June.117 The court approved the request to enter a Second
Amended Consent Decree; however, established that the Consent Decree could not
automatically expire without the determination being through the court.118
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Conclusion
The Consent Decree established goals that were consistent with the tenets set
forth in the Brown v. Board case. The Chicago Public Schools would now have to focus
on providing all students an opportunity to a quality education with the same access to its
facilities and resources. The Consent Decree would give the Chicago Public School
district an opportunity to right some of the wrongs that had been established through
years of segregative practices within its schools. With the courts watching, the
accountability to desegregate the school system would need to become a priority for
Chicago.
Research Question 3
According to available documentation, what did educational leaders have to do to
implement the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at supporting the tenets
set forth in the Brown v. Board decision?
Findings
In order to meet the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree, the Chicago
Public Schools utilized several strategies. These strategies once matriculated down to the
school level, required support from administration in order to be successful.
The Consent Decree lists the following strategies to be implemented by the Chicago
Public Schools:
Voluntary Techniques
4.1.5 Permissive transfers that enhance desegregation, with
transportation at Board expense.
4.1.6 Magnet schools that enhance desegregation.
4.1.7 Voluntary pairing and clustering of schools.
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4.1.8

If magnet schools or other voluntary techniques are used, each
shall contain/ethnic goals and management controls (e.g., an
alternative that would require mandatory re-assignments) to ensure
that the goals are met.

Mandatory Techniques Not Involving Transportation
4.2.1 Redrawing attendance areas.
4.2.2 Adjusting feeder patterns
4.2.3 Reorganization of grade structures, including creation of middle
schools.
4.2.4 Pairing and clustering of schools.
4.2.5 Selecting sites for new schools and selecting schools for schools
closing to enhance integration.
4.2

Mandatory Reassignment and Transportation- Mandatory
reassignment and transportation, at Board expense, will be
included to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other
techniques are insufficient to meet the objective stated in 2.1. The
plan may limit the time or distance of mandatory transportation to
ensure that no student shall be transported for a time or distance
that would create a health risk or impinge on the educational
process. These limitations may vary among different age and grade
levels.

4.4 Priority and Combination of Techniques- The plan may rely upon the
techniques listed above and any other remedial methods in any
combination that accomplishes objective stated in 2.1.119
Some of the voluntary methods utilized by the Chicago Public Schools Board of
Education required a certain amount of flexibility on the part of the building
administrator. The permissive transfer system allowed students to move from one school
to another to support integration in the Chicago Public Schools. This process changed the
racial make-up of a school’s student body which was received differently by those who
were already stakeholders within the school’s culture. Principals needed to employ
various strategies to establish first structural then attitudinal change amongst the diverse
119
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interests of those being served at the school site.120 Principals would have to deal with the
prejudices, fears and doubts of students, faculty, and staff.121 He/She would need to
remain cognizant of individuals varying views on desegregation and put systems in place
to support staff and students in the change process.
Magnet schools, while designed to enhance desegregation, sometimes had an
adverse effect on the neighborhood school. Principals who were battling to keep their
enrollments up suffered from the prospect of losing students to magnet schools. This
scenario became an even larger issue when underperforming and underutilized schools
became the victim of closure due to the Renaissance 2010 initiative.
Mandatory methods utilized by the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education
also brought about changes to the way school buildings had to function. Altered
attendance boundaries and adjusted feeder patterns required both elementary and highschool principals to put systems in place to make new students, who often represented a
different race, comfortable with their transition into the school population. Mandatory
methods also required principals to deal with the community, which expressed varying
views about the desegregation of its schools.
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The Role of the Principal in the Desegregation Process
There is very little literature available examining the role of the principal in the
desegregation process.122 This may be because the desegregation process, rather
voluntary or through court mandates was viewed as a change in policy and the Board of
Education and the Superintendent usually exercised policy planning and decisionmaking.123 The principal represented the position the public most closely associated with
the daily operation of the school system and was a critical element to the public
understanding and support for schools.124
Studies reveal that the presence of certain key ingredients in the principal’s
beliefs and actions ensure a greater opportunity for the development of a productive and
healthy school environment that has been altered by the implementation of a school
desegregation plan.125 These ingredients include:
1. Commitment- Principal must believe that integrated education is
better than segregated education.
2. Risk Taking- Principal must be able to place the goals and ideals of
desegregation, integration, and the special focus of his/her school of
their own personal well-being.
3. School Climate- Principal must be dedicated to developing a positive
school climate. The climate of the school is extremely important to
desegregation efforts. The pulse of a building can determine a
desegregation plan’s success or failure.
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4. Creating the Principal’s Presence- The Principal sets the tone for the
school. A principal’s presence must be keenly felt for successful
desegregation to take place.126
Each of these characteristics is of vital importance to a leader during the desegregation
process. The desegregation of schools brought with it a tremendous amount of change. A
school principal was often responsible for helping people cope with the change process.
Successful school desegregation is an ongoing set of adaptations,
modifications, and situational responses to social change. It is a dynamic,
in contrast to static, educational endeavor. Whether one views the
desegregation process as a set of predictable developmental changes, or
being so completely situational that transference from one setting to
another is not possible, the fact is that change is constantly taking place.
Being aware of this change and able to guide it distinguishes successful
from unsuccessful school principals. Reacting positively to change is
critical to successful desegregation; reacting negatively is likely to
promote dissension, conflict, and the loss of learning opportunities.127
School principals represented the catalyst of change as it related to moving from a
segregated school model, to one that embraced integration. Teachers often based their
feelings on desegregation based on the actions of the lead administrator.
Whether the desegregation efforts take place in Chicago, or any other city within
the United States, the principal plays a large role in the success or failure of the school’s
ability to be desegregated. The principal plays a critical role as a change agent in the
desegregation process because of his/her exposure to the daily operational consequences
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of desegregation as well as his/her position between the school and larger community
forces.128
In a national study looking at desegregation, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
found that when there was opposition from leadership in implementing a desegregation
plan, there were serious disruptions in the education process. 129 When leaders are
supportive, they tend to keep the community involved in the desegregation process,
making them more accepting of desegregation.130 The principal’s immediate goal in the
desegregation process is to comply with the law while peacefully implementing the plan
developed for his/her school.131 Principals must find a way to translate Board of
Education policy into educational programming.132 The Chicago Public School
Desegregation Consent Decree was no different, as school principals needed to find a
way to implement its policies while maintaining the integrity of their academic structure.
As it relates to the Chicago Public Schools and its principals’ experiences with
desegregation, the majority of available documentation on the topic is related to the Plan
for the Implementation of Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related
To: Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education
Programs established in1977, rather than the Consent Decree itself. Many of the
guidelines and stipulations set forth in the Consent Decree such as faculty integration
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were consistent with what had been set forth in Chicago’s previous attempts at
desegregation.
In the Fall of 1977, a research team from the University of Illinois at Chicago
observed several school principals during the implementation of the faculty desegregation
plan.133 Principals were the ones solely responsible for notifying teachers of transfers and
accepting or rejecting teachers that were sent to them through the new transfer policy.134
Principals also played a part in the appeals process in the aftermath of the mass transfer
of teachers.135
Principals were asked to carry out a number of tasks that were informal in nature.
The principal often had to council teachers who he/she had inherited through the transfer
process in order to make them comfortable with their new surroundings.136 The principal
would also have to continually assess instruction, keeping a pulse of teachers’ strengths
and weaknesses to determine the best fit for his/her school.
Before principals found themselves dealing with teachers who had to cope with a
change in environment, they had to recover from their own experiences with change. The
strategy to integrate Chicago’s teaching force came right behind the transformation of the
process by which the district chose their school leaders. In the late 60’s, the Chicago
Public Schools were forced to respond to the idea that white males dominated the make133
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up of its school principals.137 By 1970, the principal selection process was changed,
providing local school councils the opportunity to select principals for schools that had
vacancies.138 While this new process brought about more black administrators to
Chicago’s schools, it also perpetuated the idea that administrators match the racial
identity of their schools.139 From the list of available principal candidates in 1966, 1968,
and 1970, not a single Black male and just two Black females had been assigned to nonBlack school buildings.140
The distribution of Chicago’s principals by race became an issue of contention
with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.141 In 1977, the principal
assignment policy was changed to move toward equalizing percentages of minority and
majority principals throughout the city.142 In order to create this equalization, roughly
eighty-two principals would be transferred to lead other schools.143
This new system of transferring principals gave the instructional leaders a new set
of circumstances about which to think. In a research study supported by the Spencer
Foundation and the National Institute of Education, it was revealed that there were three
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major areas of concern for principals involved in the transfer process: 1) faculty and staff
relationships; 2) community responsiveness; and 3) resource adequacy.144
Principals found that when they took over schools, they often found themselves in
a position where they had to prove that they were competent leaders. They also needed to
establish relationships with their staff in order to create an environment of trust. There
were many scenarios in which the incoming principal represented a different race and
sometimes a different gender than their predecessor, adding another dimension to the
teacher/principal relationship.
The same elements of change that teaching staffs had to deal with also impacted
members of the school’s local community. Some principals were met with great
community resistance because of their gender or race. Some communities were content
with the previous school leadership, and did not believe change was necessary.
While the community had to adjust to the principal, principals who found
themselves in new school settings had some adjusting to do as well. Newly transferred
principals needed support, either from the community, their staff, their colleagues, or
central office. Oftentimes, none of the resources were available, leaving principals to
fend for themselves.
Conclusion
The strategies involved in any desegregation effort require strategic maneuvers by
educational leaders. The Chicago Public School Desegregation Consent Decree is no
different, as school leaders had to be committed to making integration work. As the
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Chicago Public School District had been working to desegregate its schools for decades,
school leaders had been impacted by desegregation strategies long before the signing of
the Consent Decree. As previously stated, a lot of these strategies found their way into
the desegregation Consent Decree. Between dealing with teacher transfers, leading new
schools, dealing with resistant communities, and integrating students, the educational
leader in the Chicago Public Schools had quite a bit with which to deal. Without
question, their leadership was instrumental in implementing the desegregation Consent
Decree. Principals needed to be committed to integrating their schools and embrace the
tenets set forth by the Brown v. Board case that established that every student should
have access to same educational opportunities.
Research Question 4
According to available documentation, what supports/obstacles did the Chicago
Public Schools and educational leaders face while implementing the Consent Decree
aimed at supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision?
Findings
In order to fulfill the goals established in the Consent Decree, the Chicago Public
School District had to be willing to try many different organizational strategies such as
student busing, faculty integration, and magnet schools. The Chicago Public Schools
would experience many triumphs and defeats in its quest to desegregate its schools. Some
of the strategies supported the cause, while others may have caused more harm than
good.
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As stated in the original Consent Decree, mandatory reassignment and
transportation had to be included and funded by the Chicago Public Schools Board of
Education to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques were
insufficient to create desegregated schools.145 Although the prospect of busing was an
aggressive integration strategy, it did not come without its shortcomings. Chicago had
dealt with transportation before in their quest to develop desegregated schools.
Superintendent Benjamin Willis was highly criticized for his voluntary transfer plan
which permitted the transfer of elementary students, most of them Negro, from some of
Chicago’s most overcrowded schools.146 Part of the controversy developed because the
burden of paying for the students’ transportation rested on the parents whom oftentimes
were financially incapable of covering the cost.147 Superintendent James Redmond also
took on the issue of busing when part of his proposed desegregation plan included the
busing of over a thousand Black children to schools outside of their neighborhood.148
Effective desegregation did not happen for a number of reasons including
disinterest amongst parents, lack of private transportation, and extensive traveling time
experienced by the students.149 Superintendent Joseph Hannon’s plan attempted to avoid
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mandatory busing.150 Instead, the plan relied on a voluntary system allowing students
who were chosen through a lottery system the opportunity to attend a magnet school.
Even with the prospect of voluntary busing, the plan still had its detractors. In an article
in Illinois Issues, Doris Galik, a parent from the Gage Park neighborhood stated: “The
only thing Access to Excellence will teach us is how to ride a bus at the taxpayers’
expense.”151
The Consent Decree gave Chicago the opportunity to provide busing for those
students who were accepted into one of the city’s magnet schools. Transportation is what
allowed magnet schools to service students across the city. This in turn provided an
opportunity for magnet schools to embrace a more diverse school population, and remain
consistent with the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case.
Chicago’s population changed just as those of many other urban cities that
developed some form of integration plan for its public schools. Those schools that once
attempted to integrate their populations were now being depleted of their White students.
This plight, known as ‘White Flight”, was also evident in Chicago and its public school
system. Even though the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education thwarted all
demands for segregation in the early 1900’s, white constituents of the city and its public
schools continued to migrate outside of its boundaries.152 Before 1920, Chicago only had
one elementary school that had a student enrollment that was over 90% black, but in
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1930, twenty-three elementary schools, two junior high schools, and one high school
were over the 90% mark.153 White enrollment in the Chicago Public Schools continued to
drop totaling 34.6% of the school district in 1970, 19% in 1980, and declined an
additional 8% by 1990.154
Although the cause for white migration out of Chicago and its public schools can
be up for debate, the aftermath of it taking place made it challenging for Chicago to fully
desegregate its schools, and consequently difficult to meet the goals of the Consent
Decree. Without an equitable ratio of blacks and whites in the district, it became
increasingly difficult to support integration and furthermore carry out the goals of the
Consent Decree.
Chicago also utilized the tactic of integrating their teacher force as a means of
battling years of racial isolation in its public schools. The focus became not only to
integrate a school’s student body, but also to assure that the teaching staff was held to the
same commitment. The original Consent Decree included the following provisions with
regard to teacher assignment:
The Board will promptly implement a plan to assure that the assignment of
full-time classroom teachers to schools will be made in such a manner that
no school is identified as intended for students of a particular race, color,
or national origin.155
3.1 No later than November 1, 1981, with respect to the full-time
classroom teachers in each faculty, the racial/ethnic composition and the
proportion of experienced teachers will be between plus and minus 15
percent of the system wide proportion of such teachers with respect to
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such characteristics, and the range of educational training will be
substantially the same as exists in the system as a whole.
3.2 The Board will make every good faith effort to follow professional
staff assignment and transfer practices which, when taken together as a
whole on a frequently reviewed periodic basis, will assure that the racial
composition, the experience and the educational background of individual
school faculties and administrative staff more nearly approach the citywide proportions of minority, experienced, and more extensively trained
professional staff; provided, however, that nothing that nothing in this plan
shall require the assignment or transfer of any person to a position for
which he or she is not professionally qualified. The Board will not adopt
or follow assignment and transfer practices which will foreseeably result
in the racial identifiability of school based on faculty or administrative
staff composition or in unequal distribution of experienced and more
extensively trained staff.
5.3The failure of a particular school or schools to meet the guidelines will
not constitute noncompliance with the above guidelines if the district
provides a detailed satisfactory explanation justifying such failure to meet
guidelines.156
Despite Chicago’s efforts to integrate its teaching faculty, school leaders still
found it to be an unlikely task for various reasons. Beverly Tunney, president of the
Chicago Principals Association stated, “Principals have had difficulty integrating schools
and filling positions because of distance and safety concerns.” “…in Chicago, we have a
teacher shortage. “We are finding it very difficult to get qualified teachers in the
classrooms due to the integration guidelines.”157
Chicago Public Schools still operated in racial isolation with over half of its
schools being out of compliance with faculty guidelines on race.158 In September 1980,
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29% of schools were out of compliance compared to 59% twenty years later.159 There
were proposed changes to these guidelines on Wednesday, November 15, 2000 when
school board members voted unanimously to loosen guidelines for racial composition of
faculty at individual schools.160 Former guidelines required schools to have faculties that
required plus or minus 15% with the new plan expanding that number to 25%.161
Faculty integration of Chicago Public School’s teaching force appeared to be an
elusive goal. Whether it was teachers’ negative experiences with the process, the lack of
available teachers or principal’s hiring practices, achieving the faculty integration portion
of the Consent Decree remained a feat. Just as student integration proved to be a difficult
task for the Chicago Public Schools, developing teaching faculties that would be more
racially balanced also brought about some complications. The Chicago Public Schools
needed to have other strategies in place. One of them would be the development of
Magnet Schools.
Chicago, just as many other urban school districts, saw the implementation of
magnet schools as a viable option to help desegregate its schools. It was thought that if
special schools were an option, children from all over the city would be attracted to
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them.162 As a result, schools would have a multiracial student body in a system that had
too many racially isolated schools.163
The concept of magnet schools represents another strategy the Chicago Public
Schools put into place in order to help desegregate its schools. These schools provided an
alternative to the traditional neighborhood school, attracting students from all across the
city with varying racial backgrounds. Historically, these magnets have often represented
some of Chicago’s highest performing and most diverse schools. Although these schools
had populations that reflected what was set forth in the Consent Decree and seemed to be
consistent with the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case, other schools in the city
were quickly dealing with the prospect of all their work to promote integration being
undone. Chicago Public Schools were facing the concept of resegregation.
Even with all of the efforts school districts made to desegregate their faculties and
student bodies, the goal of fully desegregating schools still seemed elusive. As time
passed the commitment to the tenets of the Brown v. Board case became less of a priority.
This created an environment that provided an opportunity for schools systems to
experience the concept of resegregation.
The Supreme Court ruled in the Oklahoma v. Dowell of 1991, that the
desegregation orders set forth as a result of the Brown decision were temporary.164 The
Oklahoma v. Dowell ruling allowed local school districts to return to a system of
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neighborhood schools even in areas where residential segregation would require school
children to attend either predominantly white or predominantly black schools.165 In the
Missouri v. Jenkins case in 1995, the Court determined that Kansas could end its
desegregation plan if it could not be proven that its neighborhood school system
intentionally promoted racial discrimination.166 Supreme Court decisions such as these
made a strong contribution to the resegregation of many of our Nation’s public school
systems.167
The Chicago Public Schools also had issues with the concept of resegregation.
Despite their efforts, the Chicago Public Schools still managed to be segregated. A
perfect example of this was Chicago’s magnet schools, schools designed to bring about
diversity. In the late eighties, during the peak of Chicago’s magnet programs, twenty-five
out of twenty-eight elementary magnet schools were racially mixed without a
predominant racial group.168 Twenty-two of these schools ranked among the top one
hundred elementary schools.169 In 2008, only ten of the existing twenty-seven magnet
schools were racially mixed, with the remaining seventeen being either predominantly
Black or Latino.170
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This trend was also evident in Chicago’s selective enrollment high-schools. While
African Americans made up half of the Chicago Public School’s student population, they
only represented 29% of the student body in selective enrollment high-schools.171 This
represented an 8% drop from the African American student population that was enrolled
in these schools twelve year ago, with the biggest drops being in Chicago’s highest
performing schools: Young, Jones, Lane, Payton, and Northside Prep.172
As the make-up of Chicago’s population shifted, so did the students to which the
City of Chicago served. The less diverse the student population became, the more
difficult it became to desegregate schools. This dilemma made it difficult for Chicago and
its school system to meet the criteria set forth in the Consent Decree and to remain
committed to the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case.
The financing of past desegregation projects had proven to be costly, and in
Chicago’s case it would be no different. Funding would serve as an obstacle for the
Chicago Public Schools and its educational leaders while implementing the Consent
Decree.
In 1980, the Chicago Public Schools would enter into the Consent Decree which
we would keep them away from any litigation.173 The Consent Decree was approved,
providing the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education not only a viable solution to
student desegregation, but also to areas that hindered their eligibility for federal funding

171

Ibid.

172

Ibid.

173

United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 1980.

228
such as classroom integration, bilingual program staffing, and faculty assignment.174
Section 15 of the Original Consent Decree directly addresses the issue of funding as it
relates to fulfilling the Consent Decree’s obligations.
Section 15 states:
15.1 Each party is obligated to make every good faith effort to find and
provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the
implementation of the desegregation plan.
15.2 Each party reserves the right to seek to add additional parties who
may be legally obligated to contribute to the cost of the desegregation
plan.
15.3 The parties recognize that financial cost of implementation does not
excuse the failure to develop a desegregation plan consistent with the
principals set forth in 55 2-14, and is not a basis for postponement,
cancellation or curtailment of implementation of the plan after it has been
finally adopted, but is one legitimate consideration of practicability in
meeting the objective in 2.1.175
The question became if these provisions set forth in the Consent Decree required
financial assistance from the federal government.176 This debate would be decided in the
United States v. Board of Education case when federal district Judge Milton I. Shadur
ruled that the United States was obligated to provide assistance.177 The Chicago Public
Schools sought payment from the federal government because they believed that the
language in the Consent Decree entitled them to government funds.178 Judge Shadur’s
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ruling required that the federal government provide $103.8 million dollars to assist in
Chicago’s desegregation efforts.179 The school board requested $114 million for its
schools, but Judge Shadur believed that some of the programs the board requested did not
meet the legal requirements of materially aiding desegregation.180
The U.S. Justice Department was unhappy with Judge Shadur’s decision.
President Reagan and his administration appealed the judge’s decision that would require
the federal government to pay $14.6 million dollars for the 1983-84 school year and as
much as $250 million dollars over the next five years.181 The government’s position was
developed from the Reagan Administration’s policy decision to reduce the government
funding made available to school districts.182 Reagan’s Administration was responsible
for phasing out the Emergency School Aid Act, the primary resource of federal aid
designed to help school districts undergoing desegregation.183 On July 13, 1983 the
Justice Department filed papers with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stating that the previous judgment constituted an unwarranted interference and intrusion
upon the discretion vested in officials in the executive branch.184 The Justice
Department’s disgust was articulated in its seeking an Order to Stay the proceedings.
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Part of the Department of Justice’s argument was that funding Chicago’s
desegregation project would take funding from other school districts trying to
desegregate their schools. This made it an issue of equity, questioning whether it was an
equitable decision to provide so much support to one single school district. The
Department of Justice also challenged the amount that the Chicago Public Schools was
requiring to implement its desegregation plan. They believed that the amount was
unwarranted, and would be used elsewhere rather than to desegregate their school system.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sided with the Department of
Justice, finding that Judge Shakur misinterpreted the provisions set forth in the 1980
Consent Decree.185 A three judge appellate panel found that the Consent Decree does not
require the federal government to lobby the Congress for desegregation funds for
Chicago but only requires that the Chicago Public School system receive “top of the line
priority” for funds from Educational Department accounts that can be used for
desegregation purposes.186 Chicago would be forced to cut some of its programs and
staff, eliminating $20 million dollars from its desegregation budget.187
Conclusion
The Chicago Public School’s quest to desegregate its schools was not easy. Some
of the strategies that were implemented would not prove to be successful. The prospect of
faculty integration became difficult tasks due to a lack of qualified teaching staff. This
would often put a strain on school principals, hindering their ability to hire certain staff
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members because of their race. School funding also became an issue. Since the
desegregation process is an expensive one, cuts in government support made it difficult to
continue some of the supports that were in place to help with the desegregation efforts.
Some of the barriers that got in the way of Chicago’s desegregation efforts were
beyond its control. A high percentage of White students leaving the school district made
it difficult to integrate the student body of many of the Chicago Public Schools. There
have been many theories to why large amounts of White students leave school districts
after desegregation efforts, but regardless of what the reasoning may be, the reality is that
the non-presence of White students made it difficult to create an integrated educational
setting.
Not all of Chicago’s efforts proved unsuccessful in the desegregation process. The
implementation of magnet schools created an opportunity for students to be educated in a
diverse environment while receiving a high quality education. The magnet school concept
utilized busing to assure that students from across the city had an opportunity to attend.
Chicago’s efforts to fulfill the goals of the Consent Decree brought the school
district closer to embracing the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. Although
some of the strategies would be problematic, the focus would remain the same. The
Chicago Public Schools would need to continue to assure that all of its students had the
same opportunity to achieve a quality education.
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Research Question 5
What implications does the implementation of the Consent Decree aimed at
meeting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision have on current and future
educational leadership?
Findings
Twenty-nine years after the proposal of the Consent Decree, U.S. Judge Charles
Kocoras has ended the federal mandate requiring the district to integrate its schools.188
Experts now wonder whether with all of Chicago’s efforts, if integration had ever been
really achieved.189 District officials state that they will start from scratch developing an
equitable system, possibly using socio-economic factors as a determinant rather than
race.190
When determining how the implementation of the Consent Decree will affect both
current and future leaders, the researcher categorized the Consent Decree’s history into
three facets: 1) prelude to the Consent Decree, 2) the Implementation of the Consent
Decree, and 3) beyond the Consent Decree. The section entitled, “The Prelude to the
Consent Decree”, examines how the Consent Decree occurred. It will recount how
Chicago operated its schools in violation of the Brown case and illustrate what current
and future educational leaders can learn from these mistakes. The section entitled, “The
Implementation of the Consent Decree” looks at how the Consent Decree was
implemented, recounting some of the strategies used to meet the goals set forth by the
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Consent Decree, and providing the opportunity for current and future educational leaders
to learn from these strategies. The final section entitled, “Beyond the Consent Decree”,
looks at how current and future leaders will be affected now that the Consent Decree has
ended.
Conclusion
The Prelude to the Consent Decree
The Consent Decree took place because Chicago’s school district supported the
segregation of its schools. This was far removed from what was established in the Brown
v. Board case. Brown v. Board established that separate facilities could not be considered
as equal. More specifically, the Brown case referred to educational facilities that were
separated by race that did not offer the same set of resources and opportunities for
students.
The first lesson current and future educational leaders must learn is that the
creation of the Consent Decree was rooted out of Chicago’s inability to embrace what
had been established in the Brown v. Board decision. They must then make a
commitment to incorporate the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case within their
own leadership practices, staying true to the idea of educating all children equally.
Thomas Sergiovanni, author of the book, Moral Leadership discusses the concept
of the heart, head, and hand of leadership. In short, the heart represents what a person
believes in, the head represents what a person learns over time, and the hand represents
the decision a person makes based on the knowledge a person has from the heart and the
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head. This concept can be effectively applied to educational leaders and their experience
with external forces such as the Consent Decree.
Most school leaders came in with what they felt in their heart as it relates to the
Consent Decree. They did not like it due to the fact they did not comprehend its
importance. They then relied on their head, which told them that the Consent Decree
affected their hiring practices and allowed students to transfer from their schools. When it
came to using their hand to drive their decisions, it would be done with resentment due to
the experiences of the heart and the head. The reality is that the information available to
the head does not tell the whole story. Leaders are influenced to make decisions without a
full scope of information. By understanding the importance of the Brown decision, and
the fact the Consent Decree is in place because its tenets were violated, the current and
future educational leader will have accurate information to help him/her better inform
his/her decisions. It is with this new found information that school leaders can strive for
equality amongst all students.
Chicago went through several initiatives in an attempt to desegregate its schools,
all to no avail. Some established moderate success, but none to the level that satisfied the
federal government. Each effort was spearheaded by an educational leader that brought
with him/her their own sense of commitment to the desegregation efforts. Some believed
it to be a more worthy cause than others. Lesson two for current and future leaders is to
be aware of their own biases and understand the importance of a school environment that
provides equal opportunities. Gareth Morgan, in his book, Images of an Organization,
refers to an organization becoming a “psychic prison.” In this case, it would refer to a
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leader becoming a slave to his/her own vision. Benjamin Willis was so committed to the
neighborhood school concept, that he was oblivious to how it affected Blacks and
minorities who were forced to be educated in substandard conditions. Joseph Hannon
provides a similar example, remaining steadfast on the idea that mandatory desegregation
efforts were bad. In his case his commitment to solely voluntary methods of
desegregation consequently became the demise of his desegregation plan.
By looking at how the Consent Decree came into existence, the current and future
educational leader can see how education can lose its focus. As we are committed to
educating all students, we should do so on an equal basis providing students the same
opportunities to achieve academic success. Current and future leaders cannot allow their
own biases to get in the way of educating children. It is the responsibility of school
leaders to embrace every student that walks through their doors, ensuring them the best
educational experience possible.
The Implementation of the Consent Decree
The Consent Decree put specific goals in place to attempt to rid the Chicago
Public Schools of its history with segregated schools. The goals set forth were consistent
with the tenets that came out of the Brown v. Board case. In order for these goals to be
achieved, the school district would have to implement several different strategies. Some
of these strategies were not received well by either the community or school staff.
Principals often found that they were attempting to carry out Board driven initiatives that
they believed had an adverse effect on their schools. Those that handled these situations
positively often weathered the storm and were able to achieve some success in the
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desegregation process. Those who were negative often found that their educational
programs suffered. Lesson three for current and future leaders is that they must
understand that the effectiveness of an educational initiative often rests in their hands. If a
staff member perceives his/her leader as disliking something, he/she too will look at it
with disgust. If an educational leader looks at an initiative positively, his/her staff will be
more apt to put in the effort to make it successful. Current and future leaders need to
understand the importance of students being provided equal opportunities in education,
and assure that those who they supervise understand this concept as well. In order to
accomplish this, leaders must be aware that the change process can be difficult. Often
people are afraid to move away from what they are comfortable with. Leaders must
attempt to show empathy and create an environment that embraces change as a means of
getting better.
The Consent Decree offered an alternative for schools that would remain racially
isolated. These particular schools would benefit from additional programming that would
be implemented to assure the same quality education as those schools that were able to
operate with a more diverse student body.
The fact that schools still operate in racial isolation requires current and future
leaders to reanalyze the tenets set forth by the Brown v. Board case. The popular
sentiment is that the Brown v. Board case established that separate facilities could not be
equal. This worked under the premise that minority students were denied education
alongside their white counterparts because of their race. It also considered that when
facilities were separated, they were done so in an unjust way with minorities suffering the
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most. The provision established in the Consent Decree worked behind the premise that a
school cannot be integrated because of the segregated neighborhood to which it resides. It
is not to say that these particular school buildings are not open to all races. With a high
proportion of minority students compared to the district’s white population of students, it
became increasingly difficult to integrate all of the Chicago Public Schools. In these
instances the district would provide additional programming to benefit its minority
students.
Current and future leaders must remember that the Brown v. Board case
established that all students should have an equal opportunity to be educated with the
access to the same facilities and resources. When students cannot share the same
facilities, it is important to first assure that it is not due to discriminatory practices. It is
the responsibility of school leaders to embrace every student that walks through their
doors, ensuring each of them the best educational experience possible.
Beyond the Consent Decree
After decades of struggling with the prospect of desegregating its schools, the
Chicago Public School District has finally been removed from government supervision.
The Consent Decree has come to an end with the future of desegregating Chicago’s
schools still up in the air. Many question what was the point, and if any good came out of
it. Schools in the Chicago Public Schools are still often recognized by race with racially
isolated schools representing the majority of the Chicago Public Schools.
Now more than ever, current and future educational leaders need to be committed
to educating our students. Leaders must remind themselves of the injustices that went on
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before the signing of the Consent Decree, and make certain that it is not allowed to
happen again. Lesson four for current and future educational leaders is that they must
take it upon themselves to create an educational environment that embraces all students
regardless of race, color, or religion. When in an isolated setting, current and future
leaders must be committed to providing their students the same opportunities as those
who are educated in more diverse settings.
What has changed is now current and future leaders must build off the foundation
created by tenets of Brown v. Board, and enforced with events such as the Consent
Decree. Current and future leaders must move to provide equitable environments for
students rather than just equal accommodations. At this point, equality is not the answer.
In order to achieve equity, current and future educational leaders must continually
advocate for the needs of children.
It will be the responsibility of current and future educational leaders to guarantee
that all students are given access to the resources needed to be successful. These leaders
may represent the only advocates these students have. It is important that current and
future educational leaders take this responsibility seriously; making it an obligation rather
than something they were told to do. No longer are the days where the Chicago Public
School District will need to work in fear of court sanctions due to non-compliance as it
relates to issue of segregation. Will the Chicago Public Schools still do the right thing?
The reality is it won’t be up to them; rather it is in the hands of our current and future
educational leaders.
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Recommendations for Further Research
This study was limited to using available documentation to provide an historical
analysis documenting the discriminatory practices responsible for the Consent Decree’s
origin, the goals established within the Consent Decree itself, the strategies used to
implement the decree’s goals, the supports and obstacles that effected the decree’s
implementation, and the effect of the decree’s implementation on current and future
leaders. Additional research could be done in a variety of ways. A researcher could
study:
1.) principals’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the Consent Decree;
2.) the effect of the Consent Decree on the academic achievement of minority
students; and
3.) a comparison of the effect of desegregation efforts on urban school districts.
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